Okay Lear.  Today is your lucky day.

I don't know enough about Afghanistan to speak on it, though that
wouldn't stop me if it was as prominent an issue as Kosova.

The apparent binary choice you offer between a) Soviet control of
E. Europe, and b) democracy with ethnic carnage is one I will
forego, since the latter is a counter-factual which merely
reinforces your argument.  My bias before the fact, when ethnic
carnage is more a possibility than an eventuality, would be to
support democracy.  I'm another 'big election guy.'

> . . .
> What you seem to be unable to grasp is the principle you are
advocating.  The principle you are supporting is that should one
group within a "parent" country attempt to pull away, and were
the country to use violence to prevent it, any another country
has a perfect right to offer an ultimatum to >>

Serbian govt action in K. goes well beyond "violence" in my view.
You're minimizing it by this choice of words.

>> that country and to persue a full-scale war against that
country should >>

To me full scale war means the obliteration of the Yugo govt and
nation-building in Serbia.  My objectives are much more
limited -- self-determination for Kosova, so the military
activities would be as well.  I would not support a campaign to
dislodge and replace Milo, only to chase his people out of
Kosova.

>> that country refuse the terms of the ultimatum, even if that
country offered to pursue autonomy for the group with
international monitoring. >>

I don't believe Serbia is (or ever was) interested in accepting
"autonomy" for Kosova.  If it was, that would be a different
situation.  Three weeks ago would be a different situation too.

>>  Fairness means you accept your argument for us, not just for
other people.  Max, are you prepared to accept this principle for
the United States and the countries it supports in their violence
against their people?  Do you really want to be on the side of
the British and French who wanted to bomb Washington and New York
City because we used violence to suppress the
South in seceding from the Union? >

Your example is a little wacky, but I take your general question,
which I would rephrase as:  when is violation of a nation's
sovereignty defensible in the matter of grievances by national
minorities?  I'd say when the national minority faces the level
of destruction being visited upon Kosova by Serbia currently, or
worse.  I've also allowed that the situation of the Kurds and
East Timorese appear quite similar.  So too would have been the
campaigns of the Israeli government against Palestinians at
various times in the past.  This is not to say that violence is
always the preferred course, but that it could be defended in
these contexts as a last resort.

The case of the ante-bellum South was a totally different story.
There was no national oppressed minority, but rather the question
of a slave system versus rising bourgeois industrial capitalism.
Supporting the North is an easy call.  There is no comparable
socialist model in Serbia worth defending in light of their
treatment of Kosova.

> You continually avoid my questions, presumably because you have
no
answer and prefer your personalized attacks and tiresome
Manichean
complaints when someone disagrees with you, as to why the US
destroyed
the democratic opposition and refused to consider the very
promising
Serb Parliament offer of autonomy in Kosovo followed by
international
observers. >

Maybe the U.S. should have taken the deal, maybe not, maybe they
miscalculated, maybe they had something more malign in mind.  I
have no idea, and nobody has convinced me they do either.  What
matters now is how to save Kosovars.  I don't think a cease-fire
does it.

> You and Nathan also ignored my reply to the simplistic argument
of
"doing good" just by accident or happy by-product, which appears
to be
your position regarding the US actions in Kosovo.  Let me repeat
Nathan's argument and my reply:
>
> . . .  Ergo, should a "humanitarian" end result from the acts
of Clinton, it is merely incidental, a fortunate accident, that
the ends deserve the
label "good".  Given that, one can therefore ask the likelihood
that a
state with a rich history of violence and flagrant abuses of
human rights and civilized norms might undertake an aggressive
and violent foreign policy campaign *and* have the ends
accidentally turn out to be "humanitarian". >>

If, lacking any specifics as to the situation, I was asked the
simple question on the probability of a Clinton/NATO action
coming to a good end, I would assign it a low, but non-zero
value.  But I'd say it's our responsibility to consider every
case on its own merits, however unlikely, when the scale of
violence presently underway in Kosova is underway.

> The relevant question to ask is not "Did the US intervention
save some
lives?", but What were the other options and why did the US
persue
the one that was guaranteed to sharply escalate the atrocities?;
What
could have saved the most lives and why did the US not persue
that?; >>

These are relevant as historical matters, but less so right now.
Your next one is what matters most:

> What could save the most lives now?.  >>

But then you go off the track again:

> Why did the US persue the only avenue that it knows: destroy
any democratic opposition, offer an ultimatum, then use deadly
force, when it admitted very candidly that it's preferred
approach would result in *more* people being killed, and 3/4ths
of the refugees were generated *after* the bombing began?   Of
course, this is to totally ignore the humanitarian crisis that is
caused by bombing the social and economic infrastructure of
Serbian cities.  Max, why do you not count the children, men, and
women of
Belgrade, as worthy of humanitarian concern?  Don't they figure
into
your moral calculus when you are weighing how much "good" the
bombs
do?  >

This last is just silly.  I've made clear my concern.  I won't
rehash it.

> The question remains of why you believe that more people would
be saved
by dropping bombs than by pursuing diplomacy.  >>

I don't.  If you remembered any of my posts, you'd know that.

In regard to the merits of bombing the U.S.A. for assorted
offenses, I'd agree (as I've said before) that in certain cases
(e.g., Kissinger/Nixon's Christmas bombing of Vietnam) it would
have been defensible, if there had been anybody big enough to do
it.  But there wasn't and isn't, so there's little point in
raising it.  The U.S. is the big dog; when it does something bad,
the only way to stop it is by internal and external non-violent
political protest, not as a matter of morality, but of
practicality.

Cheers,

mbs



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