Very interesting - thanks, Phyllis!
Cathy

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 8:47 AM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
> Gary, Cathy and Listers,
>
> I have been a Peirce-list lurker for some time and have enjoyed reading
> discussions. Until I finished galley proofs for my latest book I did not
> allow myself to post. I have a short window here before I have to clean up
> my next book and send it in.
>
> Yes, Cathy, we have been applying these concepts to human subjects since
> 1978 when the non-verbal assessment was first developed, first in school
> settings and in day treatment programs (mostly for adolescents). We began
> applying the assessments in business settings in 1986 by performing
> site-specific validations. In 2002, we received a grant to begin formal
> validity and reliability studies; these were performed at the University of
> Oregon decision sciences center. The study found very high inter-rater
> reliability and good re-test reliability (though the re-tests were performed
> too close to the original for us to feel comfortable with those results).
> Discriminate validity studies found a strong correlation between different
> non-verbal thinking processes and The Need for Cognition Scale, which is a
> paper and pencil questionnaire that addresses intellectual curiosity.
>
> However, thoroughgoing validity studies will require operational
> evaluations, which is why Jayne and I wrote this new book: Relational
> Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing inference patterns for
> computational modeling.
>
> This information should be a useful platform for developing predictive
> models of the operations and outcomes of human systems and programs modeled
> on human systems. We refer throughout the book to E. David Ford's book:
> Scientific Method for Ecological Research. It is a thoroughly Peircean guide
> to researching complex open systems, as are eco-systems. These patterns will
> require a similar approach. We are hoping to interest someone(s) with
> research/computer modeling backgrounds (which neither of us possess) to
> carry on this work.
>
> Regards,
> Phyllis
>
> BTW Cathy: I see that you are in Auckland. My husband and I love New
> Zealand! We visited our daughter and her family there (Torbay, to be exact)
> during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Catherine Legg
> Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
> Induction
>
> Phyllis I also want to say how nice it is to have you back on the list!
>
> The research into the three types of problem-solving which you outline
> below is fascinating. Would you like to say a little more about how
> you derived these results - you seem to have experimented with live
> human subjects, but how / where /when?
>
> Best regards, Cathy
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2012 at 5:32 PM, Phyllis Chiasson <ath...@olympus.net> wrote:
>> This discussion is interesting to me, as Jayne Tristan and I address this
>> issue from a different perspective in our upcoming book (available in
> April
>> from IGI Global).
>>
>> When thinking about the categories from the perspective of habitual
>> (automatic, non-deliberate applications), we notice that abductive-like
>> Relational thinkers tend to spend quite a bit of time in a sort of
>> exploratory phenomenological messing about (Firstness) before beginning to
>> juxtapose (Secondness) things together. They operate as Peirce describes a
>> phenomenologist ought to do. Often the process of juxtaposing and
>> re-juxtaposing takes even longer and returns them back to more
>> phenomenological exploration, so that before deciding upon what ought to
> be
>> represented (if they ever do), they consider many potential possibilities
>> and relationships. Based upon many years of observation by means of a
>> non-verbal assessment, very few people operate this way and almost all of
>> them use qualitative induction (which is also observable) as they proceed.
>>
>> On the other hand, Deductive-like thinkers, who tend to be analytical in
>> nature, determine options, qualities, possibilities, etc. relatively
>> quickly, but spend quite a bit of time relating elements before
> determining
>> a plan for representing these. Because they do not engage significantly in
>> the exploratory stage (Firstness), once they decide their general goal,
> all
>> of further choices are limited to those that will be most appropriate for
>> achieving that goal. These individuals shut down the discovery process,
>> except for often clever or ingenious adaptations that help them achieve
> the
>> general goal. They are naturally complex thinkers, but without the
>> abductive-like goal generating process, their goals are necessarily
>> derivative.
>>
>> Crude inductive-like (Direct) thinkers quickly apprehend a terminal goal
> and
>> apply familiar methods for achieving it, so that they are neither
>> exploratory, nor analytical. Instead, they jump almost immediately to
>> representation, which means that they tend to produce direct copies of
>> something they have seen, learned, copied, or previously done. Given
>> sufficient intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
>> students in many fields.
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
>> Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
>> Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
>> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
>> Induction
>>
>> GR = Gary Richmond
>> JD = Jonathan DeVore
>>
>> JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
>>     think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
>>     fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
>>     will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
>>     under consideration -- without being mutually exclusive.
>>
>> JD: So while 3rdnss is prominent and predominant in deduction,
>>     there is also an element of compulsion by which one is forced
>>     to a particular conclusion.  That compulsive element could be
>>     thought of as the 2ndness of deduction -- which is put to good
>>     use by the predominantly mediated character of deduction: i.e.,
>>     it serves as the sheriff to the court (of law).
>>
>> GR: I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.
>>
>> I agree with Gary that this point is well taken.
>>
>> If we understand Peirce's categories in relational rather then
> non-relative
>> terms,
>> that is to say, as a matter of the minimum arity required to model a
>> phenomenon,
>> then all semiotic phenomena, all species of inference and types of
>> reasoning,
>> are basically category three.
>>
>> Nevertheless, many triadic phenomena are known to be "degenerate" in the
>> formal sense
>> that monadic and dyadic relations can account for many of their properties
>> relatively
>> well, at least, for many practical purposes.  That recognition allows the
>> categorical
>> question to be re-framed in ways that can be answered through normal
>> scientific means.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> --
>>
>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>> mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
>> word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>>
>>
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