Steven, This seems to be a plausible judgment of contemporary scene, if a sparse one. If I continue with this, then might I ask exactly what constitutes being a scientific dualist on your view? I would agree that many contemporary positions are prima facie crypto-dualist, if that is what you mean, a hypothesis that would be verified or not in individual cases (thinkers). However, when I claim that of a view and indicate why, they always reject the view, and about the only widespread commonality that I've seen is a rejection of scholastic realism (realism about universals) and of continuity (synechism).
Best, Jason On Thu, Mar 29, 2012 at 12:01 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <ste...@iase.us>wrote: > Dear Cathy, > > "Non-Peirceans," if you will forgive the over simplification, are in two > camps: > > 1. the religious dualist, > 2. the scientific dualist. > > Often they are in both. > > One does not know how to ground what Peirce calls "Thirdness" (more > generally, "the mind") in their conception of "God," the other does not > know how to ground Thirdness in their conception of Physics. > In-other-words, there are two dogmas working against the Peircean. > > It produces precisely the problem that Stanley Fish alludes to, and that I > respond to (see my comment at the bottom of the page), here: > > Citing Chapter and Verse: Which Scripture Is the Right One? > > http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/citing-chapter-and-verse-which-scripture-is-the-right-one/?comments#permid=72 > > This is a reference to an article that Stephen Rose gave a few days ago. > > Peirce's objection to the "Russelization" of logic is relevant here, > because the eradication of "psychologism" placed "the mind" (esp. > "Thirdness") beyond the reach of 20th Century science and logic. > > It has become clear to me that Charles Peirce, and his father Benjamin, > did indeed conceive of the mind, and in particular what Charles called > "Thirdness," as grounded in both a conception of "God" and a conception of > Physics. Now I rush to add that, despite the language of the time, this > "God" conception is not the usual one but one that is really "non-theistic" > in the modern sense, in that it is without personification and clearly not > the god of popular western conception. > > This, in my view, is the proper way to interpret the apparent > contradiction in this matter when it is naively read into Benjamin Peirce's > "Ideality in the physical sciences" and in the writings of Charles Peirce. > Their view is more like that of Taoism than Judeao-Christianity (although > it maintains the passion of the later). > > So, in presenting Peirce's view in relation to contemporary arguments it > is important, I think, to highlight these points and challenge the dogma. > If you do, then Peircean concerns and questions may become more clear to > the audience unfamiliar with them. > > With respect, > Steven > > > -- > Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith > Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering > http://iase.info > > > > > > > > On Mar 29, 2012, at 2:08 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: > > > Gary R wrote: > > * > >>> For my own part, I tend--as perhaps Jon does as well--to see > > esthetic/ethics/logic as semeiotic as being in genuine tricategorial > > relation so that they *inform* each other in interesting ways. > Trichotomic > > vector theory, then, does not demand that one necessarily always follow > > the order: 1ns (esthetic), then 2ns (ethics), then 3ns (logic). One may > > also look at the three involutionally (logic involves ethics which, in > > turn, involves esthetic) or, even, according to the vector of > > representation (logic shows esthetic to be in that particular relation to > > ethics which Peirce holds them to be in). But only a very few scholars > > have taken up tricategorial vector relations. Indeed, R. J. Parmentier > and > > I are the only folk I know of who have published work on possible paths > of > > movement (vectors) through a genuine trichotomic relation which does > *not* > > follow the Hegelian order: 1ns then 2ns then 3ns. > > > > This is very interesting, thanks Gary :-) > > > >>> Indeed, with a few exceptions, there appears at present to be > > relatively little interest in Peirce's categories generally speaking. > > Given the way they pervade his scientific and philosophical work, and > > considering how highly he valued their discovery, this has always struck > > me as quite odd. > > * > > > > I have found that presenting on these concepts to non-Peirceans in > > seminars and conference papers can be very hard work. It doesn't make > much > > sense to people who aren't already thinking within Peirce's system. > > > > Cathy > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the > PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. 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