[peirce-l] Re: Epistemological Primacy in Peirce NLC

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Thank you Joe, that is helpful - I will have to get myself an electronic version of the CP. This clears up my concern regarding the term "unity" - he is using the definition that he gives to Kant's usage. CP 6.378 (1901)  from  "Unity and Plurality" in Baldwin's Dictionary 378. Unity is divided by Kant into analytical and synthetical. He never defines or explains these terms; but if we remember that, in his use of words, multiplicity of elements is essential to unity, it is easy to see that what he means by analytical unity is the unity of that which is given in its combined state and is analyzed by ordinary reflection. Thus we perceive a fact; and in order to express or think it we analyze it, and the relation of the percept to the elements resulting from this analysis is very inappropriately called analytical unity. ... I still have the problem however that this is vague with respect to my question - both here, and as Peirce observes, in the Critique of Pure Reason. I have not found a clear statement that would indicate either one or the other case I have put forward by either Peirce or Kant. I take the position that the process of analysis/semeiosis is one that, for the life of the organism, reduces the organism's entire experience to conceptions/signs and that this process is one of differentiation - not one of integration.   I find the language of integration in Peirce and Kant and the term unity is, I think, the key to it. Reviewing Kant I can also get the sense that both interpretations are possible and so I am left to conclude on my own review that neither Kant nor Peirce had refined their models to this degree - though they may well have been heading there. I will welcome any correction to this view. Carnap makes a statement about the whole experience being primary because he seeks to justify his use of the autopsychological (solipsism) as the sole basis of his construction in his epistemology: "... we have to proceed from that which is epistemically primary, that is to say, from the "given", i.e., from experiences themselves in their totality and undivided unity... ...In opposition to the "atomizing" school of thought ...  ... the total impression is epistemically primary..."  Section 67, LSotW, Rudolf Carnap He cites "more and more emphasis" from Schlick, esp. Schuppe, Cornelius, Gomperz - of whom I am only really familiar with Schlick.  In the same section he also mentions  "Reininger makes similar statements and refers to Kant." I don't know Reininger, but this suggests that Carnap was not familiar with Kant at the time. Finally, he refers to Gestalt theory. With respect, Steven On Sep 7, 2006, at 10:14 AM, Joseph Ransdell wrote: Steven: I append to this message some quotes from Peirce that might be helpful as regards cognitive synthesis, for what it's worth.  (I picked them up from a string search of the CP on "synthesis" and they looked like they might be pertinent.) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com