Frances, and list: Frances, you say: "In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may not. My current access to the published writings of Peirce is however limited, which further irritates me."
I really have no idea what made you guess that. Definitely not Peirce and what he wrote. For Peirce the word "representamen" is a more technical term than the word "sign". Please read the following from Lecture III (Lowell Lectures of 1903): "In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word REPRESENTATION to the operation of a sign or its RELATION TO the object FOR the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a SIGN or a REPRESENTAMEN. I use these two words, SIGN and REPRESENTAMEN, differently. By a SIGN I mean anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a REPRESENTAMEN as being whatever that analysis applies to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of what I say about SIGNS will be false. For in that case a SIGN may not be a REPRESENTAMEN. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen, since that is all that the word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something may happen to be true of all SIGNS, that is of everything that, antecedently to any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of which the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to HUMAN MINDS; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so" (CP 1.540; the words in capital letters here are in italics in the original published text). And then Peirce adds his definition of a representamen (this whole definition is in italics including all the words in capital letters): "A REPRESENTAMEN is a subject of a triadic relation TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a third, called its INTERPRETANT, this triadic relation being such that the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" (CP 1.541). CP 1.542: "It follows at once that this relation cannot consist in any actual event that ever can have occurred; for in that case there would be another actual event connecting the interpretant to an interpretant of its own of which the same would be true; and thus there would be an endless series of events which could have actually occurred, which is absurd. For the same reason the interpretant cannot be a DEFINITE individual object. The relation must therefore consist in a POWER of the representamen to determine SOME interpretant to being a representamen of the same object" (words in capital letters here are in italics in the original published text). Theresa Calvet --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
