> To: [email protected] > From: [email protected] > Date: Sun, 30 Jan 2011 06:59:20 +0000 > Subject: [marinongpinoy] PIRACY OVERVIEW 2010 > > > PIRACY OVERVIEW 2010 > As another full year in the pirate calendar ends, the depressing cycle seen > in 2009 has been repeated. The small green shoots of hope seen in lower > levels of activities in January and February 2010 quickly shrivelled and the > year ended with alarming levels of attacks, not only in greater numbers but > with a more extensive geographical spread than previously seen. The number of > hijacked vessels still in the hands of the pirates at the end of 2010 was 26, > a figure that could have been much higher had it not been for the dozen or so > vessels that were boarded by pirates but where protracted hijackings were > avoided by the use of the citadel. > Duration of attacks > During 2010, 21 vessels were released, with an estimated total ransom of > around US$75 million being paid. The average duration of a hijacking > calculated by reference to the last six ships released (ending with the > Marida Marguerite on 27 December) stands at 255 days. The corresponding > rolling six ship average for the previous year was 93 days. Only six ships > were released in less than 100 days and none of those occurred after May. A > thought should go out in particular to the crews of the Iceberg (hijacked 29 > March) and the Rak Africaan ( hijacked 11 April). > Assuming that a hijacking costs three times the ransom paid in terms of loss > of hire, loss of opportunity, cargo losses etc, then the total costs to the > stakeholders of those vessels involved must be close to US$400 million. The > additional costs in terms of security, additional premiums and deviation to > the industry are considerable. Lloyd's List estimated the annual cost to the > industry at US$16 billion. The human cost and the trauma suffered by the crew > kept confined in one room for over six months cannot be calculated. > In another recent article in Lloyd's List, Mark Harris of ASI Global, a > company with considerable experience in kidnapping and latterly maritime > hijackings, was quoted as saying that shipowners owed a duty to each other to > keep ransom payments to a minimum. The statement is no doubt based on the > morality of paying ransoms at all and that is fully understood by everybody > involved. > But is it right? Further, if it is not right, but is the basis upon which > negotiations are carried out, does it follow that it is the reason for the > ever-lengthening duration of the hijackings? This is a debate that the > industry has not had but, in the face of a rapidly deteriorating picture, > perhaps it should. Whilst the crew bear the brunt as the leverage in the > negotiations, the financial victims of the extortion remain, for the most > part, the hull (or war) and cargo underwriters. General Average has been > around for hundreds of years and, in maritime casualties, it is the way that > the benefits are balanced. Traditionally, crew do not contribute to the GA > part. If the present approach to the negotiations (following what has been > referred to as the "Mexican kidnapping template") is a reason for the present > situation, then is it time to question whether what is being done is right? > If, at the outset, all the stakeholders (including the P&I Clubs) ask > themselves (as they would in any other maritime casualty) what their > potential combined exposure will be assuming a five or six month hijacking > and the answer is US$10 million or US$15 million (the Actuarial Profession in > October put the average at US$9m), then surely those stakeholders would ask > why it makes sense for them to lose that sum in the face of a ransom payment > of say US$3.5 million. Nowhere else in shipping would that make sense. > Of course, it is not as simple as that and the inevitable consequence would > be an increase in ransoms. The first and obvious retort to that is that > ransoms are increasing anyway. Like housing sales in a rising market, ransoms > are often based on the price obtained in a previous case. However, if the > cost of the ransom is truly balanced between the stakeholders, there is > perhaps a reasonable expectation that the overall cost to the industry would > decrease, as it would be accompanied by a decrease in the duration of the > hijacking. If nothing else, it reduces the suffering of the crew. > Whilst the industry may have some influence on the reward side, the risk to > the pirates remains minimal. The IMO reported in July 2010 that over 700 > pirates had been caught and released by the military. Extrapolated over the > year, that would mean a total of 1,400 pirates who have been interdicted in > some way by the military but then released. There is no criticism of the > military, who can only respond according to the mandate given to them by > national governments. It is refreshing to see that France adopted new piracy > laws, making it easier for their military forces to arrest any pirate > attacking any ship. However, the law does not go as far as to allow them to > receive pirates taken by other European ships for prosecution in France. > Piracy prosecutions still make headline news in Europe and the US because of > their rarity. This year has seen successful piracy prosecutions in Holland, > Germany and the US, but the total number involved is fewer than 20 pirates. > Citadels > 2010 was also the year of the citadel being adopted increasingly as a > defensive tactic. The high profile case of the Taipan in particular and the > amendment to the Best Management Practice Guidelines gave a greater profile > to the citadel and not just in areas where there was at least a possibility > of fast military intervention. By the end of the year, at least 12 vessels > were reported to have successfully used the citadel and many of these were > deep in the Indian Ocean. The threat of military action seemed to be a potent > deterrent to the pirates remaining on board. However, the pirates' ability to > adapt means this remains a strategy which requires considerable forethought > and planning. If the threat continues in 2011, there is a risk that we will > see more aggressive tactics in trying to breach citadels and it must be a > matter of time before the owners' luck runs out. BMP Guidelines are clear and > ship operators and masters are "........ strongly advised to check directly > with MSCHOA regarding the use of citadels......". > Armed guards > The debate on armed guards continues. The trend towards arming ships grows. > There is no doubt that some owners are being driven towards army ships as a > result of purely commercial factors. Shipowners are in competition and good > business is being lost to those who have taken steps to arm ships that can > compete for East Africa business. Shipowners are increasingly pushed to > reconsider previously held principles that they would not arm their vessels. > The pool of armed men and weapons is finite and an increase in demand will > undoubtedly put pressure on the reputable maritime security companies. The > last thing the industry needs is a decrease in quality. There is a clear need > for the development of a standard MARSEC (US Maritime Coast Guard Security) > Contract which can be adopted across the board. This would give comfort to > underwriters and owners alike. The unique selling point remains that ships > with armed guards have not been hijacked. It is the mantra of the MARSEC > Companies, but it does not make the use of armed teams any less controversial. > Click here to read an article covering the use of armed guards and the legal > issues involved. > Mother ships > The other worrying development, caused in part by the duration of the > hijackings and in part by the difficulties that the pirates are having in > operating deep in the Indian Ocean, has been the use of other hijacked > commercial vessels as mother ships. This allows them to operate at much > greater limits of endurance at far less physical risk. Vessels that have been > used as mother ships include the Samho Dream (a VLCC) and, more recently, the > Izumi, the York, and the Polar (also laden with oil). The evolving picture is > of gangs using one vessel to hijack the next. This represents a serious > threat to the citadel tactic where military intervention is not on hand. It > is a credible next step that crew members from the hijacked mother ship could > be transferred to the blacked out bridge of the second ship (where the crew > are in a citadel). This would negate that crew's intention to defeat a > hijacking, particularly if the vessel was then towed, however crudely, > towards Somalia. > Legal developments > Perhaps the most significant legislative development of the year was the > Executive Order on Somalia and piracy, issued by the US on 13 April. This is > now better understood and companies work with the US Office of Foreign Assets > Control ("OFAC") to ensure that they do not fall foul of its provisions. > However, it is frustrating that OFAC will not give any clarification as to > whether the Order does not apply to secondary payments i.e. indemnity > payments by insurers of cargo or charterers, where the ransom has been paid > by a non-US person to the pirates. This can and does act as a hindrance to > the willingness of other stakeholders to engage in the process. > In the Saldanha case (see article at here), where Ince & Co acted for the > successful owners, we saw clarification under English law on the issue of > payment of hire under a time charter during a hijacking. In a more recent, > arbitration, a London Tribunal was asked to consider whether a refusal to > transit the high risk area in November 2008 by an owner relying on the > Conwartime Clause was valid. The Tribunal accepted that the Gulf of Aden was > "dangerous" and determined that an analysis of the danger should not be > calculated by reference to an increase of the statistical analysis of the > threat between the date of the charter and the date the order was given. They > also considered whether the decision made by the owners was "reasonable" and > answered that by reference to the existing authorities on the issue of > discretionary decision-making. It was said that such a decision could not be > made arbitrarily and that it was necessary to look at the basis of the > decision and the information available to the decision maker. Those findings > may yet get an airing in the High Court in London. > Comment > Perhaps the removal of the Islamic Courts in Somalia in 2006/07, which > enabled the pirates to flourish, is now regretted. But that genie cannot be > put back in the bottle and perhaps the shipping industry can do little more > than watch and wait as the international community looks for solutions > ashore. In the meantime, the commercial world must adapt to an evolving foe > that shows no sign of fatigue and indeed, if the use of the mother ships > becomes the norm, may be revitalised. This is now a long term problem with > worrying signs of being copied, particularly off the coast of Nigeria, albeit > to a lesser extent. On that basis, it is perhaps right that the industry > should take a long hard look at whether the current approach to hijackings is > the right one and try to get ahead of a game that it is, at the moment, > losing. > Stephen Askins > > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > Yahoo! Groups Links > > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ 1. Moderator tidak bertanggung jawab atas kebenaran isi dan/atau identitas asli pengirim berita. 2. ATTACHMENT akan dibanned, krmkan ke pelaut-owner atau upload ke FILE. Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/pelaut/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/pelaut/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: [email protected] [email protected] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [email protected] <*> Your use of Yahoo! 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