> Date: Sat, 20 Apr 1996 12:57:28 -0400 > From: Matthew Gaylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: FBI Bulletin: Social Protests in the 1990s: Planning a Response > > Social Protests in the 1990s: Planning a Response > > By Gary A. Allgeyer, M.S. > Captain Allgeyer serves with the Melbourne, Florida, Police > Department. > > >From the January 1996 Issue of The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin > > "The Law Enforcement Bulletin is published monthly by the Federal > Bureau of Investigation, Ninth and Pennsylvania Ave, N.W., > Washington, D.C. 20535. Contributors' opinions and statements > should not be considered as an endorsement for any policy, program, or > service by the FBI." > > > > > During the 1990s, many communities have witnessed a resurgence in > protests and civil disobedience demonstrations reminiscent of the > civil rights and antiwar movements of earlier decades. Major > issues today include abortion, nuclear proliferation, > environmental protection, service and access rights of the > physically challenged, and continued civil rights concerns. Any > community with product- or service-oriented businesses or > military installations may be targeted for action, either by > local activists or national organizations. > > The City of Melbourne, located on the southeast central coast of > Florida, has been the focus of such actions in recent years, > primarily due to the presence of the only abortion clinic in a > county with almost one-half million residents. In addition, the > clinic's highly outspoken owner makes her home in Melbourne, as > does the leader of Operation Rescue, a national pro-life > organization. These factors have made the city a hotbed for the > abortion issue. > > The intensity of pro-life and pro-choice sentiments and the > multitude of proponents on either side required the Melbourne > Police Department (MPD) to meet this challenge head on. Yet, > despite hundreds of arrests, lengthy trials, lawsuits, and > attempts by both sides of the issue to challenge the department's > neutrality and professionalism, the MPD continued to maintain a > positive public image, as demonstrated in television coverage, > press reports, and editorials. > > The department has learned a great deal since its first encounter > with activism several years ago. Agency administrators have > identified and established methods to address several issues > common to the protests they faced. In many ways, these issues > represent features typical to most contemporary activist > movements, regardless of where they operate or what causes they > support. > > NEW CRUSADERS > > For the most part, the general public's perception of social > protests has focused on the fringe--a picture of activists as a > few misguided malcontents driven by extreme viewpoints. Images of > barefooted flower children dressed in tie-dyed shirts and old > jeans usually come to mind. > > Protesters today are more likely to arrive at the scene > conservatively dressed, some even wearing designer clothes. They > are committed to a cause, but operate from what would appear to > be a less radical position. Whereas the old school proclaimed to > Middle America, "We're different," the activists of the 1990s > claim, "We are Middle America." > > Activism, once the domain of extremists, now is viewed as a valid > form of creating social change. Christian activists, in > particular, come from conservative backgrounds and depend on the > belief that most Americans share their basic values to build > their ranks and project an image of legitimacy onto their > activities. Protesters who once would have been considered > reactionary now may be seen as courageous proponents of a cause. > This change in public perception creates some particular > challenges for law enforcement. > > CHALLENGES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT > > Intelligence Gathering: > > Florida law allows law enforcement to collect and maintain > intelligence on persons and groups if the surveillance is > conducted with "a reasonable, good faith belief that it will lead > to detection of ongoing or reasonably anticipated criminal > activities"1 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, incidents of past > abuse create a negative public perception of police efforts to > gather intelligence information on activist groups. > Nevertheless, the necessity for intelligence gathering cannot be > over emphasized. To cope successfully with a major incident or a > series of announced protests, the police must collect information > about the leaders and members of the sponsoring group(s). The > Melbourne Police Department assigned a full-time de-tective to > intelligence duties with the advent of large-scale abortion > protests. The detective and the department met the challenge of > intelligence gathering in a very direct way. > > Every issue has two sides, and law enforcement can use this fact > to its advantage with regard to activist groups. For the MPD, > much of the intelligence information gained on pro-life > organizers came from their opposition. Private investigators > contracted by pro-choice groups tracked, photographed, and > collected data on pro-life activists, and then offered much of > this in-telligence information to the police department. > By accepting this information, the department could have opened > itself to criticism from the pro-life side. But such protests > have not materialized, largely because pro-life organizations > have their own intelligence groups in operation, gathering > similar data on clinic employees, doctors, and patients. > The police department uses this intelligence information to plan > its response to demonstrations and other protest activities. Much > of the success of this effort can be attributed to the approach > taken by the MPD investigator. > > During the first critical months of the intelligence-gathering > initiative, the MPD investigator remained open and approachable > to both sides. After introducing himself to pro-life leaders, he > began to attend their groups' public meetings. Although he > remained steadfastly neutral on the issue of abortion, pro-life > organizers accepted the detective in his official role. > Some of the Christian activists even saw his personal conversion > to the cause as a special challenge. While he may have gained > little critical information from these contacts, the personal > interaction enabled him to provide the department's command staff > with his intuitive assessment of the pro-life leadership. His > close involvement with the groups also minimized the effect of an > anticipated disinformation campaign against the police department > as the protests and demonstrations grew. > > In contrast, efforts to infiltrate pro-life groups with > undercover officers produced little benefit. Because of the > successful application of racketeering statutes to their > organizations, pro-life leaders avoided discussing any > law-breaking activity in rallies or other public forums. > Therefore, it became difficult for the police department to > anticipate the number and identities of participants in trespass > and civil disobedience incidents prior to the actual events. > Police staffing for the events became a combination of "best > guess" deci-sionmaking and trial and error. > > Staffing and Financial Concerns: > > Protests and mass-arrest situations are labor-intensive events > that often require more staff than departments can schedule for > regular duty. Thus, staffing becomes a financial challenge for > any agency faced with such events. > > In 1993, the MPD spent $51,000 in overtime for peacekeeping and > enforcement duties. Most communities accept such costs as a > natural consequence of the rights of citizens to engage in > peaceful protests. However, in the abortion-rights battle, public > funds can become a propaganda tool for both sides. > > Pro-choice leaders decry the need to devote tax dollars to > protect abortion clinics. They attempt to influence public > opinion by claiming that if not for the antiabortion activity, > police could be out fighting crime. Pro-life leaders attack local > governments, questioning why they spend public funds to protect > clinics that perform abortions. > > For law enforcement, the obvious need for overtime staffing does > not justify a carte blanche approach to personnel allocation. > Indeed, agencies should plan their staffing levels carefully. > Overstaffing can be interpreted as overreaction and can erode > public and political support for the police as expenses build. At > the same time, understaffing delays an appropriate response to a > fast-breaking event, opening an agency to accusations of > favoritism and lack of preparation. > > The MPD approach uses past experience, current intelligence data, > and consensus building among the command staff to determine the > department's response on a daily basis. Contingency plans, such > as callout lists and mutual-aid requests, complement the daily > plan and allow for a quick escalation of personnel levels as the > need arises. > > Use of Force: > > During a demonstration, the arrest procedures and defensive > tactics employed by police become high-visibility--and > potentially high-liability--issues. The public perceives how well > an agency responds to incidents based on the level and type of > force used in restraining, moving, and arresting nonviolent > protesters. > > Antiabortion protesters usually employ passive resistance > techniques when engaged in trespass activities and civil > disobedience. Department administrators decided that officers > should not use take- downs, come-alongs, and pressure point > control techniques in response to the protestors' passive > resistance. > > After reviewing news videos, newspaper photographs, and media > accounts, the command staff concluded that these techniques > produced fewer benefits than their associated costs--images of > over-reaction and the appearance of unnecessary cruelty. Thus, > training becomes a focal point for any agency tasked with > responding to such incidents. > > Training: > > Recognizing the hazards of overreaction, the MPD command staff > developed a thorough training plan, and from the outset, > communicated to officers both the policy and philosophy of the > department's response strategy. Instructors briefed officers on > the respective beliefs and positions of both sides of the > abortion issue and juxtaposed this information with the MPD's > operational plan: > > The morality of allowing (abortion) is unquestionably the most > passionate issue of today, and undoubtedly, the personnel of the > Melbourne Police Department hold as varied a collection of > outlooks on the matter as does the general public. > However, our code of ethics requires that we never act > officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities > or friendships to influence our decisions and that we will > enforce the law courteously and appropriately, without fear of > aggression. > > Professionally, then, we cannot and will not, collectively or > individually, take sides on the issue of whether abortion is > moral or immoral. It is therefore our intention to safeguard the > rights of holders of both convictions to the best of our ability, > by enforcing the law firmly but compassionately, while respecting > the constitutional rights of all persons.2 > > This foundation set the tone for more specific training in > perimeter security, crowd control, arrest techniques, and booking > procedures. Advised that both sides of the issue often try to > provoke personal responses from police personnel on the scene, > officers were briefed on deflection responses and the importance > of maintaining neutrality. Instruction also included handling > press inquiries, complaints from neighbors adjacent to the > clinic, and comments from passing motorists. > > Training also focused on methods of response to a frequent tactic > used by pro-life groups--individuals' and groups' chaining or > locking themselves to doors, fences, and one another to impede > entry into abortion clinics. In these attempts, the protestors > generally use steel bicycle locks or heavy chains. Therefore, > when responding to pro-life demonstrations, the MPD always comes > prepared with a variety of cutting tools, protective shields, and > specially trained personnel. > > The emphasis of the department's philosophy and the depth of > officer training paid off when the level of protests increased in > the spring of 1993. An injunction granted in April 1993, > restricting activities within a buffer zone around the abortion > clinic, led to over 140 arrests in the ensuing weeks. During that > time, no arrestees were injured, although one officer received a > back injury while attempting to catch a protestor who suddenly > had gone limp. > > Logistics: > > Preparation for events likely to result in mass arrests entails > tre-mendous effort. The wide range of potential scenarios forces > agencies to prepare numerous contingencies. In other words, they > must have a plan for personnel and equipment to respond to a > small protest that could easily either expand or fizzle. > Implementing a response plan involves considerable risk, > especially in financial terms. The MPD spent over $7,000 during > the first week of scheduled protests in spring 1993, but made no > arrests. As the protests grew, the need for more flexibility in > response became clear. > > The MPD command staff brainstormed the logistical process by > asking a number of questions. What resources are necessary for > the arrest function? How many arrests should be expected? What > are the best- and worst-case arrest scenarios? How many officers > are needed per arrestee? How long should the booking process > take? What special equipment should be on hand--or quickly > available--each day? The command staff compiled the answers to > these questions into an operational plan for the continuing > protests. > > The plan outlined job descriptions for all personnel. Many jobs > were combined for small events, but remained separate in the plan > to allow for easy expansion. The plan identified eight command > and logistical positions: Incident commander, field force > commander, tactical commander, arrest processing supervisor, > logistics officer, traffic and security supervisor, supply > officer, and tactical supervisor. > > The command staff also compiled a list of equipment that might be > needed during large demonstrations. These items were gathered for > quick issue to officers. Flowcharts and checklists provided > incident commanders with an easy method to evaluate and control > the police response. > > Interagency Coordination: > > The police department supplemented its efforts by coordinating > mutual aid with other local and State agencies. An interagency > agreement for mutual aid in emergencies had long been in place. > In addition, the MPD made arrangements with agencies to provide > personnel in the event of a major disturbance. To date, the > police department has not found it necessary to invoke the > agreement. > > However, as arrests mounted in the spring of 1993 and beyond, > police coordination with the Brevard County Detention Center > (BCDC) assumed particular importance. Operated by the Brevard > County Sheriff, the BCDC holds over 800 prisoners serving county > jail terms or awaiting trial, sentencing, or transfer to other > institutions. A large-scale protest easily can produce arrest > numbers that equal 10 to 20 percent of the current jail > population. > > Many of the tactics employed by activists--such as refusing to > identify themselves upon arrest--are designed specifically to > land them in jail and thus heighten the impact of their protests. > To reduce booking time at the jail, the police de-partment's > command staff developed an on-scene arrest procedure. Police > personnel photographed arrestees (full face, with no hats or > sunglasses) with the arresting officer. Officers then restrained > the arrestees using flex-cuffs marked with indelible ink. This > procedure simplified the paperwork process once the officers had > positively identified the arrestees. > > Department administrators also conducted advanced planning with > the county prosecutor's office. With input from police > administrators, the prosecutor's office predetermined appropriate > charges for given actions and prepared sample narratives for > officers that include all elements of each separate offense. For > major events, an assistant State's attorney provides on-scene > legal advice to the incident commander. > > Because pro-life groups often allow, and even encourage, children > to engage in protest activities, the police department also > included the Youth Services Division of the Department of Health > and Rehabilitative Services in the planning process. During > demonstrations, this agency assumes responsibility for > safeguarding children who are in custody due to a parent's > arrest. Policymakers decided to take all juvenile violators into > custody, but to file criminal charges only against those 16 or > older. Younger children are transported from the scene and held > until their parents come to get them. > > PLANNING FOR PROTESTS: > > Communities of all sizes face the potential for demonstrations > and acts of social protest. Even when peaceful, these events > challenge the resources of local law enforcement agencies. > Because demonstrations can escalate quickly into more menacing > assaults against public order, agencies must prepare for a full > range of response options. Agency administrators should use > specific planning methods to determine appropriate responses. In > the face of potential protests and demonstrations, agencies need > to scan, plan, train, respond, and evaluate. > > Scan: > > Police administrators should scan the environment. Does the > community have protest potential? Are there abortion or family > planning facilities, nuclear plants, military bases, or defense > contractors in the area? Is economic disparity an issue? Are > there civil rights concerns or racial unrest? What types of > protests have occurred locally and regionally? > > Plan: > > The size and type of potential protests should dictate the > response. Police administrators should contact their counterparts > in jurisdictions already affected by protests. Law enforcement > agencies must coordinate their planning with related agencies and > offices. > > Local law enforcement agencies must predetermine task planning, > personnel allocation, and deployment plans. Adequate supervision > of the field force and booking facilities is essential. Police > administrators also should arrange contingency funding through > the local government if current funds appear insufficient. > > Train: > > Effective training cannot occur on the day of the event; > personnel must be trained in advance. Agencies should review and > address use-of-force issues related to nonviolent or passive > resistance. Officers should train in arrest, transportation, and > confinement techniques. Administrators should use training > sessions to assess employee readiness, both on emotional and > physical scales. > > Respond: > > When an event occurs, the established reaction plan should be > implemented in increments, according to need. This measured > reaction will enable the police department to escalate or scale > down its response in a more controlled way. > > Incident commanders should scan for new tactics, attitudes, and > actions of all participants. Supervisors should monitor personnel > closely for compliance with established policies. When responding > to volatile situations, officers must avoid the temptation to > become overinvolved or to allow emotion to overtake reason. > > Evaluate: > > Agencies should conduct after-action debriefings and report their > findings in detailed postincident reports. The reports should > answer basic questions about the police response. Was the plan > effective? If not, why not? How do command officers, supervisors, > and line officers feel about their performances? What needs to be > changed? > > The evaluation stage also includes the tabulation of costs. > Agencies should count on various groups--including the press, > politicians, local government administrators, and even the > protesters themselves--to ask how much the police response cost > taxpayers. Of course, each of these groups has different needs > and motives for acquiring this information. No matter how > well-executed its response, the police department should expect > criticism to come from one or more camps. > > PREPARING FOR THE NEXT EVENT: > > After completing these stages, the agency faces additional tasks. > Scanning, planning, and training for the next potential incident > must begin anew. Unexpected questions should be answered, and old > ones revisited. > > Administrators must remember that despite the nonviolent focus of > most social protesters, fringe elements still exist that use > firearms, bombs, and chemical agents to accomplish their goals. > All aspects of the planning process should incorporate a response > strategy for such contingencies. > > CONCLUSION: > > Social protest--sometimes honorable, sometimes inglorious--has a > long history in the United States. The role of law enforcement is > not to impede legitimate acts of social demonstration but to > enforce court-mandated restrictions and to ensure individual and > community safety. By following a methodical plan and anticipating > problems before they occur, law enforcement can meet the > challenges of contemporary protests successfully. > > Endnotes: > 1 FLA. STAT. 119.011, d. 2. > 2 Melbourne, Florida, Police Department Abortion Protest > Operational Plan, January 1993, 1. > >
