To the List: The following quote, the fourth and part of the fifth paragraphs, is from Ms. 325, "Pragmatism Made Easy" (We are thankful to Juan Pablo Serra for posting this Ms.) "The particular point that had been made by Bain and that had most struck Green, and through him, the rest of us, was the insistence that what a man really believes is what he would be ready to act upon, and to risk much upon. The writer endeavoured to weave that truth in with others wich he had made out for himself, so as to make a consistent doctrine of cognition. It appeared to him to be requisite to connect Bain’s doctrine, on the one hand, with physiological phenomena, and on another hand, with logical distinctions. It had long been said that the phenomena of consciousness were of three kinds, Feeling, Volition and Cognition. The writer proposed to amend that enumeration in one particular, so as to make it correspond with a logical division. Logical predicates are of three kinds; these of wich each is connected with a single subject, these of wich each is connected with two subjects, one grammatically called the subject nominative and the other the object, and these whose connections with subjects exceed two and wich are analyzable into predicated at once of subjects nominative, of direct objects, and of indirect objects. Now feelings always arise as predicates of single objects; and it is only by subsequent reflexion, wich is not Feeling, that they may become connected with two or more subjects." I note the following: In the earlier (1869?) essay, the example of the logic of three objects was a spatial example of three paths. More directly, if two paths, then the paths could only be added, if three paths, then branching was possible. The distinction was based on the possible arrangements of two ro three "objects" in the plane or in space. This reasoning was very consistent with the chemical symbolism of Dalton in terms of relational logic among chemical radicals. In MS 325, the logic is explicitly expressed in terms of grammar. More precisely, in terms of predicate logic. The phrase: Logical predicates are of three kinds; is a particular belief about English grammar. I am skeptical that it is true for all grammars. Does anyone know of languages that have more than three kinds of predicates? Or, less than three kinds of predicates? Given the extraordinary richness of human communications, it seems highly probable that such examples exist; I would like to quote a specific example. Continuing on with the sentence: ...these of wich each is connected with a single subject, This phrase, in this context, could mean that Peirce was expressing the potential of a copula to connect the subject with a particular property of the subject. For example, "The apple is red." Does this example of the logic of predicates of English grammar start the notion of "Firstness"? If so, how does one categorize the notion of a simpler logical sentence, "Apples exist"? Continuing to decompose the sentence, these of wich each is connected with two subjects, one grammatically called the subject nominative and the other the object, This phrase appears to continue the metaphor between English grammar and logic. Does this example of the logic of predicates of English grammar start the notion of "Secondness"? I note that one could also construct a sentence of the form: Apples and oranges exist. The final part of the sentence reads: and these whose connections with subjects exceed two and wich are analyzable into predicated at once of subjects nominative, of direct objects, and of indirect objects. At this point, Peirce appears to abandon examples of Aristotelian species and goes directly to the genus, namely, with the word pair, "exceed two". Does this example of the logic of predicates of English grammar start the notion of "Thirdness"? Does this example have any explicatory value with respect to the nature of thirdness? I note that one could also construct a sentence of the form: Apples and oranges and peaches and pears exist. I also note that I have chosen examples of existential sentences with the names (categories?) of fruit. I feel that these examples would be equally germane if I had chosen the names of chemical elements or or Daltonian signs. Am I mistaken in this belief? The introductory phrase of the next paragraph: Now feelings always arise as predicates of single objects; and it is only by subsequent reflexion, wich is not Feeling, that they may become connected with two or more subjects." is simply beyond my comprehension. I have not a method to relate to the proposed illation. My belief is that my feelings are internal impulses and are independent of English grammar but are manifestations of relations intrinsic to my internal existence. If I wish to think about my feelings or to communicate a feeling to another, then I may chose to invoke grammar. For example, my dog often responds to my feelings even before the feeling is manifest in my mind. So, what was Peirce seeking to communicate with this phrase? Any ideas would be helpful. On a personal note, I beginning to grasp the challenges Pierce faced in maintaining a number based categorization system as dramatic 'sea changes' in science during the second half 19 th Century undercut the very basis of his scientific perspective. For example, the chemical table of elements, the emergence of thermodynamics as a source chemical explanation, the exploitation of the concept of chemical isomers (same symbols, different arrangements), and of course, the emergence of Darwinianism in biological explanation all destabilized the earlier Schoolmen belief system and laid the foundations for the 21 st Century metaphysics that we endure today. Finally, I would thank the several individuals who have responded to my queries. The discussions have been very helpful for my thinking. I appreciate the time and thought you have volunteered. Cheers Jerry Jerry LR Chandler Research Professor Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study George Mason University --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com |
