Dear Penners,
What follows is a response to recent requests about U.S. --- North Korean
situation.
First some sources for information.
1. Korea Church Coalition
110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Box 68
Washington DC 20002
202-546-4304
Contact Kelly Koh
2. Korea Information and Reseach Center
1314 St. N.W. Suite 5
Washington D.C. 20005
202-387-2551
3. American Committee on Korea
P.O. Box 901630
Kansas City, Missouri 64190
816-741-5096
Contact John M. Swomley
I have a piece on the Korean situation which has just come out in the
latest issue of Technology Review published by the MIT Technology Program.
Unfortunately, all I can find on disk is an early version of that piece,
but given the urgency of the situation I am including that version in this
mailing. For quotation purposes (if that is relevant) please get a copy of
Technology Review to see actual final copy.
Hope that this and the following prove useful.
Marty Hart-Landsberg
------------------------------
U.S. Foreign Policy and the North Korean Nuclear Threat
by Martin Hart-Landsberg
North Korea is "a ruthless and irrational dictatorship," "an economic
and political disaster," and, now that it has acquired nuclear
weapons, "the greatest threat to U.S. global interests and the peace
and stability of the world." That is the consensus of U.S policy
elites. They also agree that North Korea must be made to give up its
nuclear weapons and accept regular inspections of all its nuclear
facilities in accord with the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). A consensus also appears to be emerging on the
preferred strategy for achieving this goal: United Nations-imposed
economic sanctions on North Korea.
North Korea has announced that it would interpret such sanctions as
an act of war. In response, the U.S. has begun to strengthen its
military presence in the region. Are we headed down the road to
another Korean War, this time with nuclear weapons on both sides?
Background To The Current Crisis
Before events pass the point of no return, we had better make sure
we understand what is really at stake in this U.S.-initiated
confrontation with North Korea. First, some recent history: North
Korea signed the NPT in 1985 but refused to agree to international
inspection of its nuclear facilities as long as the U.S. maintained
troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea. The inspection issue
remained on the political back-burner until 1990 when the U.S.
charged North Korea with pursuing the development of nuclear
weapons. North Korea denied the charge. Tensions grew. One
example of how serious the situation became: In early 1991, the
South Korean military twice proposed military strikes into North
Korea to destroy those facilities suspected of producing nuclear
weapons.
Just when military confrontation seemed inevitable, a series of events
took place which raised hopes for a new era in North-Korea-U.S.
relations and the peaceful reunification of Korea. First, both North
Korea and South Korea entered the United Nations. A short time
later, the U.S. announced the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear
weapons from South Korea. North and South Korea then signed
two major non-aggression and reconciliation agreements. Finally,
North Korea announced its willingness to permit International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities.
Six separate inspections took place from May 1992 to February
1993. But the good will created by this development was soon
shattered by new U.S. charges leveled at North Korea. While IAEA
inspectors found no evidence of a North Korean nuclear weapons
program, their analysis of the country's nuclear waste raised
questions about whether the government was understating the
amount of weapons-grade plutonium in its possession. The IAEA
and North Korea met to resolve what North Korea called a
"misunderstanding." These meetings came to a halt, however, when
the U.S. CIA publicly declared that North Korea had two secret
nuclear waste sites where significant quantities of plutonium were
being stored and was most likely already in possession of one or
possibly two nuclear bombs.
Pressured by the CIA, the IAEA requested permission from North
Korea to make a "special inspection" of the two sites. The North
Koreans refused, arguing that the IAEA had no right to inspect non-
nuclear military facilities. Angered by this decision, the U.S.
launched, in March 1993, a new round of Team Spirit war games
directed against the North. North Korea's surprising response was
an announcement that it was withdrawing from the NPT. Although
the U.S. threatened North Korea with U.N.-imposed economic
sanctions if it did not fully comply with IAEA wishes, the North
stood firm, rejecting any further inspections and placing its military
on full alert.
The North eventually put its withdrawal on hold after U.S. and North
Korean officials began meeting to discuss ways of reducing tensions
between the two countries. Finally, in March 1994, North Korea
agreed to allow IAEA officials back into the country to inspect the
seven original nuclear sites. The inspectors announced that because
they were not allowed to examine the "glove boxes" used to handle
nuclear material at one of the sites, they could not verify that the
"continuity of nuclear safeguards" had been maintained since the last
inspection one year ago. The North has challenged this charge of
non-compliance, arguing that glove boxes were never inspected in
the past, and that the agreement authorizing this most recent IAEA
mission never contained permission for an expanded inspection
process. The IAEA has now asked the U.N. Security Council to
take up the issue of North Korea's non-compliance, and this time it
appears likely that the U.S. will press for a U.N.-sanctioned
economic embargo against North Korea.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
U.S. leaders raise the specter of unchecked nuclear proliferation to
justify taking such strong action against North Korea. If North
Korea is allowed to flaunt the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they
argue, it will become impossible to contain the spread of nuclear
weapons. But past U.S. actions raise serious questions about the
sincerity of this argument. For example: Israel, India, and Pakistan,
all known to have nuclear weapons, have refused to sign the NPT or
allow inspections of their nuclear facilities. South Africa, another
country which had nuclear weapons, did not sign the NPT until 1992.
In none of these cases has the U.S. sought to contain the spread of
nuclear weapons by demanding tough international actions against
the offending country. Only North Korea has been singled out. It is
worth emphasizing in this regard, that as of now, there is no proof
that North Korea actually has nuclear weapons. Even U.S. State
Department officials disputes CIA pronouncements on this question.
The IAEA has also singled out North Korea for special treatment.
In all other countries, the IAEA has confined its inspections to those
sites the countries themselves have designated as nuclear facilities.
Only in the case of North Korea have IAEA inspectors demanded the
right to "special inspections" of sites chosen by the IAEA itself.
A final example of bias in the treatment of North Korea: Although
North Korea has taken actions which place it in violation of the NPT,
so has the U.S. A central tenet of the treaty, which allows the five
formally declared nuclear powers (China, England, France, Russia,
and the United States) to keep their nuclear weapons while
forbidding all others from acquiring them, is that a nuclear power
may not threaten a non-nuclear power with nuclear attack. But that
is exactly what the U.S. repeatedly has done to North Korea. The
U.S. began staging Team Spirit war games in South Korea in 1976.
These annual military maneuvers, among the largest in the world, are
explicitly directed against North Korea. Throughout the 1980s and
into the 1990s -- in fact, as recently as 1993 -- they included
simulated nuclear attacks on North Korea.
The U.S. military claims that special measures are warranted when
dealing with North Korea because of the threat the country poses to
the security of both South Korea and Japan. But this argument also
appears weak on examination. Every year since 1976, South Korea
has spent more on defense than has North Korea. It now has a more
modern and powerful military, one capable of defending the country
even without U.S. support. Japan is no military weakling either. Its
Self Defense Force is supported by the second largest military budget
in the world.
U.S.-North Korean Relations
U.S. policy toward North Korea, including U.S. actions regarding
the current nuclear controversy, can best be understood as a logical
outgrowth of the highly distorted nature of U.S.-North Korean
relations, relations which have changed little since the Korean War
fighting ended in 1953. In fact, the U.S. still refuses to sign a peace
treaty with North Korea to officially end the Korean War. The U.S.
even refuses to diplomatically recognize North Korea.
The Geneva Conference on Korea was convened in 1954 to promote
the peaceful reunification of Korea. At the conference, the North
proposed a simultaneous and proportional pull-out of all foreign
troops, followed by nationwide elections under the authority of an
all-Korea electoral commission supervised by a Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission. Both the U.S. and South Korea rejected
the proposal. Instead, the U.S. called for elections to be held only in
the North, according to Southern laws and procedures and under the
supervision of the United Nations (which had been a participant in
the War). Almost all foreign observers at the Conference came to
the same conclusion: The U.S. was not serious about negotiating
peace. Sadly, little has changed. The U.S. government still seeks
victory over the North.
The connection between the "ongoing" nature of the Korean War
and the present nuclear controversy is quite direct. Although the
U.S. criticizes North Korea for its reckless nuclear ambitions, it was
the U.S. which first threatened North Korea with nuclear destruction
during the Korean War. It was the U.S. which first introduced
nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula in 1957, stationing them in
South Korea in direct violation of the Armistice signed to end the
Korean War fighting. And, as noted above, it was the U.S. which
regularly threatened North Korea with nuclear attack as part of the
Team Spirit war games. This history helps us see that it is not so
much North Korean recklessness but U.S. hostility towards the
North which is the dominant factor pushing us toward a a new
Korean conflict.
Shaping a Rational Foreign Policy
The goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula is unlikely to be
achieved as long as U.S. policy towards North Korea remains based
on the politics of the past. If the U.S. government is seriously
committed to advancing the cause of peace in Northeast Asia, it must
first and foremost commit itself to a new foreign policy, one that
finally comes to terms with the legacy of the Korean War. Towards
that end, the U.S. should agree to sign a peace treaty formally ending
the Korean War, end Team Spirit war games, and establish
diplomatic relations with North Korea.
By adopting a more rational and responsible foreign policy towards
North Korea we not only decrease the likelihood of a new Korean
War, we also help create an environment in which the Korean people
can more effectively work for the peaceful and democratic
reunification of their country. Everyone gains.
---------------
Martin Hart-Landsberg is a professor of Economics at Lewis and
Clark College. He has served as a consultant for the Korea program
of the American Friends Service Committee and is the author of The
Rush to Development: Economic Change and Political Struggle in
South Korea (Monthly Review Press, 1993).
