Jim D. says:
>Louis wrote:
>>You should read the article by Jaime Torras in the Fall 1980 Review of the
>>Braudel Center. It is a reply to Brenner, who argued in Past and Present
>>that Catalonia had the same class relations as England in the 15th through
>>17th century and therefore enjoyed a kind of prosperity. Torras agrees that
>>the class relations were similar but disagrees that Catalonia prospered.
>
>I'm not researching that subject at this time (since I'm reading
>term papers) but it's quite possible that Torras isn't disagreeing
>with Brenner's basic point here.
More likely, it's time to supplement Brenner with Machiavelli &
Thomas Hobbes. Catalonia, among others, was a cause & sign of
Spain's problem: decentralization.
***** The revolt of Catalonia
Apart from Portugal, Catalonia was the state with the greatest degree
of autonomy. Its medieval form of government had not been changed
since Ferdinand the Catholic had settled it in 1486. Its
countryside, especially on the French border, was infested with
smugglers and bandits and riven by local feuds. Its taxes were
administered by the Diputaci�, a self-perpetuating and corrupt
committee of the Catalan Corts that functioned during the long
intervals between the meetings of that body. The viceroys, hemmed in
on all sides by local privileges and without control over the
finances of the province, were virtually powerless. In 1626 Philip
IV summoned the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon. Aragon
and Valencia reluctantly voted some money but refused conscription of
troops. Catalonia refused everything. Nevertheless, Olivares
published the royal decree for the Union of Arms. Relations between
Madrid and Catalonia deteriorated rapidly.
As the costs of warfare continued to soar, the government resumed the
inflationary minting of vell�n coinage and had to declare yet another
moratorium, in 1627. In 1628 the vell�n coins were withdrawn,
causing a collapse of prices and a business recession. The 1630s
added new taxes in Castile and outright confiscations from private
individuals, both of income from government annuities and of American
silver imported in commercial transactions. Not surprisingly, Madrid
was becoming obsessed with what it considered to be the injustice of
Catalonia's immunity from taxation. In 1639 Olivares opened a
campaign against southern France from Catalonia. It had no rational
strategic objective except to pitchfork Catalonia into the war. If
the Catalans had to defend their country, Olivares argued, they would
have to support the army.
This logic was lost on the Catalans. The peasants, urged on by their
clergy, refused to support the troops. During the winter the
soldiers were billeted in the countryside. Soon there were clashes
with the population, then riots and open rebellion. Too late,
Olivares attempted to draw back and conciliate the Catalans. On June
7 the mob murdered the viceroy in Barcelona. The higher nobility and
the urban aristocracies were still most anxious for an accommodation,
but the countryside was now completely out of control. The
Diputaci�, which was the only remaining legal authority, was led by a
strong-minded cleric named Pau Claris, canon of Urgel, located west
of Barcelona, who was unwilling to make concessions. In the autumn
of 1640 Olivares scraped together the last available troops and sent
them against the Catalan rebels. Claris countered by transferring
Catalan allegiance to the king of France, "as in the time of
Charlemagne" (January 1641). French troops now entered Catalonia.
Only when the renewed French civil wars (the Fronde) induced the
French to withdraw their army were the Castilians able to reconquer
Catalonia (1652). The Catalan upper classes, at least, were
relieved, for they had found the French even less congenial masters
than the Castilians. For once, Madrid did not repeat its previous
mistakes: the liberties and privileges of Catalonia were fully
restored.
<http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/printable/7/0,5722,115207,00.html>
*****
Spain lacked the Prince (or the Leviathan) who could create an
integrated polity & national market, despite the facade of "absolute
monarchy." A vicious dialectic of external wars, internal revolts, &
mounting debts.
***** The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14) broke out upon
Charles's death. The Peace of Utrecht (see Utrecht, Peace of)
confirmed Philip V on the Spanish throne, but it transferred the
Spanish Netherlands, Milan, Naples, and Sardinia to Austria and
Sicily to Savoy. Another result of the war was that Catalonia,
Valencia, and Arag�n, which had opposed Philip, lost their political
autonomy. <http://www.bartleby.com/65/sp/Spain.html> *****
By then it was too late. Britain & the Netherlands had already risen
to prominence.
For more detail on the history of Catalan struggle for autonomy,
visit the website on "History of Catalonia" at
<http://www.gencat.es/historia/aindex.htm>.
Also, here's a couple of posts by Michael Hoover relevant to the
subject of the problem of decentralization:
***** From: Michael Hoover <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Forwarded from Anthony (Brenner)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2000 13:54:09 -0500 (EST)
> arguments I have heard in
> the past about Spain's failure to capitalize on its New World plunder don't
> necessarily take into account the intermediary role of English colonies in
> the Caribbean, Jamaica in particular.
> There's an interesting article titled "England and the Spanish-American
> Trade: 1680-1715" by Curtis Nettels that appeared in the Mar. 1931 Journal
> of Modern History. (I found it by doing a keyword search on "silver" and
> "Spain" and "England" in the JSTOR database.) Basically Nettels lays out a
> scenario in which Jamaicans sold provisions, manufactured goods and slaves
> to the Spanish, while in return they received gold and silver freshly dug
> in the Latin American colonies.
> Louis Proyect
Here's Marx's take on impact of regionalism in Spain:
"Since the establishment of the absolute monarch they [the towns]
have vegetated in a state of continuous decay. We have not here to
state the circumstances, political or economical, which have
destroyed Spanish commerce, industry, navigation, and
agriculture...As the commercial and industrial life of the towns
declined, internal exchanges became rare, the mingling of the
inhabitants of different provinces less frequent, the means of
communication neglected, and the great roads gradually deserted.
Thus the local life of Spain, the independence of its provinces and
communes, the diversified state of society originally based on the
physical configuration of the country, and historicallt developed by
the detached manner in which several provinces emancipated themselves
from from the Moorish rule and formed little independent
commonwealths - was now finally strengthened and confirmed by the
economic revolution which dried up the sources of national activity.
And while the absolute monarchy found in Spain material in its very
nature repulsive to centralization, it did all in its power to
prevent the growth of common interest arising out of a national
division of labor and the multiplicity of internal exchanges - the
very basis of on which alone a uniform system of administration and
the rule of general laws can be created. Thus the absolute monarchy
in Spain, bearing but a superficial resemblance to the absolute
monarchies of Europe in general, is rather to be ranged in a class
with Asiatic forms of government. Spain, like Turkey, remained an
agglomeration of of mismanaged republics with a nominal sovereign at
their head. Despotism changed character in the different provinces
with the arbitrary interpretation of the general laws by viceroys and
governors; but despotic as was the government, it did not prevent the
provinces from subsisting with different laws and cutoms, different
coins, military banners of different colors, and with their
respective systems of taxation. The oriental despotism attacks the
municipal self-government only when opposed to its direct interests
but is very glad to allow those institutions to continue so long as
they take off its shoulders the duty of doing something and spare it
the trouble of regular administration." ("Revolutionary Spain," in
Saul Padover, ed., _Karl Marx: On Revolution_, pp. 590-591,
originally appeared in 9/9/1854 issue of New York Daily Tribune)
Whatever one's view of Marx's use of "Asiatic forms of government"
and "oriental despotism," his point is that basis of Spanish
regionalism is not in regional differences or economy but in
political failure of Spanish state to centralize as later European
absolutist monarchies had. In effect, external source of wealth from
Americas freed Spanish state from task of national economic and
political integration. Moreover, regionalism is not effect of mode of
production but is effect of political level - the state.
Re. Spanish colonizers, appears that pattern in which ostensibly
absolutist-centralist form overlays essentially regionalist reality
was transferred to Americas. Michael Hoover *****
***** From: Michael Hoover <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Forwarded from Anthony (Brenner)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2000 18:27:52 -0500 (EST)
> >Re. Spanish colonizers, appears that pattern in which ostensibly
> >absolutist-centralist form overlays essentially regionalist reality
> >was transferred to Americas. Michael Hoover
>
> Michael, Spain and Spanish colonialism was not one of Marx's strong points.
> He wrote an article on Bolivar for an encyclopedia which practically
> labeled the liberator as a reactionary bandit. Marx was only a human being.
> Louis Proyect
I used Marx for more specific - and more important - point about
relationship between political state and political economy. But I
can make do without reference to the guy...
Conquest practice of establishing administrative center - city or
town - with jurisdiction over large productive hinterland while
over-laying that with centralized bureaucratic structure -
viceroyaltys & audencias - replicated social & political organization
familiar to Spaniards. On paper - and in form - Spanish created
centralized bureaucratic apparatus in the Americas. Flexibility in
practice, however, allowed for regional variation in administration
in what was supposed to be uniform system of rule. Administrators
could ignore superiors' orders on grounds that law/policy wasn't
applicable to local conditions.
Spanish American cabildo declined as active institution in later
colonial period. This is generally said to be result of selling
offices and subsequent imposition of corregimento placing
cities/towns firmly under royal administration - in later colonial
period. But eliminating relative autonomy (which always existed in
concert with position as outpost of central power) did not eliminate
regionalism. In many instances, local crown officials not only
maintained their status but served themselves and other local elite
interests well as secular decline of wealth going to viceregal
treasuries and Spain throughout Hapsburg era indicates.
Breakdown of Spanish central state bureaucratic apparatus in Americas
disclosed system held together by slender thread. Several tendencies
emerged in early 19th century post-colonial period. Bolivar's
project of grand continental federated state could not re-connect
what had been sundered by legitimacy crisis, loss of king, and
intense regionalism that was unleashed. Those who thought solution
was state based upon Bourbon viceroyaltys were more successful but in
certain areas - Rio de la Plata & New Granada, for example - localist
forces fought long, hard battles for autonomy. In Central America,
localist sentiment was sufficiently strong to undo federal republic
and balkanize region.
Creation of integrated national economy in early 19th century Spanish
America was blocked by imposition of dependency by external forces of
internatonal economy *and* by internal constraints of which
regionalism was important factor. Michael Hoover *****
Yoshie
