I am afraid articles of this nature may not be as dominant in the immediate future as they were in the immediate past. They will be - as Louis suggested, reflecting on encountering an old free-market-ideologue outside Columbia U - a sign of the past; a sign of a sinking ideological ship no longer appropriate to the now post-liberal 'regime of accumulation'. On another note, I anticipate, we will see an addition of discourses to the "post-" condition. As was the case with 'post-communist', 'post-Marxist', 'post-ideological', etc. discourses, which aimed at normalizing the current regime, we will have instead of Fukuyama's end of history an 'appreciation' of Huntington's civilizational discourse. A 'clash', as it were, of civilizations, which will have been unable (due to the irrationality and inferiority of the 'lower' civilizations) to live the "important truth" of liberalism pronounced by the Kojevean (actually, Straussian) prophet of the statu-quo. This period, as was the case with the 'post-communist', etc. efforts of globalising libearlism, will be the new ideology of the status quo; 'post-liberalism' will be its name and normality will be its game. Until, of course, those who such ideologies deprive of dignity, namely the workers, prove the ideologues their theories get stuck in the throat. Regards, Greg. ***** International Herald Tribune September 3, 1998 [for personal use only] Russia Has to Stop Rejecting Open and Fair Competition By Jim Hoagland The Washington Post WASHINGTON - Asked what he thought of Western civilization, Mahatma Gandhi said it sounded like a good idea and should be tried sometime. So it is with Russian capitalism. The political and financial upheaval that greeted Bill Clinton in Moscow this week represents the death throes of a hybrid national economic system that has prevailed, and failed, in Russia since 1991. That system is undergoing piecemeal destruction as painful as it is necessary. Following in the footsteps of Asian nations hit by a similar calamity a year ago, Russia demonstrates the perils of trying to skim off the cream of the globalized economy without adopting checks and controls to restrain human appetites and ambitions. Lacking in Russia and Asia was an appreciation of the open and fair competition needed to police capitalism and to make it work. The fundamental problem in Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere was not that they went too far in adopting American-style capitalism, as ideologues have begun to claim. These nations did not go far enough. They sought comfortable halfway approaches that quickly proved unsustainable. These societies must now choose from three courses of action: go backward by sealing themselves off from international capital markets and free trade; balance where they are and muddle through; or accept the responsibilities and limitations that advanced capitalism brings, as well as its gratifications, by immersing them-selves more fully in global markets. The sealing and muddling options are dead ends. Russia's immediate turmoil is the product of the unforgiving forces of globalization and the country's divided and inept political leadership. The crisis cannot be blamed on inherent flaws in capitalism, or on a Western failure to provide sufficient help and advice to Russia's government. Since its 1991 revolution, Russia has not developed a risk-based, entrepreneurial market economy, and its institutions, so as to allocate rewards and pain through the efficiency of the marketplace. Boris Yeltsin, Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Communists led by Gennadi Zyuganov and even the youthful reformers, who brought in the financial aid from abroad that kept the world's first nuclear-armed cash flow problem afloat until now, never fully committed themselves to that model of modern capitalism. At crunch time, the Yeltsinites always stopped short, intent on protecting the robber barons at the top of the heap from the scrutiny and regulation that a well-run market economy requires, or fearful of the severe dislocation for the public that a full privatization of services and goods would bring. What may have been Mr. Yeltsin's last flinch came this summer, as plunging oil prices, the lack of a functioning tax collection system and investor flight emptied the national treasury and forced a humiliating devaluation of the ruble. Pressed as well to overhaul the tottering banking system and bankrupt the leading oligarchs who backed his re-election in 1996, the Russian president fired the reformers and brought back Mr. Chernomyrdin as prime minister. The ineptness Mr. Yeltsin has shown in inflicting pain on the public while protecting tycoons has undermined his chances of staying in office until the end of his term in 2000. Mr. Chernomyrdin must now negotiate a transitional political arrangement with the Duma that will include Mr. Yeltsin's orderly departure, a yielding of significant presidential powers to the Duma, and simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections in the near future. Those are all necessary steps before Western financial aid can resume and a new generation of politicians, economists and entrepreneurs can emerge to tackle Russia's enormous problems. But this time outside help must be more focused on entrenching the rule of law and an authentic free market system in Russia. The country's only chance to generate sufficient revenues to ease the painful economic transition ahead lies in its oil and natural gas industries, which need significant foreign investment to become a global force. Mr. Yeltsin's government has always refused to open the oil and gas sector on commercially viable terms to foreign firms. That was the telling, and vital, flinch in Moscow's refusal to come to terms with global markets. Balancing on the brink of disaster, Moscow must now accept substantial foreign ownership in this sensitive area and show the world that it finally gets capitalism. -- Gregory Schwartz Department of Political Science York University 4700 Keele St. Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3 Canada Tel: (416) 736-5265 Fax: (416) 736-5686 Web: http://www.yorku.ca/dept/polisci
