In response to Rhon Baiman:

1) Social division of labor: agreed that this is important
for socialism.  But can't a substantial measure of social
control over the division of labor be handled *directly*
and decentrally via workers' self-management, and *indirectly*
and centrally via investment planning--eg. subsidized credit 
allocation for firms that innovatively deploy workers in a 
variety of supervisory and menial tasks--and *directly* and
centrally by prescribing appropriate employment policies in 
the central and local government sectors, as well as prescribing
suitable labor laws for the worker-controlled sector (mandating
various kinds of interaction in the workplace, etc)?

2) Labels: Schweickart himself terms his model 'economic
democracy', not 'market socialism'.  I think he recognizes 
the many limitations of markets, particularly as regards
the volatility of market determination of investment, the
effects of advertizing and sales manipulation, and
the need for a large, non-market sector of public services
in areas like health-care, education, social services,
public transport, public recreational spaces, etc. 
  
  3) Social pricing and externalities: how does one
  calculate the externality component of a price if
  one doesn't also know its non-externality component?  And 
  how does one know the latter in the generalized absence of 
  factor and other markets?  This is the old problem of 
  trying to calculate abstract labor values in advance of 
  prices.  Unless you pay *some* regard to the pattern of 
  monetarily effective demand for various types of concrete 
  labor--adjustments via the tax and transfer systems can 
  still be employed 'ex post' to reach socially desirable 
  goals--then a damaging degree of under- and over-supply of 
  different types of concrete labor seems likely to result.  
  The externalities associated with *this* kind of 
  misallocation of resources have in fact been greater 
  historically than those associated with markets.  Or at 
  least, societies experiencing these types of 
  misallocations have found it difficult to survive let 
  alone flourish  Practically the whole of the former 
  Communist bloc countries suffered severe economic and 
  political collapses, which is why they are *now* being 
  subjected to the most inhumane and insane efforts at 
  radical marketization.  
  
  Handing the task of overall resource allocation to even a 
  democratically accountable body of professional planners 
  will not work if the planners themselves do not have good 
  information about the pattern of demand which would flow 
  from a distribution of income reflecting individually 
  chosen labor contributions (though not property 
  ownership).  Once this pattern is known, then further 
  adjustments can of course be made via tax and transfer 
  payments, selective price controls, and enhanced 
  investment "in human beings" so as to improve the 
  prospects of those who currently are disadvantaged in the 
  labor market.  But trying to calculate all these matters 
  in advance of individual choices being registered in some 
  way strikes me as a recipe for alienation on the massive 
  scale witnessed historically under Communism.
  
  The alternative more-tolerant-markets approach is I think 
  is also favoured on political grounds.  People in advanced 
  capitalist countries have some experience of social 
  democratic methods of economic and social management, and 
  retain at least some vestigial faith in them.  I think it 
  is a much more feasible task politically to ally 
  traditional social democratic models of societal 
  governance with new (democratic socialist) calls for 
  worker self-management and social ownership of capital, 
  than it is to propose an entirely new mechanism of social 
  choice which will inevitably be associated in popular 
  consciousness with the disastrous reputation of 
  Soviet-style central planning, however much one tries to 
  avoid that association.

  Peter
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Reply via email to