--------------64551A35A4E3CC61912DB82D The post-Yeltsin era begins (Russia-watchers should not expect blood on the streets of Moscow, but the country's political elite is facing up to the agony of real change) The Guardian 28 August 1998 By James Meek in Moscow Well before the August financial crisis exploded in Russia, warning bells should have been ringing in the White House about the advisability of President Bill Clinton hobnobbing with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. Now that the Russian debt bomb has gone off, any benefits of next week's trip - political, human or economic - are void. This is not one of those periodic crises that Mr Yeltsin can muddle through, or hide from and emerge unscathed. This crisis is open-ended, and Mr Clinton flies into Russia like an ill-prepared tourist, with an out-of-date guidebook, a map that no longer makes sense, and no bulging bumbag of dollars to smooth his way with the locals. The world has grown accustomed to the cynical argument underlying Mr Clinton's warm support for Mr Yeltsin. Their presidencies have kept in step over the years, beginning with so much hope and now faltering together. All Mr Yeltsin's moral failings - his illegal dissolution of parliament in 1993, his constant lying about the bloody war in Chechenia which he began, his plunder of state funds during the 1996 presidential election - were written off by the West against the gain of having an ally in charge of the world's second-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. Bad as Mr Yeltsin was, the argument ran - and still seems to run in Washington - he was better than the inevitably nationalist, inevitably anti-US alternative. Yet even in terms of that dubious argument, Mr Yeltsin has been a growing threat to US and European national security for years. If there is one thing more dangerous than a nuclear-armed, neutral state, it is a nuclear-armed, friendly state where the people operating the weapons don't get paid for months on end. It was Mr Yeltsin's failure to negotiate a settlement with the Chechens and their neighbours which threatens to make the region a new centre of Islamic fundamentalism. Most pertinently in the present crisis, it was Mr Yeltsin who consistently sabotaged the liberal economic reforms, backed by Western governments, which pro-Western Russians such as Yegor Gaidar and Sergei Kiriyenko tried to carry out. To be fair to Mr Clinton and other Yeltsin buddies such as Helmut Kohl, it is not easy to stop supporting the elected leader of a reasonably friendly country. But what has always been offensive and is now proved unwise was the superfluous warmth towards him, the effort to yield to his desire for praise from world leaders rather than to force him into serious discussion, the missed opportunities to politely criticise him. The Yeltsin era is over, and with it Russian reliance on foreign financial bail-outs. No one can predict where Russia will go from here. Arguments in the West about who "lost" Russia - too much aid? Too little aid? The right Western policies wrongly applied? The wrong Western policies wrongly applied? - are patronising. Russia was never ours to lose. Without excusing the dreadful mistakes Western advisers and investors have made in Russia, the country cannot be saved if it cannot save itself. A lifebelt from the International Monetary Fund is not enough for a country that keeps putting lead weights in its pockets. As a Russian journalist, Pavel Fengenhauer, put it: "Russia doesn't like to learn from other people's mistakes. It prefers to make its own." There is a tendency in the Western debate to see Russia as the victim of a terrible experiment - a terrible communist experiment, in the economic liberal view, or a terrible capitalist experiment, in the anti-Thatcherite view. In reality, Russia is a series of incomplete experiments, one piled on top of the other, stretching back to the brutal 17th-century reforms of Peter the Great - even, it could be argued, to the conversion to Byzantine Christianity 1,000 years ago, imported, like Microsoft Windows, wholesale, off the shelf. Slowly, but with encouraging determination, Russia's tiny political establishment moved towards the agony of real change this week. The most likely outcome of the upheavals is not, yet, blood on the streets, or an extreme nationalist dictatorship. It is a surrender of most executive powers by Mr Yeltsin, who will move into virtual retirement; the assumption of leadership by the government, probably headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin; a far greater role for the parliamentary majority in forming policy; and a new economic programme embracing inflationary spending to invest in agriculture and industry, import tariffs, tighter currency controls, and limited nationalisation. It sounds revolutionary. It is. It sounds good. But as long as agreement about implementing it is not reached between president, parliament and government, the rouble will go on falling and inflation will rocket. And it is not enough to tackle Russia's fundamental problems. It does not address corruption. It does not address the federal government's inability to enforce policy in the regions. It does not deal with the mess of ethnically based fiefdoms violating civil rights and sucking in subsidies. It does nothing to help the millions of Russians who are stuck in Arctic communities. There is no parliamentary majority: even the Communists themselves are deeply divided. And if parliament decides where to channel the newly minted flood of roubles, we can look forward to pork-barrelling on a grand scale, with the cash being poured into military factories and inefficient collective farms for directors to line their pockets, workers to pilfer and little of use to be produced. Watching Russia's crisis unfold, there is a sense of a Western audience impatient for a dramatic upheaval, a social explosion - now, soon, tomorrow. But this isn't Godzilla. It isn't even Jakarta. A longer sense of time is required, a sense, perhaps, of the time-scale of Germany from Versailles to the Reichstag fire. A weak, indecisive Russian coalition government could limp on under hyperinflation for months or years until some force - the neo-Gaullist Alexander Lebed, or a genuine grassroots liberal movement, or a genuine grassroots fascist movement - put it out of its misery. In 1995, Professor Alexander Yanov, author of After Yeltsin: A Weimar Russia, wrote: ''The history of the Weimar Republic was brief - just 15 years long. But it will forever remain a striking illustration of an implacable historical law: any attempt to reduce the giant task of democratic transformation of an imperial leviathan to the trivial problem of money and credits ends without fail in a world disaster." -- Gregory Schwartz Dept. of Political Science York University 4700 Keele St. Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada Tel: (416) 736-5265 Fax: (416) 736-5686 Web: http://www.yorku.ca/dept/polisci --------------64551A35A4E3CC61912DB82D <HTML> <FONT SIZE=+2>The post-Yeltsin era begins</FONT> <P>(Russia-watchers should not expect blood on the streets of Moscow, but <BR>the country's political elite is facing up to the agony of real change) <P><I>The</I> <B>Guardian</B> <BR>28 August 1998 <P>By James Meek in Moscow <P>Well before the August financial crisis exploded in Russia, warning <BR>bells should have been ringing in the White House about the advisability <BR>of President Bill Clinton hobnobbing with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. <P>Now that the Russian debt bomb has gone off, any benefits of next week's <BR>trip - political, human or economic - are void. This is not one of those <BR>periodic crises that Mr Yeltsin can muddle through, or hide from and <BR>emerge unscathed. This crisis is open-ended, and Mr Clinton flies into <BR>Russia like an ill-prepared tourist, with an out-of-date guidebook, a <BR>map that no longer makes sense, and no bulging bumbag of dollars to <BR>smooth his way with the locals. <P>The world has grown accustomed to the cynical argument underlying Mr <BR>Clinton's warm support for Mr Yeltsin. Their presidencies have kept in <BR>step over the years, beginning with so much hope and now faltering <BR>together. <P>All Mr Yeltsin's moral failings - his illegal dissolution of parliament <BR>in 1993, his constant lying about the bloody war in Chechenia which he <BR>began, his plunder of state funds during the 1996 presidential election <BR>- were written off by the West against the gain of having an ally in <BR>charge of the world's second-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. <P>Bad as Mr Yeltsin was, the argument ran - and still seems to run in <BR>Washington - he was better than the inevitably nationalist, inevitably <BR>anti-US alternative. <P>Yet even in terms of that dubious argument, Mr Yeltsin has been a <BR>growing threat to US and European national security for years. If there <BR>is one thing more dangerous than a nuclear-armed, neutral state, it is a <BR>nuclear-armed, friendly state where the people operating the weapons <BR>don't get paid for months on end. <P>It was Mr Yeltsin's failure to negotiate a settlement with the Chechens <BR>and their neighbours which threatens to make the region a new centre of <BR>Islamic fundamentalism. <P>Most pertinently in the present crisis, it was Mr Yeltsin who <BR>consistently sabotaged the liberal economic reforms, backed by Western <BR>governments, which pro-Western Russians such as Yegor Gaidar and Sergei <BR>Kiriyenko tried to carry out. <P>To be fair to Mr Clinton and other Yeltsin buddies such as Helmut Kohl, <BR>it is not easy to stop supporting the elected leader of a reasonably <BR>friendly country. But what has always been offensive and is now proved <BR>unwise was the superfluous warmth towards him, the effort to yield to <BR>his desire for praise from world leaders rather than to force him into <BR>serious discussion, the missed opportunities to politely criticise him. <P>The Yeltsin era is over, and with it Russian reliance on foreign <BR>financial bail-outs. No one can predict where Russia will go from here. <P>Arguments in the West about who "lost" Russia - too much aid? Too little <BR>aid? The right Western policies wrongly applied? The wrong Western <BR>policies wrongly applied? - are patronising. Russia was never ours to <BR>lose. Without excusing the dreadful mistakes Western advisers and <BR>investors have made in Russia, the country cannot be saved if it cannot <BR>save itself. <P>A lifebelt from the International Monetary Fund is not enough for a <BR>country that keeps putting lead weights in its pockets. As a Russian <BR>journalist, Pavel Fengenhauer, put it: "Russia doesn't like to learn <BR>from other people's mistakes. It prefers to make its own." <P>There is a tendency in the Western debate to see Russia as the victim of <BR>a terrible experiment - a terrible communist experiment, in the economic <BR>liberal view, or a terrible capitalist experiment, in the <BR>anti-Thatcherite view. In reality, Russia is a series of incomplete <BR>experiments, one piled on top of the other, stretching back to the <BR>brutal 17th-century reforms of Peter the Great - even, it could be <BR>argued, to the conversion to Byzantine Christianity 1,000 years ago, <BR>imported, like Microsoft Windows, wholesale, off the shelf. <P>Slowly, but with encouraging determination, Russia's tiny political <BR>establishment moved towards the agony of real change this week. The most <BR>likely outcome of the upheavals is not, yet, blood on the streets, or an <BR>extreme nationalist dictatorship. <P>It is a surrender of most executive powers by Mr Yeltsin, who will move <BR>into virtual retirement; the assumption of leadership by the government, <BR>probably headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin; a far greater role for the <BR>parliamentary majority in forming policy; and a new economic programme <BR>embracing inflationary spending to invest in agriculture and industry, <BR>import tariffs, tighter currency controls, and limited nationalisation. <P>It sounds revolutionary. It is. It sounds good. But as long as agreement <BR>about implementing it is not reached between president, parliament and <BR>government, the rouble will go on falling and inflation will rocket. And <BR>it is not enough to tackle Russia's fundamental problems. <P>It does not address corruption. It does not address the federal <BR>government's inability to enforce policy in the regions. It does not <BR>deal with the mess of ethnically based fiefdoms violating civil rights <BR>and sucking in subsidies. It does nothing to help the millions of <BR>Russians who are stuck in Arctic communities. <P>There is no parliamentary majority: even the Communists themselves are <BR>deeply divided. And if parliament decides where to channel the newly <BR>minted flood of roubles, we can look forward to pork-barrelling on a <BR>grand scale, with the cash being poured into military factories and <BR>inefficient collective farms for directors to line their pockets, <BR>workers to pilfer and little of use to be produced. <P>Watching Russia's crisis unfold, there is a sense of a Western audience <BR>impatient for a dramatic upheaval, a social explosion - now, soon, <BR>tomorrow. But this isn't Godzilla. It isn't even Jakarta. A longer sense <BR>of time is required, a sense, perhaps, of the time-scale of Germany from <BR>Versailles to the Reichstag fire. A weak, indecisive Russian coalition <BR>government could limp on under hyperinflation for months or years until <BR>some force - the neo-Gaullist Alexander Lebed, or a genuine grassroots <BR>liberal movement, or a genuine grassroots fascist movement - put it out <BR>of its misery. <P>In 1995, Professor Alexander Yanov, author of After Yeltsin: A Weimar <BR>Russia, wrote: ''The history of the Weimar Republic was brief - just 15 <BR>years long. But it will forever remain a striking illustration of an <BR>implacable historical law: any attempt to reduce the giant task of <BR>democratic transformation of an imperial leviathan to the trivial <BR>problem of money and credits ends without fail in a world disaster." <BR> <BR> <P>-- <BR>Gregory Schwartz <BR>Dept. of Political Science <BR>York University <BR>4700 Keele St. <BR>Toronto, Ontario <BR>M3J 1P3 <BR>Canada <P>Tel: (416) 736-5265 <BR>Fax: (416) 736-5686 <BR>Web: <A HREF="http://www.yorku.ca/dept/polisci">http://www.yorku.ca/dept/polisci</A> <BR> </HTML> --------------64551A35A4E3CC61912DB82D--
