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Gary, Joe, Jim, list,
(continued, 2rd part) >[Gary] It does seem most likely and natural that there are a number of
corrections and additions to be made in regard to Peirce's theories. For
example, Ben points to the need for contemporary research fields to find their
places within Peirce's classification of the sciences. But first folk
have got to see the power of such an approach to classification, a matter which
Kelly Parker admirably discusses at length in relation to continuity/triadicity
in one of the early chapters of his book (the revisions that Ben has suggested
to Peirce's classification seem to me idiosyncratic; and certainly any such
revision of the classification ought not be one person's "take" on the matter
anyhow).
That last remark sets up a strawman. To the contrary of course I'm not
suggesting that people ought to embrace my revision even when they disagree with
it and when I'm the only one in favor of it. Any revision of the classification
ought not to be decided by a poll of whether one person supports it or dozens of
people support it, etc. If, nevertheless, numbers are worth mentioning when I'm
in the minority of one, let's remember that -- in numbers of supporters among
philosophers -- Peirceanism itself comes in far behind linguistic analysis &
phenomenological/existential philosophy. Now, if we want to rephrase
"minority of one" into "thinks he's right and whole rest of the world is wrong,"
that's merely self-inflammatory rhetoric, especially when the whole
philosophical world is far from agreement among its constituents about the
subject in question.
Now, I don't see why _more_ folks have to first see the power
of an approach to classification. What is needed is for the people most
interested in the subject to actually attempt it -- just _do_ it,
engage the issues, and get productive inquiry rolling. The commencing to appear
of some sort of interesting questions and first fruitful results along the way
will be the strongest persuader that the approach could be more
generally fruitful and that the subject is even worth pursuing at all.
Birger Hjørland http://www.db.dk/bh/home_uk.htm has
written http://www.db.dk/bh/Core%20Concepts%20in%20LIS/articles%20a-z/classification_of_the_sciences.htm "There
is not today (2005), to my knowledge, any organized research program about the
classification of the sciences in any discipline or in any country. As Miksa
(1998) writes, the interest for this question largely died in the beginning of
the 20th century." And the would-be classifier is up against a lot more than
that. It seems that not a few researchers believe that classification of
research is an unredeemable bane.
Of course, I do think that the reason that Peirceans haven't attempted
incorporations of contemporary fields into the Peircean classification, is that
it's rather difficult. For instance, statistics seems to belong in cenoscopy,
but it doesn't seem to belong within philosophy in any traditional sense. And
what of information theory and its various areas? The problems involved are
philosophical problems -- I think that they're to be solved philosophically. I
doubt that stirring interest in people from various fields will do much to help
various research fields "find their places" in the Peircean classification when
those most familiar with the classification can't figure out how to place such
well established and much written-about fields as probability theory,
statistical theory, information theory, etc. within it. Of course I'm not
against trying to stir other people's interest. But I think that it's just
delaying the grappling with the philosophical problems.
Regarding idiosyncrasy. You think my classification is idiosyncratic. I
think that a side-by-side comparison of my classification with Peirce's would
show that mine is not idiosyncratic and is actually more regular and systematic.
With each of four major families of research, I associate a category -- Peirce
doesn't do that at all -- a referential scope or 'quantity' -- Peirce
doesn't do that -- and a typical inferential mode of conclusion -- Peirce does
that only for mathematics. Crossing the families are inter-family bands of
'friendly cousins' based ultimately on such general and systematizable
conceptions as those of relationships of 'one-to-one,' 'many-to-one,'
'one-to-many,' and 'many-to-many'. What those abtract and colorless
characterizations amount to or correlate with, I try to sketch along the
first column at the relevant rows. Meanwhile the attempt to trace
out implicit Peircean inter-family and inter-subfamily bands or patterns
leads to that which Joe Ransdell has called the appearance of "derangement" in
Peircean classification.
Now, one can certainly believe that my classification is wrong,
and some years ago I put it through enough changes that the possibility of
revising it again is quite real to me, and, one way or another,
it certainly is a work in progress. I think, however, that it is harder to
say that it is particularly idiosyncratic, random, arbitrary, etc., insofar as I
do arrange it in explicit terms of large patterns logically related to one
another. I am even led, thereby, into what amounts to an intellectual
prediction -- that the field of 'inverse optimization,' 'inverse variations,'
'multi-objective optimization,' or whatever it is finally called, is a field
that will rank in importance with statistical theory (as far as I know, this
hasn't happened yet, and inverse optimization, as a disciplinary field, is
young, maybe no more than a decade old).
(1) Info theory's development of group-theoretic structures
was historically independent of group theory; ergo, such info theory
has considerable disciplinary overlap with algebra and has presumably
gotten much involved with the drawing of pure-math-style
conclusions.
Peirce's classification of the discovery sciences
>[Gary] A powerful idea is (paraphrasing Peirce) like a child--it needs
care and nurturing. With friends suggesting the child is a kind of partially
formed monster, who needs enemies?
Enemies? You have your dear theory, I have mine, others have theirs. I
won't grant to your views more value or authority than to mine on some sort
of grounds that yours have more in common with Peirce's and some others' views
than mine have. The content of such grounds is true, but wouldn't serve
reasonably as grounds. It would be to concede to an argument from authority,
authority of a kind and degree which I don't grant, so the argument just won't
work with me. The locus for an argument on whether you or I anybody should grant
Peirce's authority and correctness in these matters is in discussion of those
matters themselves, not in discussion of how brilliant Peirce and his
interpreters have been.
We all have _feelings_; none of us is the Lone Ranger in that
department. We all know that a forum where the criterion is simply
"relevance to Peirce" is hardly the place to shield one's theories from
criticism or to shield oneself from feeling pained by the sheer fact of
disagreement. If you can convince Joe to turn this into a "working" forum for
those already on board with the theory, then fine. I'd find it disappointing,
but have no objections that would be based on principle. It's Joe's forum.
>[Gary] Certainly were I ever to become convinced that there were indeed
other than three universes of experience, three categories, three semeiotic
elements I would immediately be forced on pragmatic principles to modify my view
radically. But that has not happened, and the 3 universes, categories, and
semeiotic elements continue to be confirmed in my own experience and thinking.
As regards Ben's thinking in this matter, I have not yet been convinced by his
arguments that, say, collateral experience on the one hand, or coding/decoding
on the other, necessitate adding a fourth semeiotic element or analog. Until
that happens I personally will concentrate on promoting the healthy growth
of a *child* who seems to me most remarkable, most promising, who
continuously inspires my own creative work, etc.
>[Gary] But moving along, as you've written before, Ben, your 1st is a kind of 2nd, and your fourth is in a sense another form of the object. Here you give your semeiotic four in outline form.
>[Gary] Besides the probably insignificant point that commencing with a
kind of secondness, and having two object-like elements seems to me to weight
your four-fold structure with too much secondness, as well as my sense (from
studying your Tetrast diagrams) that index, icon, and symbol in your
system represent some aspects of Peirce's categories, but also much else
which seems alien to Peirce's understanding of these three (so that they are
really not the same animals), I again just ask: how could Peirce--and many
brilliant interpreters--have missed the 4th, the proxy, your "logic itself" (as
in your schema above--there the symbol seems reduced to mere coding of
information and to have no inferential or generative power of its own vs Peirce
where "symbols grow")?
Those aren't my semiotic four per se. They are a set of correlations
between _kinds of sign_ and (hypostatically abstracted) _kinds of
attribution of predicate or proposition_. It is not hard to see the
resonance in the first three cases. The fourth correlation will
be harder to grasp since most of us are not used to thinking in terms of
that which I call a "proxy." Anyway, my semiotic four are, instead, object,
sign, interpretant, recognizant.
I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible
logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's
about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued
that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to
distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I
wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the
verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would
have addressed it more aggressively.
There's no reason for me to have to come up with a theory of "how Peirce
and others missed it," any more than you need, before forging ahead with
your work in Peircean philosophy, to come up with a theory of how it is that
many brilliant thinkers in logic & philosophy, including readers of Peirce,
have failed to see that which Peirce and others have believed that they've
seen. Anyway, such theories about ignorance or error on philosophical
issues tend to presume agreement on the issues themselves, so I'd rather stick
to the issues themselves, rather than get drawn into a sucker's game of a
delicate balancing act of trying on unaccepted premisses to illuminate some sort
of intellectual flaw in Peirce without seeming simply hostile to Peirce. Maybe I
would let myself get drawn into that, if I felt hostile to Peirce, but instead I
like Peirce.
You should feel obliged to supply such a theory, one for why so many
philosophers have failed to regard Peirce as correct and as importantly correct,
if you think that I should supply a theory for why Peirce failed
to see that which I believe that I see, (though I don't see any reciprocal
obligation on myself as thereby arising, since I don't see that either one of us
is obliged to undertake such theorizings in the first place).
It's good and constructive, if one thinks that somebody is wrong, to try to
understand how they could have failed to notice their supposed error. But
to require theories about such things as the price of disagreement would be to
concede a little too much to a validity of argument from authority, and the
subject of why is not of primary importance. Peirceans sometimes offer their
speculations as to why most philosophers are non-Peircean, but I'm not aware
that theoretical work on that question is regarded -- by Peirceans, at least --
as necessary in order to pursue Peircean theory despite its non-acceptance by
philosophers in general.
I'll continue this.
Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
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