I wonder if you can comment a bit more on the end of your note--how exactly 
does it make sense from a Peircean point of view to claim that poems are 
arguments?  More specifically, if poems qua aesthetic objects partake most of 
firstness, how can they also be arguments?


-----Original Message-----
>From: Eugene Halton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: May 9, 2006 7:45 AM
>To: Peirce Discussion Forum <>
>Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
>Kirsti M: ��The entelechy or perfection of being Peirce here refers to is 
>something never attained to full, but strived at, again and again. Just as 
>with science and scientific knowledge. It's about striving to approach, 
>better and better, The Truth. If there ever would be an end, the absolute 
>perfection of knowledge, that would mean an end, which would be in 
>contradiction with  life and living. Life and living IS striving - with 
>some kind of an end. Never the last possible��
>         I have to disagree, Kirsti. Life is more than �science and 
>scientific knowledge,� and more than �striving to approach, better and 
>better, The Truth.� And I mean this in a Peircean sense. Stated 
>differently, science is part of life, not the determinant of it.
>         By my lights life is participant in the entelechy of being, not a 
>spectator looking at a scoreboard it can never reach. The perfection of 
>being manifests all the time in realized aesthetic moments. Entelechy has 
>Firstness, here and now, does it not?
>         Perhaps something like this aesthetic perspective is what William 
>Blake had in mind when he wrote: �If the doors of perception were cleansed 
>every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed 
>himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern.�
>         ��[T]he living intelligence which is the creator of all 
>intelligible reality��, as Peirce put it in the earlier quotation you 
>comment on, means that ongoing creation involves more than chaos or chance, 
>it involves a �reasonableness energizing in the world,� as Peirce put it 
>elsewhere. If logic, as self-controlled thought, is a species of ethics, as 
>self-controlled conduct, and ethics is itself a species of aesthetics, as 
>the intrinsically admirable, then �The Truth� ultimately gives itself to 
>Beauty, as the ultimate of entelechy, as I understand Peirce.
>         And if so, as I see it, the perfection of being involves genesis, 
>as well as development. Perfecting habits of conduct and even the laws of 
>the universe itself, means the perfection of ongoing creation, not the 
>�overcoming� of it in some Hegelian straitjacket. From this perspective 
>final entelechy of all being is itself such a moment, poem, painting, 
>banquet, music, or better, mousike, rhythm-rhyme-dance-musicking, at least 
>in the sense in which Peirce claimed that:
>         �The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a 
>great poem -- for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony -- just as 
>every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a 
>painting -- with an impressionist seashore piece -- then every Quality in a 
>Premiss is one of the elementary colored particles of the Painting; they 
>are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that belongs 
>to the whole as whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can 
>appreciate in some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole -- 
>which Qualities result from the combinations of elementary Qualities that 
>belong to the premisses.� CP 5.119
>         Gene
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