[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC

[Patrick Sullivan]

Title: Re: [peirce-l] Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC

Been awhile since I’ve worked with this stuff, but there is a fundamental difference between ontologies in Carnap and Peirce that will inform how each discusses the relationship between experience and knowledge.  The statement below would be far more in line with the nominalism behind Carnap, and inconsistent with Peirce’s realism.  The reduction of “the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity” would be a function of continuity, of real generality in experience, driven by an inferential theory of cognition at the level of knowledge.  The “gradiations” among concepts reflects the iterative, transitive nature of the categories via thirdness (in later essays for example, why there is no “problem of induction” for Peirce— Carnap missed that one, too, along with Popper, regarding Peirce).  The “theory already established” would be Kant.

So, view things through the difference in ontologies, and follow the realist thread.


On 9/6/06 7:34 PM, "Steven Ericsson-Zenith" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

An alternative point of view would argue that Peirce is saying the opposite of what I have said before and that he means that distinct "sensuous impressions" are brought to together as a function of conceptions. 

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