Gary,
perhaps I have here something more that might be of interest for you:
<begin citation>
Logic requires us, with reference to each question we have in hand, to
hope some
definite answer to it may be true. That *hope* with reference to *each
case* as
it comes up is, by a *saltus*, stated by logicians as a *law* concerning
*all*
cases, namely, the law of excluded middle. The law amounts to saying that
the
universe has a perfect reality. It is, therefore, inapplicable to
universes of
fiction, concerning which we may, nevertheless, reason. Whether Hamlet had
or
had not a strawberry mark on his left shoulder, admits of no other answer
than
that Hamlet is indeterminate in that respect. Now what pure mathematicians
reason about is always a universe of their own creation; and therefore the
doctrine of some logicians that an idividual is whatever is determinate in
every
respect must be banished from the logic of mathematics.
(from MS 140)
<end citation>
<begin citation>
A collection is not a *thing*, but an *ens rationis*, since its distinctive
identity is constituted not only by an arbitrary act, but by the
distinctive
identities of other things, namely those that it comprises. At the same
time,
it so far partakes of the nature of a thing, that it is constituted not at
all
by anything of a general nature but by individual things, irrespective of
their
characters. This gives the collection individuality.
from MS 142)
<end citation>
<begin citation>
The only use of ideas at all is to bind facts into a great continuum, by a
logic
at once subjective and objective.
As for topics of vital importance, all sensible talk about them must be
commonplace,
all reasoning about them unsound, and all study of them sordid. Reason,
anyway,
is a faculty of secondary rank. Cognition is but a superficial film of the
soul,
while sentiment penetrates its substance. Reason is divine insofar as it
fills up
the gaps of the discrete and displays a continuum. But it is of just as
much
worth in this respect or even more when it is applied for example to the
theory
of numbers of which a great mathematician said that its glory was that it
never
had been nor ever could be prostituted to any practical application
whatsoever,
or when it counts the imaginary inflections of a curve of which only a
small
fraction can correspond to anything in nature, as when it is applied to the
study of real phenomena. But reasoning has no monopoly of the process of
generalization -- Sentiment also generalizes itself; but the continuum
which it
forms instead of being like that of reason merely cognitive, superficial,
or
subjective ... penetrates through the whole being of the soul, and is
objective
or to use a better word exstant, and more than that is exsistant.
(From fragment of Detached Ideas, MS 438)
<end citation>
<begin citation>
I have several times argued, at some length, that the unity of personality
is
in some measure illusory, that our ideas are not so entirely in the grasp
of
an *ego* as we fancy that they are, that personal identity differs rather
in
degree than in kind from the unity of "public opinion" anf gregarious
intelligence, and that there is a sort of identity of dynamic continuity
in all intelligence. Accepting this opinion, a man is not radically devoid
of the power of saying what every scientific intelligence must observe, if
he has the power of saying what he observes himself.
(from an unidentified fragment)
<end citation>
<begin citation>
The universe is to become a more and more perfect mirror of that system
of ideas which would result from the indefinitely continued action of
objective logic. The universe is, as it were, an awakening Mind.
Now just as we say this man has such and such a character, not because
of any ideas he has this minute present, but because under suitable
circumstances such ideas are bound to be evolved by him, so the universe
may be said to be governed by a God insofar as it is bound more and more
to conform to the ultimate result of the evolution of pure ideas. But the
sole Ancient of Days is Continuity in the abstract, a spontaneity which
might be assumed to be very slight, though it is probably enormous.
As to the continued existence of the soul after death, the general
idea of Continuity, if unreservedly accepted, hardly permits us to doubt
it. The difficulty is, that there is no positive evidence in favor of it.
It seems, however, easier to account for such defect in other ways than
by a breaking off of consciousness. That the second element of
consciousness,
the reactive consciousness, ceases when external stimulation ceases, is
certain. We see it in sleep. But the mind does not cease to exist in sleep;
and many persons perform their most difficult operations of thought best
in their sleep. They wish to "sleep upon" a difficult question. There is
no more reason to suppose that death at once causes the annihilation of
mind.
Whatever may happen later, at first it can be nothing but a sleep. To be
awakened, the soul must in some way be acted upon. But there our
information
ceases.
(unidentified fragment)
<end citation>
Ok, so far some scattered citations from "The New Elements of Mathematics"
as edited by Carolyn Eisele; Vol. IV.
The typos are mine.
Thomas;-)
On Thu, 16 Feb 2006 18:34:10 +0100, gnusystems <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
What struck me immediately about Thomas's quote from CP 4.546 was its
distinction between logical subjects and meta-physical Subjects, or
"substances". Just this morning i've been perusing the Century
Dictionary on
"subject", "subjective" and "subjectivity", all of which are on the UQAM
word list indicating Peirce's authorship. Under "subject", entries 5, 6
and
7 give the usage in grammar, logic and metaphysics respectively. But
instead
of quoting them all, i should first explain what i was looking for in
those
definitions and how they relate to CP 4.546 and New Elements.
In current discourse about the mind, whether philosophical or
psychological,
the term "subject" is mostly used in the Kantian sense epitomized by the
phrase "subject of experience". The operative distinction behind this
usage
is the subject/object distinction, to which the distinction between
"subjective" and "objective" is closely related. But Peirce, even though
he
uses "subjective" and "objective" pretty much like everybody else, almost
never uses "subject" in that Kantian or "metaphysical" sense; he uses it
in
a grammatical or logical sense. (On the other hand, he hardly ever
mentions
the grammatical sense of "object".) I couldn't help wondering why Peirce
would thus restrict his usage of "subject". (A question that probably
wouldn't occur to anyone but a novice in Peirce studies like me ... )
Now, for me at least, the question of "Existent vs. Real" is all about
*objects*. I found that most of my questions about the reality of "real
things" were cleared up by perusing the Commens entries on "object". But
this didn't answer my question about the usage of "subject" in New
Elements
III.1, and there is next to nothing on "subject" in the Commens; so
that's
why i turned to the Century Dictionary. And here we are getting into
another
realm of reality, as it were.
New Elements III.1 has plenty to say about "real objects", but nothing
about
"real subjects". And only once in all of CP does the phrase "real
subject"
occur. That happens to be the 1885 review of Royce's _The Religious
Aspect
of Philosophy_ (CP 8.41):
[[[ He seems to think that the real subject of a proposition can be
denoted
by a general term of the proposition; that is, that precisely what it is
that you are talking about can be distinguished from other things by
giving
a general description of it. Kant already showed, in a celebrated
passage of
his cataclysmic work, that this is not so; and recent studies in formal
logic have put it in a clearer light. We now find that, besides general
terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensable in all
reasoning. One of these kinds is the index, which like a pointing finger
exercises a real physiological force over the attention, like the power
of a
mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense. One such
index
at least must enter into every proposition, its function being to
designate
the subject of discourse. ]]]
Clearly the "subject of discourse" here represents the *object* of the
index
which enters into the proposition. Most of Peirce's many references to
"real
objects" in CP are likewise connected with some discussion of
indexicality.
In these cases, "real" refers not to scholastic realism and Thirdness
but to
Secondness and actuality. Peirce calls it a "polar sense" in the one
passage
i've found in CP which clearly uses "subject" in the sense opposed to
(and
paired with) "object": CP 3.380, from "A Guess at the Riddle":
[[[ One great psychologist has said that the will is nothing but the
strongest desire. I cannot grant that; it seems to me to overlook that
fact
which of all that we observe is quite the most obtrusive, namely, the
difference between dreaming and doing. This is not a question of
defining,
but of noticing what we experience; and surely he who can confound
desiring
with doing must be a day-dreamer. The evidence, however, seems to be
pretty
strong that the consciousness of willing does not differ, at least not
very
much, from a sensation. The sense of hitting and of getting hit are
nearly
the same, and should be classed together. The common element is the
sense of
an actual occurrence, of actual action and reaction. There is an intense
reality about this kind of experience, a sharp sundering of subject and
object. While I am seated calmly in the dark, the lights are suddenly
turned
on, and at that instant I am conscious, not of a process of change, but
yet
of something more than can be contained in an instant. I have a sense of
a
saltus, of there being two sides to that instant. A consciousness of
polarity would be a tolerably good phrase to describe what occurs. For
will,
then, as one of the great types of consciousness, we ought to substitute
the
polar sense. ]]]
As i said above, i think the Century Dictionary listings under "subject"
imply a fairly clear answer to my question of why Peirce so consistently
eschews reference to the "subject of experience", except in the above
passage. But i won't elaborate on that, as this message is quite long
enough
already.
gary F.
}My only drink is meaning from the deep brain,
What the birds and the grass and the stones drink. [Seamus Heaney]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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