> Date sent: Fri, 05 Jun 1998 15:18:57 -0700 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > From: James Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: [PEN-L:440] Re: In Defense of History > Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Ricardo responds: >Jim also wants to have it both ways. On the one hand [1] > the realist does not assume anything about the "content" of the world.; on > the other, [2] the realist does know that there is something out there > which we can perceive, which is the basis of our knowledge.< > Jim: > [1] Actually, the realist _does_ assume something about the "content" of > "the world," i.e., that it is in some way related to our perceptions, being > in some way the basis for our perceptions. (So if one actually perceives > gods or goddesses, there's some reality behind that perception, even if it > may be the consumption of LSD.) > > But when I wrote about this (as seen in the selection that Ricardo himself > quotes, which was repeated above), the referent of the word "content" was > not "the world" (objective reality) as Ricardo asserts, but instead "what > we know" (subjective perceptions). This blatant misinterpretation just > confuses matters. Okay, so your position is not that of the naive realist. That is, the only thing you assume is that you do have a subjective perception of something, but you do not assume that your perception corresponds directly to a physical object. You admit that there may be a gap between the way the object seems to your perceptions and the way the object really is. But you are satisfied that the way the object seems to your perceptions is a sufficient ground for knowledge. If this is what you are saying, then you position is a lot more sophisticated than that of the naive realist, still so common among many marxists. I had to check A.J Ayer's book, The Problem of Knowledge, to interpret your position. Are you consciously following his views? If so, my "blatant misrepresentation" is a result of your own ambiguous use of the term "realist postulate", since what you are defending is the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume. > As I said before, the realist > _postulates_ (i.e., assumes rather than knows) that there is something out > there which is the basis of our knowledge. We perceive something. The > realist assumes that this perception in some way reflects the external > world, objective reality. You see here you are moving back to naive realism. For if what counts is your subjective perceptions, then the *basis* of your knowledge cannot be something out there. The basis, rather, has to be your subjective perception of something out there. > So I am not "having it both ways." Rather, Ricardo is interpreting what I > said in a way that promotes the appearance of contradiction (though perhaps > this is not his goal). You have to decide between naive realism and the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley, then I will not "promote the appearance of contradiction". > I'm no positivist, so I see nothing wrong with examining questions in > greater depth than the usual. Is looking into an issue in greater > philosophical depth what Ricardo objects to? I have shown that your position occasionally resembles that of A.J. Ayer who is a positivist. Depth will require that you stake a clear position if you do not think you are a follower of Ayer and Berkeley. > There's also the definition that Engels seems to use on occasion, i.e., > metaphics deals with parts of the whole, violently abstracting them from > the whole. I wasn't engaged in that kind of metaphysics. Engels's conception of matter as the ultimate basis of everything is metaphysical. ricardo > in pen-l solidarity (if pen-l really exists rather than being a product of > my fevered imagination), > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & > http://clawww.lmu.edu/Departments/ECON/jdevine.html > "It takes a busload of faith to get by." -- Lou Reed. > >
