Jerry, Gary, list, > A number of recent posts have addressed the topics of:
>>On Jun 19, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: >> Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign > I am seeking help in understanding the importance of these terms to > individual scholars. > The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me. > At issue is the question of why are these terms important to understanding > human communication. To Peirce, logical process = representational process, and is not a specifically human or intelligent-life phenomenon, a chapter in the books of psychology, sociology, history, even if these books covered reasoning creatures other than homo sapiens which is the only clear example of which we know (SETI hasn't found ET, at least not yet). Instead, to Peirce, humans are a special logical phenomenon -- he might assent to a current phrase like "logic processors" though not in the computer sense (deductive, with strict algorithms, etc.). For my part, I would say that "logicality" is general like statisticality or (in the information-theoretic sense) information. So these terms (signsign, legisign, qualisign) are important in understanding the logical possibilities which human communication tends to actualize. IMHO the importance is not so very different from the importance of aerodynamics to the evolution and anatomy of winged insects, pterosaurs, birds, bats, flying organisms generally. But I think that a more exact analogy would be the relationship of probability, statistics, and, as a general mathematical & statistical subject, stochastic processes, to matter. In the Peircean system, terms like qualisign/sinsign/legisign are also important, or regarded as destined to be important, in understanding the possibilities realized in metaphysics -- questions of ontology, questions of God, freedom, immortality, and (philosophical) questions of space, time, matter, etc. This is implicit in Peirce's classification of logic as a field which does not presuppose metaphysics but which is presupposed by metaphyiscs. > The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a "sign" is clearly > a creative use of language. > The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new categories as > derivatives of the parent word, sign. > Could one imagine other prefixes to the word sign? Peirce imagined quite a few other prefixes to the word sign. But presumably you mean such as to make a semantic distinction, not merely a morphological improvement. > Could one imagine more than three other prefixes? Your question would be helpfully clarified if you stated it directly instead of morphologically. Obviously one can imagine, so to speak, many more classes of signs, and Peirce certainly did. Can one imagine a classification into a 4-chotomy of signs? Of course one can, but, for better or worse, it would be unPeircean. Triadism is built deeply into Peirce's semiotic. > How is this context important in distinguishing among paths of usages? It's a way of distinguishing between specific occurrences of signs, the appearances of signs, and the general "meaning" or habitual 'conventional' interpretation of a sign. (The symbol's interpretant, in being an inferential outcome, usually goes beyond such conventional significations.) For many practical and theoretical purposes, English "horse" and Spanish _caballo_ are the same legisign. "Horse" and _caballo_ won't be regarded as the same qualisign (except by those for whom all human words are indistinguishably the same qualisign). "Horse" and _caballo_ won't be regarded as ever being the same sinsign (except by those for whom pretty much all human occurrences are one single undecomposable occurrence). > What other terms might be substituted for these terms? Peirce himself offered, at various times, at least three sets of words for the same trichotomy of logical terms: Tone, token, type. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign. Potisign, actisign, famisign. One might call them: a quality-as-a-sign, a singular-as-a-sign, and a general-as-a-sign. He at least mentioned other words as candidates as well. > Do these terms impact the concept of a grammar? It depends on the grammar. If this were some other forum, your conception of "grammar" might be implicitly understood and accepted. Here, in a philosophical forum which happens to be a crossroads of many specialties and traditions, you need to define it and state the context and tradition from which you are drawing your sense of the word, in order to make yourself widely understood. > Is this ad hoc extension of the concept of sign desirable for mathematics? > How does it contribute to the mathematical usages of signs? You specified neither the "hoc" nor the basal concept of which you characterize Peirce's terms as an extension. I guess everybody likes to think of his or her concept as the genus and of the other forms of the concept as the specializations. But you haven't said what your concept is, so there's no way to judge the plausibility of your characterization of it as an ad hoc extension. Peirce would probably argue that semiotic is desirable for philosophy about mathematics. His classification of semiotic (aka logic aka sign studies) as part of philosophy is his statement that semiotic presupposes mathematics and that mathematics does not presuppose semiotic. Nobody actively participating on peirce-l has self-identified as a mathematician, but perhaps some peirce-lister could say whether any mathematician has commented on the possibilities of the qualisign/sinsign/legisign conception's contributing to mathematical usages of signs. Maybe somebody could say whether Peirce himself said anything on the subject. > Is it desire to bring the concept of 'many' into the concept of 'sign' in > this manner? Why? I'm not sure what you mean by "to bring the concept of 'many' into the concept of 'sign' in this matter." However, in a general way, the Peircean answer is that logic is semiotic and is more basic than metaphysics. Peirce defined and pursued semiotic as a philosophical field, not as a field in linguistics, which is concerned with language as a concrete historical phenomenon involved especially with _homo sapiens_ and as may turn out to be involved with intelligent life elsewhere than Earth, and as may become involved with such intelligent life as _homo sapiens_ or its heirs eventually breed or engineer. Best, Ben Udell > I presume that many readers of this list are teachers and have lectured on > these terms. I have been struggling with these terms for some time and hope > that knowledgable Peircian students can explain the importance of this > seemingly disconnected usage of grammar from various perspectives. > Cheers > Jerry --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
