Jim Devine wrote:

> if there's no _reason_ for the exponential increases, they're worth
> forgetting.

Well, the increases in oil and energy consumption are matters of fact, of
history. The problem is (a) explain and (b) propose effective policies
against.

Albert Bartlett seemed to assume that the increases were due to human greed
and stupidity in the absence of real information either about the limits of
the resource or about the consequences when anything grown exponentially.
Later someone sugested to him the Malthusian answer. Even then Bartlett
said, if population is the problem, its the population of America which is
the worst problem, since Americans use proportionately more energy than
anyone else. In others words, he continued to say, it's energy that's the
problem. My answer is to say that expanded capitalist reproduction is the
explanation for the exponential growth which even know every OECD, IMF, WB
etc report celebrates. Given that the world's population is still growing
exponentially at 1.6-1.7%  p.a., energy consumption must inccrease by at
least that amounbt, other things being equal, for living standards not to
fall. But the actual increase has of course been higher.

> One thing I know is that deflation and underconsumption go together.

Not necessarily. Global deflation can coincide with hefty gnp per capita
increases for certain social groups and certain nations or regions. It
happened after 1870. It hapened in the 1930s and it's happening now. More:
there is no strict causal relationship between deflation and
underconsumption. The latter does not determine the former. Deflation, in
othger words, is not a realisation problem, it is an accumulation-dynamics
problem. You do not need anything from Keynes to explain, that I can see.
Attempts to invoke Keynes to plug imaginary holes in Marxism inevitably
result in problems.

> >There is a problem of a global capital shortage. If you boost demand, you
> >will just get energy shortages still quicker, followed by stagflation and
> >then worse things.
>
> a statement of faith?

No, it is not. There is excess capital which cannot profitably be invested.
This is because there is an overall capital shortage relative to an
underlying problem: the problem is that no series of innovations or
path-breaking systems or novel resource discoveries have emerged which can
cheapen the cost of capital and allow the rate of surplus-value to grow. The
world-system is short of capital on a number of different levels and is
therefore unable to transform either the global means of production or the
global production relations (the institutes and systems of US hegemony
primarily) in order to allow for new growth. This is a systemic problem, ie
it is a crisis of US hegemony. It is also a structural problem, ie the
structures of production are exhausted but cannot be renewed because the
existing capital base is too small to do what is required (for example, if
as some energy engineers who seriously argue that the solution to energy is
to import H3 from the planet Jupiter, then we clearly do not have the
capital to do that; but in reality we do not even have the capital to
convert the global energy system to alternatives like PVs even if, as some
now argue, the net return on new-generation solar cells is as high as 7).
>
> you'll have to explain more. Is there an energy economics expert in the
house?

Doug had one. Where is he, Doug?

>
> >  It does explain the phenomenon of falling energy prices in an era of
> > growing resource scarcity, and this argument explains the fallacy of
> > Simon's thinking.
>
> what fallacies are those?

This is a separate discussion, about natural resources other than energy,
which I don't want to get into now. But I already gave enough reasons in an
earlier posting, which I cannot repost to the list right now. Arguments
about Simon tend to become waterfalls. It's a waste of time.

> Are you saying that the price of oil has been falling relative to what it
> "should" be?

No, I'm not. I'm saying that the fall in energy prices is
politically-overdetermined. I've posted on the 'true price of gasoline' at
length before on this list.

> yes, but there was a downward trend before 1989. The big fall was in 1986
> or so.

Which figures are you using? I'd be interested to know. And if there is an
energy economist in the house, I'd be interested to talk more about what the
lessons, if any are, of the Soviet oil collapse. It's my belief, based on
personal experience of both the Russian and N Sea oil industries, that a
similar collapse in production is now happening in the N Sea. US production
is, of course, falling rapidly.

> what I didn't follow was the assertion that we're running out of oil.

Since even the International Energy Authority now accepts that recoverable
oil resources are limited and that production will peak in the next few
decades (I think it has already peaked), who still argues that we're NOT
running out of oil. BTW, the importance of the Soviet experience (and I
lived in Tyumen for long periods in 1985-92 and spent most of my time with
oil geologists and soviet expro people) is that production falls did not
follow a smooth exponential peak-followed-by-downhill curve. There were
dramatic spikes as people struggled like hell to meet ambitious Plan
targets; followed shortly afterwards be even more dramatic declines. Only
when you stood back from what happened could you see that the rise, decline
and fall of Soviet oil does map onto a Hubbert bell-curve. The same exaclty
(IMO) is happening in the N Sea and many other oil provinces right now.
Triumphalist talk about 'new technology', seismic 3-D, horizontal boring,
magnetic resonance imagery etc, is accompanied by shortlived production
spikes and then even steeper declines. In Soviet times they had their
triumphalist talk about meeting and exceeding plan targets too. Now western
oil men are encouraging a new image of themselves as steely eyed energy
frontiersmen braving the deeps of the Atlantic to get more oil. It is a
bluff. There is very little deepwater oil.

Mark Jones

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