[peirce-l] Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary, Ben, List:

Thank you for the responses to my questions.  Your answers persuade  
me that my questions were not crisp and hence not very generative.   
BTW, I try to make it a habit to use logical terms in the sense of  
their roots in Latin or Greek, hence my use of the term "category"  
was in the wide sense.

It seems from this and subsequence discussions on the list, that I  
failed to weigh the depth of effort to trichotomize decision logic in  
Peirce's writings adequately.  The use of the term "divisible" in  
reference to natural languages terms is rare and I find it quite  
difficult to interpret.  I find it rather difficult to think of  
common language as a source of terms that can be divided into three.   
This sentiment certainly comes out of respect for the concept of  
arithmetic  operations.

The design of the trichotomies in chemical structures is a relatively  
simple task in that each trichotomy of material origin is signified  
by the identities of three different elements.  For each of the three  
elements, concrete evidence must be obtained that exhibits the  
present of that element in the compound.  For example, any chemical  
structure that contains only carbon, hydrogen and oxygen is a sign.  
This tactic for generating chemical trichotomies is not readily  
extended to natural terms.  How would one show that a particular term  
has three extensions?  Even a superficial examination of a dictionary  
shows that many, perhaps the majority of words have more than three  
meanings attached.

Of course, one could assume that the categorization into trichotomies  
is not a general logical operation.  Perhaps it is only a local  
operation that is restricted to some fraction of the terms.  How  
would one identify such a fraction of the potential terms?  The image  
of a commutative diagram comes to mind but...

From a mathematical perspective, the richness of the combinatorial  
possibilities is daunting.  How does one ensure consistency within  
trichotomies in the absence of concrete grammars that generate  
Porphyrean trees?

I will be at the Whitehead Conference in Salzburg next week so I do  
not anticipate much time for replies.  At least for the Salzburg  
papers, I am going to restrict my remarks to comparison of   
"synthetic symbol systems", although I continue to hope that Peirce  
had something useful to say to modern chemical logic.

Cheers

Jerry







On Jun 21, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote:

Subject: Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
From: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2006 18:14:24 -0400
X-Message-Number: 10

Jerry, Gary, list,

A number of recent posts have addressed the topics of:

On Jun 19, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote:
Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

I am seeking help in understanding the importance of these terms to =
individual scholars.
The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me.
At issue is the question of why are these terms important to =
understanding human communication.

To Peirce, logical process =3D representational process, and is not  
a =
specifically human or intelligent-life phenomenon, a chapter in the =
books of psychology, sociology, history, even if these books covered =
reasoning creatures other than homo sapiens which is the only clear =
example of which we know (SETI hasn't found ET, at least not yet). =20

Instead, to Peirce, humans are a special logical phenomenon -- he  
might =
assent to a current phrase like "logic processors" though not in the =
computer sense (deductive, with strict algorithms, etc.). For my  
part, I =
would say that "logicality" is general like statisticality or (in  
the =
information-theoretic sense) information.

So these terms (signsign, legisign, qualisign) are important in =
understanding the logical possibilities which human communication  
tends =
to actualize. IMHO the importance is not so very different from the =
importance of aerodynamics to the evolution and anatomy of winged =
insects, pterosaurs, birds, bats, flying organisms generally. But I =
think that a more exact analogy would be the relationship of =
probability, statistics, and, as a general mathematical &  
statistical =
subject, stochastic processes, to matter.=20

In the Peircean system, terms like qualisign/sinsign/legisign are  
also =
important, or regarded as destined to be important, in  
understanding the =
possibilities realized in metaphysics -- questions of ontology, =
questions of God, freedom, immortality, and (philosophical)  
questions of =
space, time, matter, etc. This is implicit in Peirce's  
classification of =
logic as a field which does not presuppose metaphysics but which is =
presupposed by metaphyiscs.

The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a "sign"  
is =
clearly a creative use of language.
The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new  
categories as =
derivatives of the parent word, sign.
Could one imagine other prefixes  to the word sign?

Peirce imagined quite a few other prefixes to the word sign. But =
presumably you mean such as to make a semantic distinction, not  
merely a =
morphological improvement.

Could one imagine more than three other prefixes?

Your question would be helpfully clarified if you stated it directly =
instead of morphologically. Obviously one can imagine, so to speak,  
many =
more classes of signs, and Peirce certainly did. Can one imagine a =
classification into a 4-chotomy of signs? Of course one can, but,  
for =
better or worse, it would be unPeircean. Triadism is built deeply  
into =
Peirce's semiotic.

How is this context important in distinguishing among paths of  
usages?

It's a way of distinguishing between specific occurrences of signs,  
the =
appearances of signs, and the general "meaning" or habitual =
'conventional' interpretation of a sign. (The symbol's  
interpretant, in =
being an inferential outcome, usually goes beyond such conventional =
significations.) For many practical and theoretical purposes,  
English =
"horse" and Spanish _caballo_ are the same legisign.  "Horse" and =
_caballo_ won't be regarded as the same qualisign (except by those  
for =
whom all human words are indistinguishably the same qualisign).  
"Horse" =
and _caballo_ won't be regarded as ever being the same sinsign  
(except =
by those for whom pretty much all human occurrences are one single =
undecomposable occurrence).

What other terms might be substituted for these terms?

Peirce himself offered, at various times, at least three sets of  
words =
for the same trichotomy of logical terms:

Tone, token, type.
Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.
Potisign, actisign, famisign.

One might call them:
a quality-as-a-sign, a singular-as-a-sign, and a general-as-a-sign.

He at least mentioned other words as candidates as well.

Do these terms impact the concept of a grammar?

It depends on the grammar. If this were some other forum, your =
conception of "grammar" might be implicitly understood and accepted. =
Here, in a philosophical forum which happens to be a crossroads of  
many =
specialties and traditions, you need to define it and state the  
context =
and tradition from which you are drawing your sense of the word, in =
order to make yourself widely understood.

Is this ad hoc extension of the concept of sign desirable for =
mathematics?
How does it contribute to the mathematical usages of signs?

You specified neither the "hoc" nor the basal concept of which you =
characterize Peirce's terms as an extension. I guess everybody  
likes to =
think of his or her concept as the genus and of the other forms of  
the =
concept as the specializations.  But you haven't said what your  
concept =
is, so there's no way to judge the plausibility of your  
characterization =
of it as an ad hoc extension.

Peirce would probably argue that semiotic is desirable for  
philosophy =
about mathematics. His classification of semiotic (aka logic aka  
sign =
studies) as part of philosophy is his statement that semiotic =
presupposes mathematics and that mathematics does not presuppose =
semiotic.

Nobody actively participating on peirce-l has self-identified as a =
mathematician, but perhaps some peirce-lister could say whether any =
mathematician has commented on the possibilities of the =
qualisign/sinsign/legisign conception's contributing to mathematical =
usages of signs. Maybe somebody could say whether Peirce himself  
said =
anything on the subject.

Is it desire to bring the concept of 'many' into the concept of  
'sign' =
in this manner?  Why?

I'm not sure what you mean by "to bring the concept of 'many' into  
the =
concept of 'sign' in this matter." However, in a general way, the =
Peircean answer is that logic is semiotic and is more basic than =
metaphysics. Peirce defined and pursued semiotic as a philosophical =
field, not as a field in linguistics, which is concerned with  
language =
as a concrete historical phenomenon involved especially with _homo =
sapiens_ and as may turn out to be involved with intelligent life =
elsewhere than Earth, and as may become involved with such  
intelligent =
life as _homo sapiens_ or its heirs eventually breed or engineer.

Best,
Ben Udell

I presume that many readers of this list are teachers and have =
lectured on these terms. I have been struggling with these terms for =
some time and hope that knowledgable Peircian students can explain  
the =
importance of this seemingly disconnected usage of grammar from  
various =
perspectives.

Cheers

Jerry


Jerry LR Chandler
Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
George Mason University





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