Carrol Cox wrote: > This is an essential point. Nearly the whole of the metaphysical > argument over "free will" is grounded in this idealist assumption > of such a mysterious "will." The Will, in this context, is always > a euphemism for "The Soul" and hauls in religion by the back > door. > No. Everyone has a will. For example, if someone wants to quit smoking they must will it to happen or they must have the will to overcome the urges to smoke a cigarette. Having a will is compatible with materialism and physicalism in the same way that emotions are. The will is physically embodied in the brain. There is the well known problem of "weakness of the will" where someone knows a particular action is bad for them e.g. smoking, yet the person engages in it anyway. Is such behavior irrational or just a sacrifice of long term self interest for short term? Some theorists regard the failure of the working class to carry out revolution as an instance of weakness of the will. Some philosphers, notably Schopenhauer, did make the will into an idealistic concept. The question of free will is not metaphysical rubbish but simply asks was someone free to act otherwise? Belief in free will underlies many forms of right wing ideology. Someone is poor or unsuccessful because of the free choices they have made. A person chooses to sleep in the street rather than get a job etc. etc. However, if one denies free will and argues that all events have causes and actions are events then this form of blaming the victim is taken away. > One can go further. Rod's metaphysics of the "will" is > self-refuting, since if you wish to begin a causal chain > (while adhering to even a mechanical materialist premise) > that chain is older than humanity. Perhaps. This a very strong form of causal determinism. If my actions are the result of a causal chain older than humanity there is no way I can be responsible for my actions since there is no way I could have done otherwise. And if I remember correctly, at some point in the > debate he asked the question, which he intended as > merely rhetorical: Is society older than humanity? But of > course human society is older than humanity, just as human > thought is older than language and language must be older > than consciousness of language. I disagree. Thought is language. And of course Rod's assertion of the causal > force of "the will" is just another way of saying that ideas are > prior to action -- another way of denying materialism. Why draw a distinction? Ideas can only be expressed in language and speaking or writing a language is an act. An action must be originated. For example what is it that causes someone to get out of bed? Sam Pawlett
