Many thanks Irving for the detailed response.  I found the title of your 1600 
page file hilarious, the references useful and the stories entertaining. The 
designation of Carnap's 1923 Abriss as the earliest textbook is important for 
my own understanding of "how this whole symbolic logic mess for undergraduates" 
came about.  Weiner's dissertation on comparative expressive power of 1913 gets 
more to the point. Here, rather than  the ideography of the symbols, lies a 
clue to the sociological thesis, namely, those in control of the research 
program produce the initial condensed texts, and inevitably, the 
self-understanding of the end users. Both systems  are capable of expressing 
mathematical truths.  Presumably, the Algebraicists could have been Logicists, 
but were not. Why or why not? ( Susan Haack actually took up whether Peirce was 
a logicist in TCP winter 1993.)> Date: Sat, 5 May 2012 13:12:22 -0400
> From: ianel...@iupui.edu
> To: jimwillgo...@msn.com
> CC: peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce
> 
> 
> Jim Willgoose wrote:
> 
> >> ...The "Studies in Logic" would not lose its relevance then as 
> >> potential topics for philosophy classes, although the symbolic 
> >> portion would be eclipsed by the "Fregean Revolution."<<
> 
> That's an accurate summary of my main point.
> 
> 
> >> For example, Bode could have included something of it in his 1910 
> >> book if he so chose.  On another point, would it be fair to say then 
> >> that the Fregean Revolution is as much about the uses to which 
> >> symbolism is put, as it is about competing historical traditions?<<
> 
> That would certainly be one of the claims for Frege's _Begriffsschrift_ 
> made by van Heijenoort, that among the original contributions to logic 
> that Frege made in the _Begriffsschrift_, according to van Heijenoort, 
> was that that it made mathematical or symbolic logic applicable to the 
> study of philosophy and the sciences in general, and most especially of 
> language in particular.
> 
> 
> 
> >> In other words, the equal weight of emphasis of a historical 
> >> explanation for the eclipse of the algebraic tradition lies with 
> >> logicism in the philosophy of mathematics rather than the 
> >> superiority of the symbolism and methods.  I get the feeling 
> >> sometimes that the so called "Fregean" methods are simply superior 
> >> and this explains why it won out in terms of the historical 
> >> understanding of the writers of the earliest elementary and 1st 
> >> order symbolic logic textbooks.<<
> 
> The question of the superiority of the methods of the "modern 
> "symbolic" or "mathematical" logic or logistic -- which more properly 
> ought to be called function-theoretical -- as compared with that of the 
> classical Boole-Schröder calculus was a matter of debate from the 
> instant the reviews of Frege's _Begriffsschrift_ appeared. John Venn, 
> who in 1880 produced a catalog of the various notations from Leibniz 
> through Peirce, Schroder, and Frege, in his review of the 
> _Begriffsschrift_, called Frege's notation "cumbrous", find some two 
> dozen competing ways of rendering "a is b" (In _Studies in Logic_ 
> Christine Ladd-Franklin explicitly remarked, or shall we better say 
> complained, that Venn had "collected some two dozen ways in which "a is 
> b" has been put into logical form". In 1898, Schroder argued the 
> superiority of Peirce's notation or "pasigraphy" (and by implication 
> his own, which, with minor exceptions he derived directly from Peirce 
> and Peirce's student Oscar Mitchell); and Peano and Frege also had 
> exchanges as to which of their respective notations was the better. The 
> goal of Norbert Wiener's Harvard doctoral thesis of 1913 was to 
> demonstrate that the classical Boole-Schroeder calculus has the same 
> expressive power as the logic of _Principia_.
> 
> 
> >> But a slight alternative historical explanation is simply 
> >> sociological, and places greater emphasis on the research program 
> >> that dominated in the early decades. Put counterfactually, had 
> >> logicism not occurred, the earliest elementary symbolic logic books 
> >> with suitable formalization and proof could have developed without 
> >> that historical understanding. Nested in here is also the claim that 
> >> formaization and proof for textbook presentation could have 
> >> developed without the Fregean revolution.<<
> 
> Certainly another one of the major characterizations of the 
> _Begriffsschrift_ that van Heijenoort claimed as original with Frege is 
> the institution of formalization. Peirce's attitude is well known; 
> we've more than once in this forum talked about the import (I almost 
> said "implication" -- how's that for a bad pun?) of his remark about 
> proof as merely the pavement on which the chariot of mathematics rolls.
> 
> Seriously, there is no one sentence answer that I could offer. I have 
> some 1600 pages on a wordprocessing file in the effort to clarify and 
> detail the issue, under the cumbrous, or even baroque, title "From 
> Algebraic Logic to Logistic: How We Stopped Algebraicizing and Learned 
> to Love Logistic, or, Forgetting the Classical Boole-Schröder Calculus 
> — The Fregean "Revolution" and the Rise of the "Russellian" View of 
> Mathematical Logic: An Historiographical, Philosophical, and 
> Sociological Investigation of an Episode in the History of Mathematical 
> Logic", ... and I don't seriously expect to complete this any time 
> soon, or even in what's left of my lifetime.
> 
> On the more readily accessible and simple question of whether the 
> _Studies in Logic_ suffered because of the difuseness of the topics, 
> the previous response I gave is, I think, more than adequate. It 
> certainly would not have bothered philosophers ill prepared to deal 
> deal with the mathematics.
> 
> That does not speak specifically to the point that Mr. Rooney was 
> presumably attempting to make, that those with mathematical training 
> would not, unlike their enumerate or mathophobic cohorts, have been put 
> off by the mathematical nature of the logic. My response to that part 
> of the issue would be that, in the post-Principia era, logicians who 
> had mathematical background gradually gravitated towards the 
> Frege-Russell approach, towards logistic, or function-theoeric, as 
> opposed to the algebraic Boole-Peirce-Schröder approach. That, too, is 
> one of the principal issues that "From Algebraic Logic to Logistic..." 
> attempts to explain.
> 
> It is worth noting:
> 
> (1) that _Studies..._ was well appreciated by logicians with strong 
> mathematical qualifications during Peirce's lifetime; here, we may 
> point to De Morgan, Venn, Schröder, MacColl, and Charles Lutwidge 
> Dodgson (a.k.a Lewis Carroll). Thus, for example, as Francine Abeles 
> demonstrated, it was reading Marquand's contributions to _Studies_ on 
> logic achines together with Ladd-Franklin's contribution, focusing on 
> the antilogism, that led Dodgson, in the unpublished-in-his-lifetime to 
> combine these to develop his version of the falsifiability tree method 
> for polysyllogisms. Beyond that, even while Bertrand Russell was 
> pointedly denying that he was familiar with any of Peirce's work in 
> logic, he was privately writing to Louis Couturat in 1899 recommending 
> that Couturat read _Studies..._.
> 
> (2) As usual, accuracy, exactitude, precision -- "picky, picky, picky" 
> -- is more complicated than we would sometimes wish. "Und in dem 'Wie', 
> da liegt der Unterschied." No one would, so far as I am aware, not even 
> I, claim that algebraic logic vanished altogether from the scene with 
> the arrival of logistic. It became, along with model theory, recursion 
> theory, proof theory, set theory, one of the specialized branches of 
> mathematical logic, beyond general logic (which, incidentally, also 
> encompasses, in the AMS subject classification scheme, besides prop 
> calc, FOL, higher-order calculi, non-classical logics, probability 
> logic -- thus continuing in some repects to justify the "mix" of topics 
> in intro logic texts for philosophers), and that primarily thanks to 
> Jan Lukasiewicz, who referred to Peirce's work in his claases at Warsaw 
> and especially his foremost student, Alfred Tarski. But listen to 
> Tarski decrying, in 1941, in "The Calculus of Relations" (p. 47) the 
> lack of attention to algebraic logic during the early post-Principia 
> period, noting that, "given the wealth of unsolved problems and 
> suggestions for further research to be found in Schröder’s _Algebra der 
> Logik_ [1890-1895]", it is "amazing that Peirce and Schröder did not 
> have many followers." Tarski’s analysis of this situation and the 
> reasons for it appear to rest on the assumption that the absorption of 
> algebraic logic into Whitehead and Russell’s logical system was at the 
> cost of ignoring the mathematical content of the algebraic theory. 
> Tarski then wrote [1941, 74] that: "It is true that A.N. Whitehead and 
> B. Russell, in _Principia mathematica_, included the theory of 
> relations in the whole of logic, made this theory a central part of 
> their logical system, and introduced many new and important concepts 
> connected with the concept of relation. Most of these concepts do not 
> belong, however, to the theory of relations proper but rather establish 
> relations between this theory and other parts of logic: _Principia 
> mathematica_ contributed but slightly to the intrinsic development of 
> the theory of relations as an independent deductive discipline. In 
> general, it must be said that -- though the significance of the theory 
> of relations is universally recognized today -- this theory, especially 
> the calculus of relations, is now in practically the same stage of 
> development as that in which it was forty-five years ago."
> 
> 
> The survival of algebraic logic as a specialized subfield may be due 
> preeminently, if not exclusively, as much as any factor, to the work of 
> Tarski and the generations to logicians that he taught and promoted at 
> U Cal Berkeley from the 1940s to his death.
> 
> (3) Since Mr. Rooney spoke of logic at the University of Illinois in 
> the 1950s, perhaps it would be worth remarking that in the mid-1930s, 
> one had to take logic, as did my father and Paul Halmos, in the 
> philosophy department with Oskar ("Oscar") Kubitz, who used the 
> then-brand-new Cohen & Nagel as the textbook for the course. Kubitz was 
> a Millian, and the author of the _Development of John Stuart Mill's 
> System of Logic_ (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois, 1932). My father was a 
> chem major, and enjoyed Kubitz's logic course (I inherited his copy of 
> Cohen & Nagel); Halmos was double majoring in philosophy and 
> mathematics, and his disaffection with that logic course and the drills 
> in syllogistic was one of the factors in deciding him to become a 
> mathematician.
> 
> (4) For those unafraid of mathematics, between 1910 and 1930, there 
> were few options in the immediate post-Principia era for studying the 
> "new" symbolic logic other than to do as Quine did, and that was to 
> find a professor willing and able to join him in working through 
> _Principia Mathematica_. The first textbooks began appearing in the 
> 1923s, led off by Carnap's Abriss; in English, Clarence Irving Lewis  
> and Cooper Harold Langford co-authored the first modern symbolic logic 
> textbook in English, their _Symbolic Logic_ (1932; 2nd ed., 1959). This 
> was followed by Susanne K. Langer's textbook, _An Introduction to 
> Symbolic Logic (1937; 2nd ed., 1953); in the first edition of her book, 
> she mistakenly claimed it to be the first modern symbolic logic 
> textbook in English, but she corrected this error in the second 
> edition, reminding her readers of Lewis and Langford’s textbook. 
> Tarski's _O logice matematycznej i metodzie dedukcyjnej_ appeared in 
> 1936, his _Einfu&#776;hrung in die mathematische Logik und in die 
> Methodologie der Mathematik_, in 1937, and the English edition in 1941. 
> John Cleveland Cooley worked out his lecture notes as Quine's T.A., to 
> produce his own _Primer of Formal Logic_ (1942; reprinted: 1946; 1949). 
> The next step was for professors, for more sophisticated treatments, to 
> hand out mimeographed copies of their typescripts, as Alonzo Church did 
> at Princeton for his students (Kleene among them), of what eventually 
> became Church's _Introduction to Mathematical Logic_ (1956)Carnap's 
> _Einführung in die symbolische Logik_ didn't appear until 1954.
> 
> 
> ----- Message from jimwillgo...@msn.com ---------
>     Date: Fri, 4 May 2012 12:09:13 -0500
>     From: Jim Willgoose <jimwillgo...@msn.com>
> Reply-To: Jim Willgoose <jimwillgo...@msn.com>
> Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce
>       To: ianel...@iupui.edu
> 
> 
> >
> > Thank you Irving. The "Studies in Logic" would not lose its relevance
> > then as potential topics for philosophy classes, although the
> > symbolic portion would be eclipsed by the "Fregean Revolution." For
> > example, Bode could have included something of it in his 1910 book if
> > he so chose.  On anther point, would it be fair to say then that the
> > Fregean Revolution is as much about the uses to which symbolism is
> > put, as it is about competing historical traditions? In other words,
> > the equal weight of emphasis of a historical explanation for the
> > eclipse of the algebraic tradition lies with logicism in the
> > philosophy of mathematics rather than the superiority of the
> > symbolism and methods.  I get the feeling sometimes that the so
> > called "Fregean" methods are simply superior and this explains why it
> > won out in terms of the historical understanding of the writers of
> > the earliest elementary and 1st order symbolic logic textbooks. But a
> > slight alternative historical explanation is simply sociological, and
> > places greater emphasis on the research program that dominated in the
> > early decades. Put counterfactually, had logicism not occurred, the
> > earliest elementary symbolic logic books with suitable formalization
> > and proof could have developed without that historical understanding.
> >  Nested in here is also the claim that formaization and proof for
> > textbook presentation could have developed without the Fregean
> > revolution.
> > > Date: Thu, 3 May 2012 15:31:15 -0400
> >> From: ianel...@iupui.edu
> >> To: jimwillgo...@msn.com
> >> CC: peirce-l@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> >> Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce
> >>
> >>
> >> Jim,
> >>
> >> I suggest -- assuming I have not missed the import of your question --
> >> that it would be far more accurate to propose that "Studies in Logic",
> >> like most of the work of the algebraic tradition of the
> >> "post-Principia" era was a victim rather of the so-called "Fregean
> >> revolution" which, when not ignoring algebraic logic, rejected it
> >> altogether as "inferior" to the modern logistic. If, for example, on
> >> examines introductory logic textbooks from the mid-20th century, in
> >> particular those aimed at philosophy students, one continues to find
> >> inductive logic and scientific method ensconced in the same
> >> introductory textbooks as deductive logic, although then the deductive
> >> logic includes propositional calculus (and, depending upon the level of
> >> the textbook, first-order predicate calculus), along with syllogistic
> >> logic. One of the earliest, popular, post-Principia intro texts aimed
> >> at philosophy students was Cohen & Nagel's "Introduction to Logic and
> >> Scientific Method", which first appeared in 1934 and still had a strong
> >> following until well into the 1960s at least. If differed from newer
> >> intro logic textbooks aimed at philosophy students such as Copi's
> >> "Introduction to Logic", appearing twenty years later and still going
> >> strong, only in preferring the axiomatic approach to prop calc and FOL
> >> rather than Copi-style natural deduction. They differ from an older
> >> "pre-Principia" textbook such as -- to pull one off the shelf here,
> >> Boyd Henry Bode's 1910 "An Outline of Logic" only in that deductive
> >> logic meant syllogisms. Even in Peirce's day, few philosophers would
> >> touch algebraic logic, taking the tack of Jevons in wanting to get rid
> >> of the "mathematical dress" of classical algebraic logic.
> >>
> >> On a related matter: The fact is, that the classical Boole-Schröder
> >> calculus was simply too technically difficult, both in its day and
> >> since, to fair well at appealing to any but those with mathematical
> >> training. Examine the American Mathematical Society's and Zentralblatt
> >> für Mathematik's Mathematical Subject Classification (any edition will
> >> do): what you will find is that algebraic logic is listed as a
> >> specialty, on a par with model theory, recursion theory, proof theory,
> >> set theory, rather than as belonging to general logic that includes
> >> propositional calculus, FOL, and the sorts of topics you might expect
> >> to find in introductory textbooks.
> >>
> >> Sorry if this doesn't speak more explicitly to the question you had in 
> >> mind.
> >>
> >> ----- Message from jimwillgo...@msn.com ---------
> >>     Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 14:41:18 -0500
> >>     From: Jim Willgoose <jimwillgo...@msn.com>
> >> Reply-To: Jim Willgoose <jimwillgo...@msn.com>
> >> Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce
> >>       To: ianel...@iupui.edu, peirce-l@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >> > Irving and Jon; I wonder if the "Studies in Logic" did not suffer, in
> >> > part, from a retrospective lack of unity. In other words, from the
> >> > vantage point of 1950, the various topics (quantification, induction,
> >> > Epicurus etc.) did not fit the 20th century development of a more
> >> > narrow-grained classification into history of philosophy of science
> >> > or formal deductive logic, or philosophy of language and meaning.
> >> > Another conjecture might be that the first two decades of the 20th
> >> > century dealt with the formalization and sytematizing of deductive
> >> > logic for textbook presentation. Only after sufficient time had
> >> > passed could the book be retrieved for historical and philosophical
> >> > interest. Of course, there is always the nefarious possibility of an
> >> > 'institutional apriori" authority having its way. Jim W
> >> > > Date: Wed, 2 May 2012 11:48:14 -0400
> >> >> From: ianel...@iupui.edu
> >> >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Not Preserving Peirce
> >> >> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> >> >>
> >> >> Jon,
> >> >>
> >> >> I couldn't have said it better myself!
> >> >>
> >> >> Kneale & Kneale, to which Jack referred, was originally written in the
> >> >> late 1950s and published in 1962, and in terms of respective
> >> >> significance pays more attention to Kant even than to Frege, and is
> >> >> best, thanks to Martha Kneale's expertise, on the medievals. Trouble
> >> >> was, in those days, and pretty much even today, it is about all there
> >> >> is in English.
> >> >>
> >> >> My joint paper with Nathan Houser, "The Nineteenth Century Roots of
> >> >> Universal Algebra and Algebraic Logic", in Hajnal Andreka, James Donald
> >> >> Monk, Istvan Nemeti (eds.), Colloquia Mathematica Societatis Janos
> >> >> Bolyai 54. Algebraic Logic, Budapest (Hungary), 1988
> >> >> (Amsterdam/London/New York: North-Holland, 1991), 1-36, includes a
> >> >> brief analysis of what's WRONG with Kneale & Kneale and its ilk.
> >> >>
> >> >> When Mendelson's translation of Styazhkin's History of Mathematical
> >> >> Logic came out in 1969, it should really have come to serve as a decent
> >> >> supplement to Kneale & Kneale for K & K's grossly inadequate treatment
> >> >> of Boole, Peirce, Schröder, Jevons, Venn, and Peano to help fill in the
> >> >> serious gaps in Kneale & Kneale.
> >> >>
> >> >> Even if one looks at the hugh multi-volume Handbook of the History of
> >> >> Logic under the editorship of Dov Gabbay and John Woods that is still
> >> >> coming out, it's a mixed bag in terms of the quality of the essays,
> >> >> some of which are historical surveys, others of which are attempts at
> >> >> reconstruction based on philosophical speculation.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Irving
> >> >>
> >> >> ----- Message from jawb...@att.net ---------
> >> >>     Date: Wed, 02 May 2012 11:15:05 -0400
> >> >>     From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
> >> >> Reply-To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net>
> >> >> Subject: Re: Not Preserving Peirce
> >> >>       To: Jack Rooney <johnphilipda...@hotmail.com>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> > Jack,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > All histories of logic written that I've read so far are very weak
> >> >> on Peirce,
> >> >> > and I think it's fair to say that even the few that make an
> >> >> attempt to cover
> >> >> > his work have fallen into the assimilationist vein.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Regards,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Jon
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Jack Rooney wrote:
> >> >> >> Despite all this there are several books on the history of logic eg
> >> >> >> Kneale & Kneale[?].
> >> >> >
> >> >> > --
> >> >> >
> >> >> > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> >> >> > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> >> >> > mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey
> >> >> > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> >> >> > word press blog 1: http://jonawbrey.wordpress.com/
> >> >> > word press blog 2: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> ----- End message from jawb...@att.net -----
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> Irving H. Anellis
> >> >> Visiting Research Associate
> >> >> Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought
> >> >> 902 W. New York St.
> >> >> Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
> >> >> Indianapolis, IN 46202-5159
> >> >> USA
> >> >> URL: http://www.irvinganellis.info
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
> >> >> PEIRCE-L listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a
> >> >> message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF
> >> >> PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message.  To post a message to the
> >> >> list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> >> >
> >> >
> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the
> >> > PEIRCE-L listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a message
> >> > to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in
> >> > the body of the message.  To post a message to the list, send it to
> >> > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >> ----- End message from jimwillgo...@msn.com -----
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Irving H. Anellis
> >> Visiting Research Associate
> >> Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought
> >> 902 W. New York St.
> >> Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
> >> Indianapolis, IN 46202-5159
> >> USA
> >> URL: http://www.irvinganellis.info
> >>
> >
> 
> 
> ----- End message from jimwillgo...@msn.com -----
> 
> 
> 
> Irving H. Anellis
> Visiting Research Associate
> Peirce Edition, Institute for American Thought
> 902 W. New York St.
> Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis
> Indianapolis, IN 46202-5159
> USA
> URL: http://www.irvinganellis.info
> 
                                          
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