************************************************************************ Click http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume5/v5n23.html to view an HTML-formatted version of this issue of Progressive Response. (Due to technical difficulties, this link will not be available until sometime on 20 July 2001.) ************************************************************************ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response 19 July 2001 Vol. 5, No. 23 Editor: Tom Barry ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF)--a "Think Tank Without Walls." A joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies, FPIF is an international network of analysts and activists dedicated to "making the U.S. a more responsible global leader and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas." We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in the PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. For more information on FPIF and joining our network, please consider visiting the FPIF website at http://www.fpif.org/. **** We Count on Your Support **** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Updates and Out-takes *** BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS NOT ISOLATIONIST *** By Tom Barry *** MIXED SIGNALS ON MISSILE DEFENSE *** By Michelle Ciarrocca *** ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE: FATED TO FAIL *** By Gina Amatangelo II. Outside the U.S. *** MIGRATION TALKS MUST TIE IN TO TRADE RELATIONSHIP OR THEY WILL FALL SHORT *** By Carlos A. Heredia III. Letters and Comments *** THANKS FOR OUTSIDE U.S. FORUM *** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Updates and Out-takes *** BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS NOT ISOLATIONIST *** By Tom Barry (Editor's Note: The following is from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary available at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0107isolate.html.) With his photo ops in the British Museum and the Cabinet War Rooms in London, George W. had planned to pitch the story of his second European trip as president more positively. Instead the headlines were dominated by his denials that he is an isolationist. Responding to charges by Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, who accused the administration of isolating the U.S. from the world, Bush said, "We are not retreating within our borders." True enough, the U.S. is not keeping out of global affairs. Rather it is simply doing what it wants around the world--regardless of world opinion, impacts outside our borders, and the conventions of multilateral governance. Bush put it plainly: "I will continue to stand for what I think is right for our country and the world." If the Democrats want to attack U.S. foreign policy, they should get the terms right. While there is an isolationist streak in the new foreign policy agenda--particularly when it comes to addressing humanitarian concerns--the path that the Bush administration is taking is decidedly unilateralist. It's the "U" word--not the "I" word--that is the glaring sin of the administration's approach to global affairs. But Democrats like Daschle would rather take pot shots that create their own photo ops than forthrightly address what's really going on with U.S. foreign policy. Talking about America's unveiled unilateralism is problematic, though, for the Democrats or anyone else for two reasons: one, because the level of national discourse about U.S. foreign policy is at such an abysmally low level that terms like unilateralism and multilateralism carry little meaning for the public or the media (or policymakers, for that matter); and two, because the Democrats themselves are not committed multilateralists. In their heart of hearts, the Democrats--like the Republicans--believe that the U.S. has the god-ordained right to assert its power the way it sees fit, regardless of international rules, decisions, and conventions. The Bush administration does not represent the head-in-the-sand isolationist wing of the Republican Party. Their global economy policy calls for increasingly integrated markets. Their new energy policy calls for an aggressive expansion of U.S. energy companies to all corners of the globe--no matter the dicey political context (from Nigeria to the Caspian region). Their military policy is not only about homeland defense but also about bolstering the U.S.-Japan military and NATO alliances, bombing Iraq, and maintaining military aid to Israel. Unilateralism--not isolationism--is the operating principle in violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol, withdrawing executive support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, dismissing the International Criminal Court, etc., etc. Sure it's nice to see George W. squirming in the global affairs arena. But let's get the critique right. (Tom Barry <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is codirector of Foreign Policy In Focus and a senior analyst at the Interhemispheric Resource Center.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** MIXED SIGNALS ON MISSILE DEFENSE *** By Michelle Ciarrocca (Editor's Note: The following is from a new FPIF Global Affairs Commentary available at: http://www.fpif.org/commentary/0107mdefense.html.) On Saturday, July 14th, the Pentagon conducted the fourth intercept test of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Delayed by more than 18 months due to technical problems, early reports from Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization indicate that "everything worked in a nominal (or acceptable) mode." However, in the aftermath of the successful test--the first in almost two years--Kadish's remarks were unexpectedly subdued. He cautioned that it takes many weeks to analyze the test data and that, "we have a long road ahead in all the missile defense activities." Kadish's caution is warranted. Preliminary information shows that there was a problem with the prototype radar used to tell ground controllers if the kill vehicle hit the target. In the case of the first NMD intercept test, which took place in October 1999, missile defense advocates were quick to praise the test as an unqualified success. Months later, however, test data revealed that the interceptor homed in on the large, brightly illuminated decoy balloon that helped guide it to the mock warhead. As Tom Collina of the Union of Concerned Scientists aptly stated, "They got lucky." Counting the most recent NMD test, the test record stands at two hits and two misses--hardly an outstanding ratio. Philip Coyle, formerly the Pentagon's chief civilian test evaluator, noted in a report last September that the NMD system's effectiveness is not yet proven, even in the most elementary sense. In fact, the program is so immature that ''a rigorous assessment of potential system performance cannot be made.'' Coyle described how flight tests are being "dumbed" down to ensure the public perception of success, and interceptors are being given advance information they will not have in real world engagements. Undeterred, missile defense enthusiasts like Senate minority leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) viewed the successful test as a reason to deploy the system as soon as possible. "We should put this right at the top of the agenda, not allow it to be pushed aside by Democrats," the Senator remarked on Fox News the day after the test. Bush has talked of a deploying a "layered" missile defense system that would combine the ground-based NMD system with sea-, air-, and space-based components, but the specifics remain vague. In keeping with this plan, in FY 2002, the Bush administration has requested $8.3 billion for missile defense programs, an increase of 57% over last years' budget. The Pentagon is planning on spending a substantial portion of the budget increase on an ambitious new testing schedule of the various missile defense systems. In the next year and a half, the Pentagon wants to conduct up to 17 flight tests. Each test costs about $100 million. Also in the budget request are funds to build a new missile defense test site in Alaska. The idea is that the new test site could become the command center for a rudimentary missile shield as early as 2004. Because both the expanded testing and the new test facility will violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow, the State Department sent out a 14-page memo to all U.S. diplomatic posts abroad warning that these violations could take place ''in months, not years,'' as previously thought. While the Bush administration is trying to move fast and furiously with the missile defense programs, the fact remains that none are currently up to the task. As Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has pointed out, "There is no test that could possibly be conducted in the next twelve months that would violate the ABM Treaty. Neither the ship-based systems nor the Airborne Laser are ready to test against any target, let alone an ICBM." Russian officials have indicated a willingness to discuss changes in the ABM Treaty to address U.S. concerns about emerging ballistic missile threats, but warned that a U.S. "go it alone" approach on missile defense could seriously jeopardize future nuclear reductions in Russia's armaments and encourage China and other nations to build up their arsenals. Given that the $70 billion spent on missile defense technologies over the past two decades has not produced a single workable device, a crash program to deploy a system is unlikely to fare better. Before President Bush throws away four decades of progress on arms control and risks sparking a new arms race, he should rethink the consequences of moving full speed ahead with a missile defense system and readjust the direction of his policy to bring it into line with strategic, political, and economic realities. (Michelle Ciarrocca <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is a research associate at the World Policy Institute in New York.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE: FATED TO FAIL *** By Gina Amatangelo (Editor's Note: The following is excerpted from a new FPIF policy brief, available at: http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol6/v6n29andean.html.) The Bush administration is attempting to secure congressional approval for its Andean Regional Initiative--largely an expansion of U.S. support for Plan Colombia. The administration has requested $882.29 million in the 2002 State Department budget to support this initiative. Included in this request is a $731 million budget to fund a project component called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which would be administered through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement budget. This new request follows congressional approval in 2000 for a $1.3 billion two-year supplemental package for Plan Colombia. The amount of the requested funding flowing through normal budget channels for counterdrug programs in the Andes has jumped into the $1 billion range for just one year--2002. The administration's proposed budget allocations for Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador are more than double the amount the U.S. government spent on counternarcotics programs in those countries prior to Plan Colombia. Governments in the Andean region are expressing their alarm about the spillover effects of the counternarcotics and counterinsurgency wars in Colombia, and they are lobbying for increased aid from Washington to protect their borders. If these trends continue, the U.S. may be on the verge of a continuing annual commitment of $1 billion for counterdrug efforts in the Andes--an amount that would constitute a major portion of the diminishing overall foreign aid budget. This administration's framing of its counterdrug efforts as an Andean regional strategy is reminiscent of the approach of the previous Bush administration, which launched the first Andean Initiative in 1989. Similarly, that earlier initiative also prioritized military hardware and training for the Andean military and police forces to combat drugs. According to the State Department International Narcotics Strategy Report, since 1989 the coca cultivation in the region has declined a mere 16%, as relatively large reductions in production in Peru and Bolivia have been paralleled by increased cultivation in Colombia. In this expanded aid proposal, the Bush administration has attempted to address persistent critiques of its support for Plan Colombia. To address concerns about regional stability and spillover effects, it has taken a more regional approach to halting the spread of drug trafficking and political violence. Responding to critics that are concerned about an undue focus on military solutions, the administration has outlined a package of development and judicial aid to balance the budgets for military and police aid. Not included in this regional proposal, however, is the military funding that will flow through the Defense Department (DOD). When asked by a congressional representative if additional funding for security forces through the DOD would tip the military/nonmilitary aid balance, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs William Brownfield responded, "guilty as charged." Estimates suggest that if DOD funding levels remain constant, 71% of the total U.S. assistance allocated for Colombia in 2002 will go to security forces. Both the Plan Colombia supplemental and the Andean Regional Initiative include assistance for democracy strengthening and economic development programs. But such nonmilitary assistance will continue to be overshadowed by the military component of the U.S. strategy in the Andes. The U.S. is making a major investment in training and arming thousands of Colombian troops to combat Colombian guerrillas in coca producing regions of southern Colombia. This assistance is drawing the U.S. into this brutal 35-year internal conflict and undermining the fragile peace negotiations between the government and guerrillas. The Bush administration is asking Congress to expand U.S. support for Plan Colombia and counterdrug efforts in the region, despite the fact that the attempts to attack drugs at the source have consistently failed to have a significant impact on the flow of drugs to the United States. Even after the new adjustments, the strategy as outlined in the Andean Regional Initiative fails to adequately address concerns about human rights abuses and rural unrest. (Gina Amatangelo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is a fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, specializing in international drug control programs in the Andes region.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. Outside the U.S. (FPIF has a new component called "Outside the U.S.," which aims to bring non-U.S. voices into the U.S. policy debate and to foster dialog between Northern and Southern actors in global affairs issues. Please visit our Outside the U.S. page for other non-U.S. perspectives on global affairs and for information about submissions at: http://www.fpif.org/outside/index.html.) *** MIGRATION TALKS MUST TIE IN TO TRADE RELATIONSHIP OR THEY WILL FALL SHORT *** By Carlos A. Heredia (Editor's Note: This commentary was originally published in the borderlines UPDATER, an online source of news and analysis on U.S.-Mexico issues produced by the Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC). See: http://www.us-mex.org/.) Seven-and-a-half years after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect, the situation of Mexico's migrant workers in the United States is still being approached as if it were divorced from the two countries' trade relationship; and calls by labor, human rights organizations, church groups, and progressive political constituents in favor of a policy recognizing migration's link to trade continue to fall on deaf ears. During the debates over the passage of the trade pact, U.S. President Bill Clinton repeatedly told members of Congress that NAFTA would create jobs and keep Mexicans at home. The fact is, however, that throughout the terms of Mexican presidents Carlos Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo, and Vicente Fox, the number of their compatriots seeking work north of the border has not diminished. Nor does a significant decline appear likely as long as the difference in the U.S. and Mexican minimum wage maintains the enormous ratio of 12-to-1. The administrations of both Fox and U.S. President George W. Bush have stated their wish to progress through a constructive dialogue on migration. But naturally, they have differences regarding the meaning of progress. While Washington favors broadening the guest worker program, Mexico City insists on legalization or normalization of Mexican workers in the United States. While the United States considers amnesty, Mexico does not speak the word, which, from its perspective, implies migrants' commission of crime. The fundamental question is what each party wants in exchange for relaxing its demands. The U.S. government has reiterated its willingness to move beyond initial talks and increase the number of visas issued to Mexican applicants, if the Mexican government will do its utmost to deter migrants from illegally crossing in the desert or other dangerous areas. Yet any such increase likely would be insufficient to meet the avalanche of visa requests. The Mexican government is willing to press for an improvement in the situation of migrant workers, but not to the point of straining its trade and financial ties with the United States. During Salinas' term, Mexico spent far more in Washington to promote the passage of NAFTA than to protect the millions of Mexican migrants in the United States. Mexico's NAFTA lobbying cost in excess of $100 million, The Wall Street Journal reported at the time. We don't have data yet to compare that with the current government's spending. But, in any event, the new administration clearly seems unlikely to assume a more energetic position linking its emigration and its human rights policies to its trade stance. The deaths of 14 impoverished Mexican migrants in the Arizona desert a few weeks back evoked merely official rhetoric and condolences, demonstrating that. In the bilateral NAFTA dispute over trucking, Economy Secretary Luis Ernesto Derbez has declared that the Mexican government might be prepared to take reprisal against the United States for failing to abide by its commitment to clear the way for the entry of Mexican truckers and trucks in the U.S. border states. We will have to wait and see how far this statement goes. But the Mexican government in no way appears poised to impose trade sanctions on the United States for its clear violations of Mexican migrants' human rights in operations such as Gatekeeper, Hold-the-Line, and others. In the end, the future of the bilateral relationship will continue to be dictated largely by the interests of Wall Street and U.S. corporations established in Mexico, rather than by the needs of migrant workers. All too often we have been told that the relaxation of immigration and naturalization laws is a topic that "won't fly" on Capitol Hill, or that "this isn't the time" to engage in the debate due to sluggishness in U.S. economic cycles. Apparently the Fox administration does not intend to revisit its earlier position in favor of a "NAFTA Plus" that would include immigration and labor rights in the main section of the trade agreement. That means continuing to ignore, hypocritically, that the U.S. economy depends on the subsidy provided by cheap Mexican labor, whether in U.S. territory or in maquiladoras located in Mexico. It is now time for that subsidy to be acknowledged for what it is--the crux of the bilateral economic relationship, and not just a human rights issue separate from trade relations. (Carlos Heredia <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> is a Mexican economist. He served as a federal congressman from 1997 to 2000. He has worked for 20 years on trade and development issues with the Mexico City-based NGO Equipo PUEBLO. He is currently a Cabinet member in the Mexico City government. His comments do not necessarily reflect the views of the city government.) (Editor's Note: The last issue of the Progressive Response included an excerpt in the Outside the U.S. forum of a commentary by Adrian Bonilla. The links--Spanish and English--to the entire commentary were mistakenly not included. See: http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/0107ecuador.html and http://www.fpif.org/outside/commentary/0107ecuadorSP.html.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. Letters and Comments *** THANKS FOR OUTSIDE U.S. FORUM *** Thanks for an outstanding issue! [Progressive Response, July 10, 2001, posted at http://www.fpif.org/progresp/volume5/v5n22.html] I especially like the fact that you are providing a forum for thinkers from outside the U.S. to voice their opinions and ideas. The item by Adrian Bonilla of FLACSO is a thoughtful and carefully worded piece that deserves to be read by policymakers and others capable of changing the direction of U.S. policy in Colombia. Ecuador is already feeling the ill effects of Plan Colombia. There are now almost daily reports in the local press about the militarization of the Colombia/Ecuador border, the increasing numbers of refugees entering Ecuador, and the disruption of the lives of local peoples. I look forward to reading other opinions from "Outside the U.S." in future issues. - Lucille Lane <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please consider supporting Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). FPIF is a new kind of think tank--one serving citizen movements and advancing a fresh, internationalist understanding of global affairs. Although we make our FPIF products freely available on the Internet, we need financial support to cover our staff time and expenses. 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