Justin writes:
>Actually, I think that Cohen did a good thing in putting the issue on the
>table, but utter[ly] failed to show how functional explanations were
>valid. However, I think he was right in identifying historical materialist
>explanations as functional ones.
A lot of other people, "put the issue on the table." For example, see
Rader, Melvin. 1979. Marx's Interpretation of History (New York: Oxford).
Of course, Rader didn't do so using false precision the way GA Cohen did.
He also doesn't go for technological determinism...
I don't think he showed that historical materialist explanations were
functional ones any more than Stinchcombe did. It's simply a matter of his
interpretation, together with assertion. Further, it's a matter of his
debate with Elster (who rejects functional explanation) more than anything
else. It's an argument among a small group of academics.
That you admit that GAC failed to show how functional explanations are
valid is quite a concession. Why, then, should anyone pay attention to Cohen?
I wrote:
> explanations of this sort involve an obnoxious form of teleology. if you
> don't introduce the dysfunctional mechanisms in conjunction
>with the functional ones.
Justin writes:
>I agree. It's part of my criticism of Cohen in that he cannot make this
>distinction, although he does insist in another part of his account on the
>distinction between relations of production that are functional for and
>those that fewtter or are dysfunctional for the forces of production.
if he can't make the distinction, all he's got is a functional explanation,
which lands him smack dab in the middle of the functionalist camp.
> > functionalism and functional explanation are the same thing if
> dysfunctional mechanisms -- i.e., the way in which capitalism is a
>contradictory system -- are ignored.
>No, because you might think that there are many social phenomena that have
>neither a functional nor a dysfunctional explanation. Functionalism I take
>to be doctrine that everything is functional.
No, the star functionalist, Talcott Parsons, saw some phenomena as
nonfunctional. For example, he starts with the "fact" that children are
born as barbarians, with none of society mores drilled into them as yet.
This is a nonfunctional phenomenon. It creates a tension, obviously. Then
various social institutions (schools, etc.) have the function of "solving"
the tension. As a functionalist, he does not feel obligated to explain how
such institutions, though later sociologists did so, without really
abandoning functionalism.
Parsons never allowed for dysfunctional phenomena -- except for outside
agitators and the like, what orthodox economists (functionalists all) call
"exogenous shocks."
BTW, for anyone who's interested, here's a list of Stinchcombe and Cohen's
functional mechanisms, dealing specifically with capitalism and in terms of
the attainment of capitalist class goals:
1. Purposive: far-sighted capitalist elites promote the development of the
productive forces or certain superstructural institutions (such as
religion) in order to stabilize the system. This might be called the
"Rockefeller Foundation" mechanism.
2. Evolutionary: variation in institutions (either random, i.e.,
independent of the environment, or due to experiments as an effort to
survive) is gradually weeded out (selected) by competition under conditions
of scarcity.
3. Unplanned side-effects: "Without planning, people may find consequences
of behavior satisfying. Thus, church services might be maintained without
much planning to achieve theological ends, because people find the social
interaction or the respectability, satisfying" [Stinchcombe, 1968: 86].
Here are the dysfunctional mechanisms I could think of, ignoring exogenous
shocks (outside agitators):
1. Purposive: an elite may be ignorant of functional needs, incompetent,
short-sighted, self-interested, and/or internally divided. (This might
include the "President Dan Quayle" mechanism.)
2. Evolutionary: variation and competition under conditions of scarcity may
be destructive. (as capitalist competition sometimes is, especially when
it turns into international wars.)
3. Side-effects: individuals may act in terms of their own self-interest,
ignoring the destructive externalities of this type of action.
4. Class antagonism: the organization and resistance of the direct
producers may prevent the realization of ruling-class interests. More
generally, the conflict between the dominant and the dominated societal
interests may prevent the former from achieving their goals.
5. Uneven development: because of the relative independence of different
layers in society from each other, they develop at different speeds and
different ways. Thus they can come into conflict.
The above is from an unfinished manuscript of mine that's gathering dust
(and the gnawing criticism of the electronic mice) until I get back to it.
I presented the paper at the Association for Economic and Social Analysis
conference "Marxism in the New World Order Conference: Crises and
Possibilities" in Amherst, Massachusetts, on November 14, 1992.
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
