This is not about regulation theory. RT is about capitalist governance
(thus far) and thus specifically about capitalist institutions, their
evolution, their practicality, and their design for a better future.
Industrial policy is only a small aspect of it. Naturally there are all
sorts of people using RT, marxists and non-marxists, policy-makers and
academics.
Aside from the macroeconomic takes by RT, such as Aglietta, Boyer, and
the like, there are others who are more micro oriented, especially
examining the sectoral dynamics, such as the auto, engineering, health
etc. Best, Pyke, Penrose, Hollingsworth, Streeck come to mind.
Cheers,
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Anthony P. D'Costa
Associate Professor Ph: (253) 692-4462
Comparative International Development Fax: (253) 692-5612
University of Washington Box Number: 358436
1900 Commerce Street
Tacoma, WA 98402, USA
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On Fri, 28 Apr 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> I don't know if this helps to requested info on regulation theory..
>
> Mine
>
> >Although I have not read it, the paper abstracted below seems very
> >interesting. I plan to obtain it soon. Some of you may also find it
> >interesting.
>
> >Cheers,
>
> >McKeever
>
> >"The Political Economy of Protectionism and Industrial Policy"
>
> BY: HADI SALEHI ESFAHANI
> University of Illinois
> MUNIR MAHMUD
> Pennsylvania State University
> Dept. of Economics
>
> Document: Available from the SSRN Electronic Paper Collection:
> http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=150730
>
> Paper ID: Working Paper No. 98-0111
> Date: June 1998
>
> Contact: HADI SALEHI ESFAHANI
> Email: Mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Postal: University of Illinois
> 210DKH
> 1206 South Sixth Street
> Urbana, IL 61801 USA
> Phone: (217)333-2681
> Fax: (217)333-1398
> Co-Auth: MUNIR MAHMUD
> Email: Mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Postal: Pennsylvania State University
> Dept. of Economics
> 609 Kern Building
> University Park, PA 16802-3306 USA
>
> Paper Requests:
> Contact Illinois Research and Reference Center, 128 Library,
> 1408 West Gregory Drive, Urbana IL 61801 USA. Fax:(217)244-0398;
> Phone:(217)333-1958. Basic fee is $10.
> http://www.library.uiuc.edu/library/irrc/default.htm
>
> ABSTRACT:
> This paper develops a model of trade and industrial policy where
> the politicians in charge of the government can direct the rents
> generated by their policies toward their political or economic
> objectives through different channels: lobbying, taxation,
> regulation, and tariff and quota allocation. Different
> mechanisms are distinguished by their point of rent extraction
> and differences in resource waste for each dollar of transfer.
> In conjunction with industrial policy, specific asset formation
> is also endogenized. We show that many characteristics of the
> model's equilibria transcend specific channels of rent
> extraction that prevail. The parameters that represent the
> effectiveness of rent transfer through various channels play a
> mediating role. The results show that the relationships between
> these parameters and policy outcomes may be different from those
> based on single-channel models. We show that under reasonable
> conditions, a variety of parameter changes induce a positive
> relationship between the restrictiveness of policies toward
> domestic and foreign competition. This helps explain a number of
> important empirical regularities such as the positive
> association of protection with import penetration and
> output-capital ratio. The model also offers a guide for
> empirical research on the role of lobbying and other rent
> extraction mechanisms in policy-making.
>
>
> JEL Classification: F13, L52
> _
>
>
