Ben Writes:
Jim, list, A few corrections, then a discussion which may be of interest to, ahem, not only Sir Piat, but also Sir Ransdell & Sir Richmond. Interpretants & iconicity are dealt with, eventually. I beg a little patience on this one, good Sir Knights, unsheathe thy swords not too quickly. (Note to self: ask them later what, if any, effect this near-flattery had on them.) Correction: I left "reality" accidentally off this trikon, now I've put it where I originally meant to: 1. Term (seme, etc.) - (univocality?) -- (case in the sense of question, issue, matter, _res_?) --- possibility. |> 3. Argument -- validity -- law --- (conditional) necessity, reality. 2. Proposition - truth -- fact --- actuality. Correction the second, I said: "...we did not find resemblance embodied except in "compromise" form with indexicality, in material kinships...." I think that Peirce would take the embodiment of mathematical diagrams as the embodiment of icons and as not needing to be in something like the "compromise" form with embodied indexicality which I was discussing as "material kinship." I forgot that at that moment because I generally think of the mathematical diagram not as an icon of its object but instead as an instance of a sign defined by that support which it would supply to recognition (of its experimentational & decision-process legitimacy), across any & all disparities of appearance (and of time, place, modality, universe-of-discourse, etc.) between said sign & its object. \ 1. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial character, neither opens nor closes questions (i.e. it keeps information the same), then the ground is a reaction or resistance, a concrete factual connection with its object. Then the sign itself is an index. (I strongly suspect that this info-preservative kind of "abstraction" can indeed be called an abstraction; but, if not, then not.) 2. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial character, only opens questions (only removes information), then the ground is, to that extent, a quality, a semblance, a sample aspect apparent as sustained and "carried on" by the sign so long as the sign is "true to itself" in this. (To gain such a sign brings an increase of information, of course, but I am focusing on the info relationship between the ground and that from which it is abstracted.) Then the sign itself is an icon. 3. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial character, only closes questions (only adds information), i.e., reduces away or "sums over" all factors seen as extraneous to the abstraction's purpose, then the ground is, to that extent, a meaning or implication, a gist, an effect that it will, by habitual tendency, have on the interpretant, of making the interpretant resemble the gist, in meaningfully _appearing_ as -- without iconically resembling -- the object. (This is clarified further down.) 4. If a genuine sign's ground is an abstraction which, by its categorial character, both opens & closes questions (removes some information & adds some information), then the ground is, to the extent, a validity, soundness, legitimacy (in that respect in which the sign counts _experientially_ as the object itself without necessarily being confused with the object at all), a support which the sign would most naturally and directly supply to its recognition, a support via its reacting legitimately in some respect as -- without indexically pointing to -- the object itself, and the reaction or resistance being _with the "recognizant."_ Then the sign itself is that which I call a "proxy." Its ground's abstraction involves a closing and settling of questions (adding of information) as to what object-related information is relevant, (e.g., "There are five initially selected objects in question, it doesn't matter whether we miscounted them or whether they're really oranges," etc.) and an opening of questions (removal of information) (e.g., how would the five behave and interact and collaborate with us, the mathematical observer-experimenter, sheerly in virtue of their fiveness, supplying us with answers to _fresh and unforeseen_ questions in accordance with _the rules_ of "fiveness"? I.e., in the concrete world, the question, for instance, of 5^3=? is taken as closed in the sense that the "world" will behave as determined by the answer -- but in the abstract, we come into relief as a part of, or really a wannabe-proxy for, the world, so that we're as the world as having "forgotten" the answer and needing to "recollect" it.) The proxy doesn't have to be a mathematical diagram, it could be a lawyer behaving, acting, decision-making on a client's behalf _in accordance with the rules_ pertaining to the legal interests of said client who may be sitting right there but insufficiently adept at representing his/her own legal interests, or who may be elsewhere, or asleep, or non compos mentis, or in a coma, or deceased, or even somewhat idealized from the start, as sometimes in a class action lawsuit. Thus arises the importance of the WOULD-BE in the definition of the proxy, defined by the legitimacy which the sign WOULD have to the recognizant observing its object, irregardlessly of current & prominent appearances. The icon is defined by its OWN APPEARANCE, the sign's ACTUALIZATIONAL seeming as the object which has been or seems to be or will likely be or is presumed to be. The icon is defined by the appearance which it IS presenting to the capacity to feel, and NOT by the sign's AGENTIAL POTENCY as the object which has been or seems to be or will likely be or is presumed to be. It's an agential, decisional power which is properly that of a proxy in matters ongoing, unpredicted, newly arising. The imagination binds itself to _honor_ and _adhere to_ the hypothetical as real. The ground as abstraction that only closes questions (only removes information): Like being an appearance of the object in a different, and very special, modality. Then the sign itself is a symbol. In other words, it's not like the _reproduction_ of a quality in the same modality, but like the _translation_ of a quality into another modality, but not just any other modality, but instead one specially apt and purposed for such translations AS translations for the interpretant, a modality in which things are decidedly not primarily what they seem. It will often be the case that the reason for the translation is not that the mind in question is unable to sense the quality, but rather that the icon is not, as a practical matter, obtainable; so instead another sign is obtained, and the interpretant then either (a) retranslates to a reasonably approximate icon of the object; and likewises icons of icons and icons of symbols and ICONS WHOSE OBJECTS ARE INDICES or (b) goes far enough in the direction of such retranslation as to feel assured in the probability of doing so if the need or desire for further such explicitation should arise or (c) lacks the needed icons and hopes either that they aren't really needed or that they can be supplied later (e.g., as in "I followed the surface sense of the text, but I don't really _understand_ it yet."). The interpretant does not translate to indexical sinsigns per se. That would be an experiential recognition of a reaction or resistance. The interpretant qua interpretant (as opposed to qua interpretand) always has the generality of a quality of sense or feeling. Hence, the interpretant is iconoid, iconlike, just as the recognition is indexoid, indexlike. Qua interpretant it is the qualification, the qualitatization, of that event, that "particular" universe, which is the interpreted sign qua interpretand. The sign, qua event, itself is as a universe, and thus is symboloid, symbollike -- this is in a different sense than that in which the sign is sinsign, qualisign, or legisign. The sign itself is the referring of the object to some world or universe. The "pre-sign" object itself, qua representand & not qua representans, is as a universal and thus is proxyoid, proxylike, like a mathematical diagram or a node in a mathematical diagram. 1. Object (qua still to be represented)-- proxylike, quasi-noumenal but NOT a fiction, that by which semiosis seeks to be determined, but which in its phase of indeterminate representation, interpretation, & experience, is as a mathematical universal, a "something" x, imaginative--volitional (such that one wills, tries, seeks, chooses, adheres to being determined by the object). 2. Sign (qua still to be interpreted) -- symbollike -- event, _a_ universe, term of an alternative, intellectual--abilitative/technical/competential. 3. Interpretant -- iconlike, qualitative, sensory-intuitive--affective. 4. Recognition -- indexlike, concrete singular among more such, commonsense-perceptual--cognitive. Note consistent & complete pattern of inverse relationships. 1. Object, (D) proxylike -- a sign defined by relationship to object is (A) an index. 2. Sign, (C) symbollike -- a sign defined by relationship to itself (sign) is (B) an icon 3. Interpretant, (B) iconlike -- a sign defined by relationship to interpretant is (C) a symbol. 4. Recognition, (A) indexlike -- a sign defined by relationship to recognition is (D) a proxy. 1. The idealized system of motions & forces -- classical Newtonian or pure-quantum-system -- is time-symmetric, completely deterministic in the given relevant sense, unmuddled, pure OBJECT to us, information about which object we can only approach indefinitely, as to a limit. 2. The material system is time-nonsymmetric, stochastic-processual, in which the system at a given stage is only ALMOST the system at another given stage, i.e., a SIGN to us of the system at other stage. 3. The vegetable-level biological system is time-nonsymmetric but LOCALLY pointed thermodynamically in the opposite direction from that of its material world, from which it filters order and is an INTERPRETANT to us. 4. The intelligent living system is time-nonsymmetric but INDIVIDUALLY pointed variously in both directions thermodynamically -- as living thing, it filters for order -- as intelligent, it is a sink, retaining sign-rich disorder as recorded -- I don't know how it pulls double-direction "trick" off -- anyway it is a RECOGNITION which we are. The sign defined by its relationship to recogition is a proxy. ERGO: As sign, man is most of all a proxy. At intelligent life's best, only indefinitely approached, intelligent life is a genuine, legitimate proxy acting & deciding on behalf of the ideal, in being determined _by_ the ideal. Intelligent life shouldn't let it go to his/her head, though. Hard it is to be good; harder still to confirm & solidify it by entelechy = by staying good => continual renovation and occasional rearchitecting (entelechy is not necessarily a freeze) amid changing & evolvable conditions. Best, Ben ----- Original Message ----- From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:15 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Jim, list, Jim Piat wrote: >>[Joe Ransdell] Good point, Gary. Still another way of thinking about it might be to suppose that the emphasis is supposed to fall on "thing" rather than "sign": "no sign is a real THING" rather than "no sign is a REAL thing"; but that doesn't sound very plausible to me. I like your solution better. >> Joe Ransdell >[Jim] While we're raising questions about the distinctions among such notions as the real, the existent and the true (their relationships to the categories etc) Are you disagreeing with Peirce here? It's okay to disagree with him, I do too, but I'm wondering whether that's what you're doing. Here's Peirce's view: 1. The possible |> 3. The (conditionally) necessary ("would have to" approx. = "should"), the real 2. The actual, the reactive, the existent "Truth" in Peirce's use of the word is the property of a true proposition, its property of corresponding to fact, though it could also correspond to a law regarded as a fact. I'll give this a try. Keeping in mind that these are correlations, not equations: 1. Term (seme, etc.) - (univocality?) -- (case in the sense of question, issue, matter, _res_?) --- possibility. |> 3. Argument -- validity -- law --- (conditional) necessity. 2. Proposition - truth -- fact --- actuality. >[Jim] -- I'd like to throw in a related question: Does existence as a mode of being ever occur outside of representation or thirdness (as a mode of being). Or is existence (and objects conceived of as merely existing -- ie something less than signs) something that always swims in the contiuum of representation. My take has been that existent objects are always also embodied signs, but that embodied interpretants aren't so common. I'd have to dig. I seem to remember Peirce talking about genuine phenomenal thirdness as not being everywhere -- but I also remember thinking that he was talking in terms of the interpretant, and not of "just any" signs -- i.e., it was the thing about embodied interpretants again. Peirce doesn't use the phrase "embodied interpretant," as I recall. Gary used it & I picked it up from him. Now, Peirce says that an index doesn't necessarily resemble its object at all, and that it indicates its object whether we notice or not -- the relationship with its object is one of actual resistance or reaction (when the index a sinsign; otherwise, the relationship of its replica with the object). If I think of such reactions, I think vaguely of forces, variational principles, etc. And I think of effects which quantitatively and qualitatively differ a lot from their causes. In the case of icons, Peirce is more likely to think in terms of mathematical diagrams. He thinks that mathematical structures and patterns are real, and are real thirdness (I think). However, I don't know what Peirce thinks about iconicity in statistical patterns and processes in material nature -- I don't mean in the sense of statistical patterns making pictures of physical objects, if that ever happens. I mean in the sense that there are statistical processes whereby random fluctuations and differences cancel out to a common middle or average, and a stage of a process can be predictably similar to a current stage depending on how recent or soon-to-arrive it is at the time of the given curren stage. There are other kinds of widespread similarities -- typical percentages of various substances in widely dispersed material, & so on. Now insofar as we're talking about embodied iconicity, it's not just about resemblances, but about resemblances arising among things reactively or resistantially related -- in other words, a lot of things with family kinships, things made of the same kinds of stuff often from common sources and maybe ultimately all from a common source way way back, anyway, such that these things informatively resemble one another. Peirce does not seem to have regarded biological phenomena as involving genuine thirdness. He includes biology in the physical wing of cenoscopy. He says that if a sunflower's turning sunward could reproduce another sunflower's turning sunward without the second sunflower's having directly reacted with the sunlight, then the first sunflower's turning sunward would be a genuine a representamen (to the second sunflower) -- in the sense that a sign entails a mind, while a representamen does not, a distinction which he later dropped. And of course the second sunflower's turning sunward would be an interpretant representamen. If we look inside vegetable organisms, rather than among them, we might have better chances of finding genuine semiosis. However, although there is a lot of what we now call decoding, there doesn't appear to be the kind of learning & retention that allows chains of interpretants onward indefinitely, which is an essential part of what Peirce means by "interpretant" and semiosis. My view has been that retention in some useful form happens only with learning and testing of signs, interpretants and systems & "codes" of interpretation, and this involves recognitions which are neither mere claims (=signs) nor mere construals (=interpretants). I suspect that, instead, the info-theoretic setup is what there is at the vegetable level -- there are sources but not semiotic objects for the vegetable, there are encodings but not signs/representamens for the vegetable, there are decodings but not interpretants by the vegetable, and there are recipients but not recognitions by the vegetable -- also, the recipient of the signal seems to be the evolutionary process itself, whose "disconfirming" of the vegetable's decodings tends to involve removal of said vegetable from the gene pool. The individual vegetable does not learn, or even biologically evolve. Biological evolution is by trial and error, and, while biological evolution itself might be described as a capacity which has "evolved" in some ways (at least in regard to genetic change & stability), I don't know in what sense one would call it a learning process. However, we were discussing indices & icons, and then instead of moving on to symbols, I switched to interpretants. What about symbols? Now, certainly one can take planets as symbols -- Jupiter for power, Mars for war, Venus for love -- yet, for a scientific intelligence, is there anything in nature, at least at the biological level, which could be taken as symbols? Since we did not find resemblance embodied except in "compromise" form with indexicality, in material kinships, perhaps we have to look for some such "compromise" form in the case of symbols too. I don't know how to think of it except in terms of one's witnessing an organism decoding a stimulus and reacting in terms of that stimulus's "meaning" or "importance" for the organism by the standard of its species, gender, developmental phase, etc. The stimulus is an encoded signal for the organism but is a genuine symbol for us because we actually interpret it in a way that continues generating interpretants in us. But it's like a symbol in another language, the conventions are not ours but those of the vegetable species, etc. But it's not just a cause of a mere reaction because we're understanding it in terms of its "meaning" for the organism, in terms of the organism's interests; the organism's response is guided by functionality, ends. Well, this seems to complicated, I feel like there should be something simpler, and what happened to the "compromise" with indexicality that I was talking about? There should be a salient reactional or material connection between symbol & object, if we're to be consistent with the above icon case. Well, I guess there is that, with vegetable organisms. Anyway, that's enough for the time being! >[Jim] My personal understanding is that Peirce views objects as something which we abstract from triadic or representational experience. IOWs in the act of perceiving an object we are engaged in representation. However, I do not take this interpretation of Peirce to mean that Peirce is arguing that objects do not exist outside of our representation of them because clearly he is not saying this. The fact that objects exist (and are thus real in his definitional sense of the real as that which exist apart from what we imagine) does not mean that we have access or experience of objects apart from the triadic or representational mode of being of which they are inextricably embedded. Nor I might add does it mean that objects as we experience them representationally are necessarily other than what they are -- in contrast to the view that we experience objects through some distorting lens. What we experience is always a part of the truth -- our error is not that what we perceive is distorted but that we mistake the small part of the truth that we perceive (from our limited POV) as being the whole truth! Sometimes our error is that what we perceive is distorted, but just not always (one hopes!). Take Gary's notion that Queens is a part, a "borough" (quaint term!) of New York City -- next thing you know he'll be claiming that there are enormous bridges spanning the East River! Or, more seriously, let's say that somebody actually believed that Queens is NOT part of New York City. Or how about this, an actual case, a guy I knew believed that there are stable water-valleys in the ocean, places where the water doesn't find its level. But, yes, sometimes our error is just overestimation of the completeness of what we know. don't know about Peirce's thinking that we abstract objects from representational experience in some sense that we don't likewise abstract signs. Besides that, a lot of what you say sounds to me like that which Peirce is saying. >[Jim] This view raises the question (I guess I'm trying to suggest an answer to my own questions -- so my larger question is how does this solution seem to yall) what then is the distinction between objects such as trees and objects such as the word tree which are replicas of signs (or representamen of representations -- is that the correct usage of these terms btw). My answer is that both are abstractions. All are signs. So called objects are merely signs that we have not interpreted as signs. So called objects are signs in the universal mind of god or the universe -- but it is only when we use these objects as signs for other objects that we think of them as signs. IOWs what we have here is a confusion of level and meta level -- a sort of category mistake. All is a sign -- all things are signs and all of reality is merely a matter of signs interpreting signs. Indeed the modes of being called qualtiy reaction and interpretation can each be conceptually abstracted from the all inclusive reality of a universe of signs which is itself a sign -- but all experience (in the fullest sense of the word) is a matter of representation. At least I take this to be the overall thrust of Peirce's comments though I must admit that in some context and on some occassions his comments do seem to suggest that we can experience or know objects or reactions without representation. Why "so-called" objects that are "really" signs? There couldn't be semiotic objects or signs without each other. I don't see Peirce as seeing objects as less real than signs, or, to put it another way, object-roles as less real than sign-roles. The only case where in some sense signs may drop out of the picture is in idealized isolated mechanical systems in which complete knowledge of any stage tells you EVERYTHING about all stages before and after, such that familiarity with any stage would count as familiarity with all stages. You know the object whole in its any single moment. Only thing is, you'd have to interrupt this isolated "perfect" system in order to measure it. So you never get to know it. And I can't think even of an idealized case of signs where objects drop out of the picture -- it sounds like a mirror maze waiting for something opaque to be reflected in and throughout it. That's it. My brain has stopped working. That may already have been evident. Good evening! Best regards, Ben [Jim] > But as to the specific quote above -- I'm inclined to go with the reading you suggest above, Joe. Gary's reading (while a good way of illustrating the question or problem) changes the logic of Peirces statement. Yours, for me, clarifies Peirces remark in what strikes me as a most plausible way. Signs are not mere things -- however real. In fact, as I've argued above, what we call things are actually abstracted from signs. Things are mere replicas of signs as Gary has pointed out. -- on a related note: Wittgenstein points out (according to PMS Hacker) that when we say such things as "I have a pain" supposing we are describing an internal object such as the sensation of pain we are instead actually expressing the pain itself. The _expression_ is less an indicative symbol of pain as an exclamatory index of pain. I mention this because I think it may have some bearing on the issue of the so called internal vs external nature of experience. IOWs some seemingly symbolic sentences are actually merely indexes -- dressed up in the traditional form of symbolic sentences. This misunterpretation of how we are using language when speaking of such things as feeling and thoughts (as I understand Wittgenstein) accounts for much of the confusion we have about private language intuition and the like. I think Peirce may be saying saying something similar. And finally, (trying to squeeze a lot into this quick weekend note) -- I found a passage of Leo Strauss on interpretation vs explanation (and how to read texts in general) that I think is interesting both in terms of our reading of this text as well as giving some insight into Strauss. He comes off to me as not so sinister as I'd feared -- and in fact rather straight forward. This "secret/privledged reading stuff is merely a common sense admonition to be mindful of the context in which a writer is or was expressing his views. Minorities are of necessity generally more aware of this than those whose consciousness is limited by being of the majority opinion. As Peirce has said all development is a matter of eliminating options. On that which everyone agrees -- interpretation, development and consciousness stops. Which is the danger of mistakenly supposing agreement determines truth rather than truth being one factor that tends to promote agreement over the long haul. Perhaps truth is the only factor that promotes lasting agreement, but the trouble here is that lasting is a very long time so mere agreement by itself (without consideration of the time element) turns out to be a very poor measure of truth. Actually I think our individual perceptions (even including illusions and delusions) are excellent and indeed the only measure of personal truth -- but we must be ever vigilent not to mistake our narrow individual truths (limited across time and space) as the whole truth. But anyway I will try to post a short Strauss passage later. Just musing as usual. I'm greatly enjoying this New Elements and related discussion. Best wishes, Jim Piat
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