Gary, Ben, Jon, Gary, I think you got this just right.
Best, Gary R. On 3/9/12, Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Ben, Jon and list, > > I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me > that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in > question, Peirce does NOT use the term "Categories" in reference to what he > elsewhere calls categories, or "elements" of the phaneron, or even sometimes > "universes" -- i.e. the triad of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. > > The "Prolegomena" is all about diagrams, specifically Existential Graphs, > and the purpose of these diagrams is to facilitate the analysis of > propositions. The first use of the term in the Prolegomena, namely CP > 4.544-5: > > [[[ As for Indices, their utility especially shines where other Signs > fail.... But of superior importance in Logic is the use of Indices to denote > Categories and Universes, which are classes that, being enormously large, > very promiscuous, and known but in small part, cannot be satisfactorily > defined, and therefore can only be denoted by Indices. Such, to give but a > single instance, is the collection of all things in the Physical > Universe.... > > Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category > are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of > Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of > Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe > the two correctly is a question for careful study. ]]] > > Peirce then proceeds to take up the question of Universes, returning to > Categories much later, in the passage Jon quoted; and he begins by saying > that he prefers the term "Predicaments" for classes of predicates, no doubt > because this avoids confusing them "with the different Modes of Being" which > are elsewhere called "categories. And indeed he never mentions "Categories" > again in this very long article; nor does he make any explicit reference in > the whole article to Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness. I can only conclude > that the passage you quoted from it, Jon, tells us nothing about *those* > "categories", which i guess are the ones you referred to as "Peirce's > categories." The connection between them and the triad of first, second and > third *intentions* is very tenuous, as i think Peirce indicates by saying > that his thoughts about the latter triad are "not yet harvested" -- > something he could hardly say in 1906 about his phaneroscopic "categories". > > Gary F. > > } We are circumveiloped by obscuritads. [Finnegans Wake 244] { > > www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce > > > -----Original Message----- > From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On > Behalf Of Jon Awbrey > Sent: March-08-12 11:05 PM > > Ben & All, > > I see that I omitted to give my initial thoughts on that last paragraph of > yours, so let me do that now. > > BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are > "different in the different Modes of Being"? Where in his other > writings does he call his own categories "predicates of predicates"? > It's hard not to think that by "Predicates of Predicates" he does not > mean his own categories, and instead that, at most, 1st-intentional, > 2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional entities, on which he says that > his "thoughts are not yet harvested," will end up being treated by him > as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds — instances or applications of his > categories. > > There is nothing very exotic about predicates of predicates. We use them > all the time without taking much notice of the fact or bothering to describe > them as such. > For example, terms like "monadic", "dyadic", "triadic" are predicates of > predicates. > When a phenomenon requires a k-adic predicate or a k-adic relation for its > adequate description, we say that the phenomenon has "k-ness". So category > k is the category of phenomena that need k-adic predicates or relations for > their adequate description. > > When it comes to what Peirce means here by "Modes of Being", I guess I had > assumed from the words he used — Actuality, Possibility, Destiny — that he > was talking about the traditional triad of modalities, but I'm not so sure > about that now. At any rate, those would not be the first words that come > to mind when I think of the categories. I am more used to the paradigm of > Quality, Reaction, Representation and its later variants, and the only way I > could force an association would be by interpreting those modes of being, or > modalities, if that is what they are, in relational terms. Shy of that, I > have the feeling that Peirce could talk us into any given order he chose on > any given day ex tempore. > > But maybe my readings will bring more light tomorrow ... > > Regards, > > Jon > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > -- Gary Richmond Humanities Department Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College--City University of New York --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. 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