---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sun, 11 Jun 2000 02:54:54 -0400
From: Mine Aysen Doyran <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: The Long Twentieth Century


Review, Giovanni Arrighi, _The Long Twentieth Century_

(Verso, 1994)

                   by Immanuel Wallerstein


Copyright (c) 1995 by Immanuel Wallerstein


v.10/4/95


Despite its title, this book is not really about the twentieth

century, long or otherwise. It is an attempt to understand the de-

cline of U.S. hegemony and the present dilemmas of the world-system

in the light of the historical evolution of world capitalism begin-

ning with Venice and Genoa. It is a historicized political economy

of the world-system, a major contribution to our understanding of

our world. It is ambitious theoretically, since Arrighi is trying

to put together a whole series of familiar stories and theoretical

propositions in a provocative and original way. It will be dis-

cussed and debated and used widely.


     Arrighi sees a constant tension between the "revenue-maximiz-

ing logic of trade expansions" and the "profit-maximizing logic of

capital accumulation" (p. 232) which alternately coincide with and


[Page 1]


reinforce each other and bifurcate. Lest this seem abstruse,

Arrighi immediately translates this into a concrete interpretation

of 600 years of world history. He builds his story on the idea of

successive, alternating forms of hegemony within the world-system,

what he calls the dialectic of state and capital.

     He takes off from a boutade of Braudel: "[In] Venice the state

was all; in Genoa capital was all" (p. 145). In Venice the strength

of capital rested on the coercive power of the state; in Genoa,

capital stood on its own two feet, and the state, such as it was,

was dependent upon it. Arrighi's summary judgment: In the short run

(in which a century is a short run), Venice's method seemed unbeat-

able, but in the long run it was Genoa that created the "first

world-embracing cycle of capital accumulation" (p. 147). Then, in

one of those clever antinomies of which he is fond, Arrighi says:

"Just as Venice's inherent strength in state- and war-making was

its weakness, so Genoa's weakness in these same activities was its

strength" (p. 148). Venice became the prototype of "state (monopo-

ly) capitalism" and Genoa of "cosmopolitan (finance) capitalism."


     So far, most readers will nod hazily in their fuzziness about

the details of the fifteenth-century world. It is when Arrighi

starts applying these categories closer to home that the surprises

come. It turns out the "Dutch regime, like the Venetian, was rooted

from the start in fundamental self-reliance and competitiveness in

the use and control of force" (p. 151), which explains its hegemony

and which then "backfired...[by creating] a new enticement for ter-

ritorialist organizations to imitate and compete with the Dutch..."

(p. 158). Once again, success would mean failure, Arrighi's

repeated leitmotiv.



[Page 2]    Journal of World-Systems Research



     The British replaced the Dutch, and the Age of the Genoese was

paralleled by the Age of the Rothschilds. They did this by reviving

"the organizational structures of Iberian imperialism and Genoese

cosmopolitan finance capital, both of which the Dutch had supersed-

ed" (p. 177). "Control over the world market was the specificity of

British capitalism" (p. 287). The Germans tried to suspend the ex-

cessive competition this brought about, but the U.S. "superseded"

it (p.285). U.S. corporate capitalism, expanding transnationally

became "so many 'Trojan horses' in the domestic markets of other

countries" (p. 294). This destroyed the structures of accumulation

of British market capitalism but once done, "U.S. capitalism was

pow-

erless to create the conditions of its own self-expansion in a cha-

otic world" (p. 295). The impasse was overcome only by inventing

the cold war.

     In the light of this history, the financial expansion of the

1970s and 1980s does not seem revolutionary but a repeat of an

old story. The overall picture is of four successive hegemonies:

Genoese, Dutch, British, and U.S., about which three major

statements

can be made: they successively were briefer; there was a long-term

tendency for the leading agencies to be successively larger and

more complex; there was a double movement, backward and forward in

time, with each shift of hegemony (Venice/United Provinces/U.S.



[Page 3]



contrasted with Genoa/United Kingdom).

     What can we say about such a vast canvas, most inadequately

summarized here? Its greatest strength is its clear vision of capi-

talism as a single-mindedly rational attempt to accumulate capital

endlessly, which means, says Arrighi, capitalists are interested in

the expansion of production only if it's profitable, which is true

only about half the time. The rest of the time, the capitalists ex-

pand their money stocks by playing financial games. They can inter-

nalize or externalize their protection costs (Frederic Lane's very

fruitful concept) and there are pluses and minuses in each path.

But it's not a matter of capricious option. The structure forces

capitalists to alternate in a sort of ratchet fashion: one step

backward, two steps forward.

     Arrighi's intellectual indebtedness to Marx and Schumpeter are

well-known. What he has done is this book is take Braudel seriously

as a source of data and hypotheses and cast him in a Marxo-Schum-

peterian mold. The work is truly a political economy, one in which

successes breed failures, where "the real barrier of capitalist

production is capital itself" (Marx), but (or is it and?) capital

ism is the "anti-market" (Braudel).

     This book will not make everyone happy. There is no discussion

of class, but then there is none in Marx's Capital. Perhaps more

surprisingly, in a work written by Arrighi, there is scarcely a

hint about the core-periphery antinomy in the organization of the

world-economy. What Arrighi is concentrating upon is the organiza-



[Page 4]    Journal of World-Systems Research



tion of the cycles of accumulation as the key to the story of the

historical development of the world-system. And finally, for a

political economy, which in theory emphasizes the role of political

factors in the process of accumulation, there is little real poli-

tics in the book. Words like left and right do not appear, and ide-

ology is never mentioned. The current very central concerns of rac-

ism/sexism or culture do not appear in the index.

     Nonetheless, this is an important and exciting work, which

challenges most people's approach to the understanding of the

world-system. It is argued intensively, if a bit kaleidoscopically.

It forces the reader to reflect, if only to locate the potential

inconsistencies in the fast-moving narrative. It is not bedside

reading. It is a serious book for serious people in serious times.

--

Mine Aysen Doyran
PhD Student
Department of Political Science
SUNY at Albany
Nelson A. Rockefeller College
135 Western Ave.; Milne 102
Albany, NY 12222


_____________________________________________
NetZero - Defenders of the Free World
Click here for FREE Internet Access and Email
http://www.netzero.net/download/index.html

Reply via email to