Gary,
I think that you're right in suggesting that it's probably not a good
idea to mix creation myths and the like--even Peirce's "non-scientific"
early cosmological musings--with emergent or evolutionary theory. I
would suggest, however, that such ideas do have semiotic and
metaphysical significance for Peirce (say, as much as Big Bang theory
has in the physical theories of some). Nonetheless, I would tend to
agree with this statement:
GF: Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in the
constraints imposed by an emergent system on the processes it has
emerged from (and still depends on for its existence). For instance, the
self-organization of the brain emerges from the constant chaotic “firing”
of individual neurons, yet it organizes itself by imposing constraints
on them, and it's the latter part of this circle that is “top-down”.
This is indeed “from the whole to the parts” but not in the sense where
the “whole” is the world of possibilities and actualities are parts.
GR: Still, the question remains: whence the greater system? Sometimes
this strikes me as one of those "chicken or egg" conundrums (I see
Deacon wrestling with this too, but in an entirely different way). So,
what can be 'built up' or 'emerge' or 'evolve' occurs in a systemic
context (as the result of the reciprocal relations within a system--and
as the system) and within an Umwelt. In any event, I'll look forward to
your further thoughts regarding " the connection between Thirdness and
reciprocality."
As to your thoughts as to an approach for reflecting on Deacon's book in
the forum, I think your ideas are excellent. So let's continue to toss
this around a bit and see what we list members come up with. You and I
seem in agreement that *Incomplete Science* represents some
extraordinary research with implications for semiotics generally, and
reaching, perhaps, even beyond biosemiotics. My own sense is that I'll
be studying and reflecting on this book for many years to come.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
>>> Gary Fuhrman 01/11/12 7:50 AM >>>
Gary,
I've been wondering myself how to approach Deacon's book on this list
and was hoping you would have the answers. :-) All i can suggest is a
post or two that would explain why the book would be worth reading --
perhaps introducing some of Deacon's most crucial innovations, such as
the concepts of orthograde and contragrade change -- and then proceed
directly to the explicitly semiotic aspects of the book. Certainly we
can't do some kind of slow read that would cover his whole account of
emergence, so i would suggest that we cut directly to the semiotic chase
and then deal with questions as they arise, rather than build the whole
theory from the ground up as the book does. I think Deacon's theory fits
into a line of thinking that will be familiar to some members of the
list -- people like John Collier -- but fills in some of the gaps in
earlier versions of the story. Those to whom it's all new will just have
to read the book in order to follow what we're saying about it, if
they're interested.
For now, just one comment on this:
GR: [[ There are places in Peirce (for example, near the conclusion of
the 1898 Cambridge Lectures (the so-called "cosmological lectures")
where he argues (the 'blackboard' analogy) that there is a vague general
character (the blackboard) out of which the three categories emerge.
This is 'top-down' thinking in Deacon's and Fernandez's terms (and
'top-down' causality too==from the whole to the parts; categorially,
from thirdness to firstness). So, "the world of possibilities" within
that vague generality, so to speak. ]]
If everything emerges out of this vagueness, then it would be the “top”
in some schemas — like the Ein Sof in Kabbalah, the supernal out of
which everything emanates — but i think “top-down” in Dneuroscience of circular
causality, is just the opposite, where the
primal is the bottom or ground, while the top is the highest emergent
level. Top-down causation, like Aristotelian formal cause, consists in
the constraints imposed by an emergent system on the processes it has
emerged from (and still depends on for its existence). For instance, the
self-organization of the brain emerges from the constant chaotic “firing”
of individual neurons, yet it organizes itself by imposing constraints
on them, and it's the latter part of this circle that is “top-down”.
This is indeed “from the whole to the parts” but not in the sense where
the “whole” is the world of possibilities and actualities are parts.
More later when i've clarified (for myself) the connection between
Thirdness and reciprocality.
Gary F.
} No wise fish would go anywhere without a porpoise. [the Mock Turtle] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
-----Original Message-----
Sent: January-10-12 1:52 PM
Gary, List,
Gary F. wrote: It's just occurred to me that there's another reciprocal
pair of semiotic principles [. . . ]: (1) All thought is in signs
(EP1:24), and (2) All signs are in thought [. . .]. Of course "one must
not take a nominalistic view of Thought as if it were something that a
man had in his consciousness. ... It is we that are in it, rather than
it in any of us” (CP 8.256; see also EP2:269, etc.) -- and the same goes
for this usage of "mental". Biosemiotics would seem to be rooted in the
principle that all living beings are "in thought" in this Peircean
sense.
GR: This immediately brought to my mind the passage from 'Prolegomena to
an Apology for Pragmaticism' where the concepts of quasi-mind,
quasi-utterer, and quasi-interpretant are introduced, the beginning of
it speaking directly to the matter as biosemiotics views it. Peirce
writes:
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and
one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
shapes, etc., of objects are really there [, , , ] Not only is thought
in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a
General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought
without Signs. We must here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but
not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that
connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that
there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two
Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these
two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must
nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded.
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a
necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be
dialogic (from Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism', CP 4.551,
1906)
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/quasiinterpreter.html
You continued:
GF: [. . . ]some of the implications of this thought/sign reciprocity
have yet to be fully explored (if they can ever be fully explored!) ...
indeed they are related to the subject of Intelligence Augmentation
which the still current slow read is dealing with.
GR: I'm not exactly sure what you have in mind here, Gary, but I hope,
perhaps when Peter continues the IA slow-read, that you'll explicate
your thinking here. You immediately continued:
GF: They are also related to Terrence Deacon's observation in
_Incomplete Nature_ that recursive or reciprocal processes are essential
to teleodynamics and thus to life and sentience. I'm wondering now
whether a reciprocal relation between *different* recursive loops is
essential to Thirdness itself. Perhaps we can take this up along with
Deacon's book.
GR: For those not familiar with Deacon's book, here is the definition
of 'teleodynamics as it appears in his GTeleodynamics: A form of dynamical
organization exhibiting
end-directedness and consequence-organized features that is constituted
by the co-creation, complementary constraint, and reciprocal synergy of
two or more strongly coupled morphodynamic processes (Incomplete Nature,
552)
GR: Here 'morphodynamic' refers to dynamical organizing tending
spontaneously to more and more organization over time. My first thoughts
on your comment above is that (1) I think it is indeed likely that
"recursive or reciprocal processes are essential to teleodynamics and
thus to life and sentience," while (2) I'm must less likely to imagine
that "a reciprocal relation between *different* recursive loops is
essential to Thirdness itself." But, again, these are just first
reactions.
The second, re: "essential to Thirdness," may be the consequence of my
discussing a related matter with a scholarly friend not in the Peirce
forum, but who is now reading Deacon's book. My correspondent wrote of "
'the world of possibilitchance that must be accounted for as
originating."
My comment in response to this was:
GR: "There are places in Peirce (for example, near the conclusion of the
1898 Cambridge Lectures (the so-called "cosmological lectures") where he
argues (the 'blackboard' analogy) that there is a vague general
character (the blackboard) out of which the three categories emerge.
This is 'top-down' thinking in Deacon's and Fernandez's terms (and
'top-down' causality too==from the whole to the parts; categorially,
from thirdness to firstness). So, "the world of possibilities" within
that vague generality, so to speak."
My tendency has been to see that 'vague generality' (the Tohu Bohu, or,
in Egyptian mythology, the dark Nun out of which arise all the
principles and powers of nature, the neteru) as primal. How would
firstness--not to mention mere chains of secondness--ever bring about
thirdness if it weren't there from the outset? But perhaps this
pre-scientific isn't exactly to your (and Deacon's) point, so I'll have
to reflect further on it.
In any event, I'm wondering how to go about commencing a discussion of
*Incomplete Nature* in the forum. I certainly wouldn't expect many on
the list to have a copy (although there are two members whom I know do
since I sent it to them as a holiday gift), or to buy it (although for
its length--602 pages including the Glossary, Notes, and Index--it's
quite reasonably priced, the e-version going for $16, the hard-copy
version for under $20--it retails for $29). But the length itself
presents another problem (I've been encouraging folk to start with the
Peircean 6th chapter, "Constraint," but the entire work is breakthrough
in my opinion). I know that Eliseo Fernadez's Kansas City based Peirce
discussion group is now reading portions of Incomplete Nature, and I'll
contact him and Deacon perhaps later this week for any thoughts they
might have on taking up a discussion of the book online. Meanwhile, I'd
be interested if you and anyone on the list have any suggestions as to
how to proceed in consideration of a list discussion of Incomplete
Nature. I'm hoping that Deacon will at least allow us to post some
excerpts from the book, but of course copyright considerations might
severely limit the length of those excerpts.
Best,
Gary
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