It's not the cleverness of bureaucrats that makes states effective but
rather the relationship the state has with various social groups,
particularly the bourgeoisie. Certainly we cannot assume this
relationship to remain immutable. Besides, Japanese capital is
transnational enough that pure nationalistic monetary policies may either
be not supported nor be effective.
Cheers, Anthony
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Anthony P. D'Costa
Associate Professor Ph: (253) 692-4462
Comparative International Development Fax: (253) 692-5718
University of Washington Box Number: 358436
1900 Commerce Street
Tacoma, WA 98402, USA
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On Wed, 4 Apr 2001, Charles Brown wrote:
> Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2001 09:22:01 -0400
> From: Charles Brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [PEN-L:9957] Re: Japan
>
> Maybe big recessions ( depressions even) are inevitable with capitalism , and so ,
>no amount of clever monetary policy can avoid that. That theory would be consistent
>with the empirical facts regarding Japan.
>
> Charles
>
> >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 03/20/01 09:29PM >>>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote, though with oddly broken lines in the original:
>
> >it seems to me that the following solution to Japan's woes (banks
> >stuck with bad debts, monetary policy ineffective, depression) may
> >be possible. Please tell me why it wouldn't work. Without raising
> >taxes, the government could buy out the banks' bad loans in return
> >for reforms of accounting, etc., that are aimed at preventing future
> >bubble economies. This would solve the monetary problem at the same
> >time it provides fiscal stimulus, moderating depression.
>
> Japan has been unable to appropriate the serious sums necessary to
> socialize all that bad debt. Or, put another way, the Japanese ruling
> class has been unable to use the state to bail out Japanese
> capitalism. Compare it with the S&L/bank bailout in the U.S., in
> which something like $200 billion - no one can say exactly how much,
> really - was spent with almost no public debate (and little in the
> way of reforms).
>
> And what's with the Bank of Japan taking so long to ease in the early
> 1980s? And that VAT increase in 1996?
>
> What's with the Japanese state? I thought their bureaucrats were so clever.
>
> Doug
>
>
