[corrected & amended -- see the end.]
In response to David's questions ..., Louis Proyect writes:
<Because they didn't recognize their own long-term class interests as well
<as bourgeois intellectuals such as Alfred Kahn did. This is the role of the
<intelligentsia, to raise such ideas. It is the role of the bourgeois state
<apparatus to then act upon it. FDR functioned in the same manner in the
<1930s when he pushed for regulation. The last of the "New Dealers", Ted
<Kennedy, was responding to the same class interests when he fought for
<deregulation.
David ripostes: >This is a very interesting theory you have. Whatever the
government does, by definition, is in the long-term class interests of
industry/business/bourgeois/guys who wear tophats/play golf, even if the
industry strenuously opposes the government action. No wonder Marxist
analysis is never wrong.<
I can't speak for Louis, but the idea that "whatever the government does,
by definition, is in the long-term class interests of" the bourgeoisie is a
very simplistic version of the Marxian theory of the state. It's absolutely
true, to my mind at least, that the state under capitalism works to serve
the class interests of the capitalist class under normal conditions. These
interests center around the preservation of class privileges, of capitalist
property. (Sweezy's chapter on the state in his THEORY OF CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT is very good: one of his key points is that bolstering class
rule is seen as "normal" by most people who think about the state.)
However, beyond that, capitalist class interests become vague, since the
future is uncertain: no-one knew at the time if Alfred Kahn's scheme would
serve the long-term interests of capital. We still don't know, but strictly
speaking the nature of the long-term class interests of the capitalist
class can only be determined after the fact (and the long-term implications
of that scheme aren't all in yet).
This vagueness opens the state to two kinds of deviations from what's good
for capital. First, in the short run, in many cases, the short-term
interests of particular power blocs within capital can dominate, going
against what most people would agree are the long-term interests of
capital. For example, a lot of George Dumbya's programs seem to go against
what's good for capital. Continuing the slighting of public health by the
Clinton administration, for example, risks the rise of plagues that hurt
capitalists along with workers and could even shake the social order that
allows the capitalists to exploit workers (though frankly such is likely to
promote barbarism more than it does socialism -- neither result seems good
to capitalists). BTW, this picture of the general interest of capital vs.
the particular interests of capitals is reflected (in a mystified form) in
the mainstream liberal vision of the "public interest" vs. special interests.
Second, if working class or other dominated groups can organize and gather
a lot of power, they can push the government away from serving the
short-term interests of capitalists and even the long-term interests of
capital. The latter was seen, for example, with the election of Salvadore
Allende to the presidency of Chile in 1971. But even though he had
governmental power, state power (Pinochet, the CIA, etc.) eventually
smashed Allende and the Unidad Popular government. The power of the working
class has to be widened and deepened in order to counteract the power of
capitalists and capital. Among other things, the state repressive power has
to be taken away from capital's lackeys. (I'm being nice to Pinochet by
calling him merely a "lackey.")
The former case -- where working class power pushes the government away
from serving the short-term interests of capitalists -- seems to be the
basis for the social democracy that prevailed in Sweden and some other rich
capitalist countries for a couple of decades after World War II. (In the
U.S., we had only a weak echo of this kind of system.) Though other results
are possible, in the case of Sweden the power of the working class enabled
the wise management of the national economy by social-democratic
technocrats, allowing a very popular class compromise that for many years
served the long-term interests of capital while minimizing the role of
capitalist special interests. Of course, this kind of compromise requires
some very special social and historical conditions, which seem to have gone
away in Sweden. Further, individual capitalists have an incentive to "free
ride" on the social-democratic accord, taking advantage of the system while
moving capital to low-wage areas, etc. Finally, the bureaucratization of
the Social Democratic party and the labor unions eventually undermined the
popular base for the system, so that resistance to its abolition was sapped.
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
