The troubles with technical trends

Professionals have lost sight of the risks but cannot blame day traders
for the outcome, writes Barry Riley 
Financial Times, Oct 05 2001

For eight years I contributed a weekly Financial Times column - recently
labelled Investment Watch - on developments in the fund management
industry. I closed the series in August, but in the context of the stock
market slump I would like to draw out some themes and explain how
technical trends in the asset management industry, especially in
equities, may have caused trouble.

Too many professionals have lost sight of the risks being run. Instead,
they have focused on a particular definition of active risk (also called
tracking error). It is measured, using complex models, in terms of the
standard deviation of expected investment returns compared with the
benchmark index. It is precise, but it gave clients no inkling that the
stock markets had become highly risky by the end of the 1990s.

The atrocities of September 11 prompted a further slide in equities, but
many stock markets had already tumbled from their peaks by September 10;
the World Index was down 32 per cent in dollar terms.

Those eight years took in a stock market bubble. This in part reflected
favourable economic trends, and especially growth in corporate profits.
But the scale of the price rise also reflected uprating. When I started
writing the column, the S&P 500 offered a dividend yield of 2.7 per cent
and a price/earnings ratio of 23, falling to 16 in 1995: at the market
peak in March 2000 the yield was just 1.07 per cent and the p/e ratio
had reached 35.

This bubble was often presented at the time as being created by
day-trading amateurs, but it can be better viewed as a collective
mistake by investment professionals. How did it happen? Here are a
number of the themes I discussed during the late 1990s:

* Indexation and its "closet clone" benchmarking.

* Distortions arising from capitalisation-weighted indices.

* Risk control applied through "tracking error" estimates.

* Increasing focus on investment "styles".

* Prevalence of short-term performance measurement.

To this list could usefully be added some characteristic failures of
client protection. The managers' business risks were usually controlled
more carefully than the clients' investment risks. The pay and bonuses
of asset managers rose rapidly, and many cashed in through takeovers of
their firms.

Many asset management firms are now in disarray. Most have depended on a
steadily rising stock market and have no strategy to cope with adverse
circumstances. A new category of alternative asset managers has sprung
up, hedge funds.

These pose their own problems, especially through the generation of high
volatility, which has recently caused problems for regulators. But they
represent an important reorientation from relative risk towards absolute
risk.

The relative risk concept was a fundamental cause of the great bubble.
Ironically, it has now even spread into bonds: a curious paper from JP
Morgan's emerging markets research team a few weeks ago, entitled The
Argentine Portfolio Dilemma, discussed why bond fund managers were being
drawn into wildly risky Argentine paper because otherwise they would
suffer high tracking errors against emerging market bond indices in
which Argentina has a weighting of about 20 per cent.

This has uncomfortable echoes of the stock market distortions of the
late 1990s. In more normal conditions, overpriced stocks and sectors
would be sold by value-oriented portfolio managers.

Across continental Europe, the telecoms sector generated similar huge
distortions, largely because of weighting technicalities related to low
free floats. Through entirely artificial shortages of stock, both France
Telecom and Deutsche Telekom achieved phenomenal prices, before the
inevitable reversals.

Now there is a global economic recession in the offing. It has become
evident that herd behaviour caused by the risk reduction procedures of
big institutions can be disruptive and lead to irrational valuations.

There has also been a failure of the various agents who stand between
the corporate sector and investors. Investment banks, for instance, fed
the mania through initial public offerings of quite unsuitable
companies, and promoted ill-conceived mergers. All the while, analysts,
many employed by the same investment banks, were encouraged to publish
what turned out to be quite unrealistic forecasts of earnings.

None of this provides a decent excuse for asset managers. They are
supposed to base their decisions on rational analysis, and should act in
the interests of their clients.

True, there can be variations on these themes. Running overtly
speculative portfolios on a short-term basis in a bubble for mutual fund
clients is a different matter from pursuing prudent long-term strategies
for, say, pension funds. Unfortunately, the clients are rarely made
fully aware of the risks being run on their behalf.

It is worth pointing out that UK pension funds often used peer group
benchmarks, rather than market index ones, in the 1990s. This enabled
them, as a group, to back away from an increasingly overpriced Wall
Street. But they remained highly exposed to equity risk through their
core equity holdings in the UK and continental Europe.

Defining risk as short-term volatility against an index has proved to be
a trap. The index providers, including MSCI, FTSE and Dow Jones Stoxx,
have brought in measures to correct the free float distortions. But
there is a basic flaw in the use of capitalisation-weighted indices to
define risk: it attracts fund managers towards expensive stocks and
encourages them to maintain low exposures to cheap ones.

The control of absolute risk, and the establishment of strategies in the
light of very long-run historical returns on different asset classes,
would help to avoid similar upsets in the future.

But then, the rationality of financial markets in the short term has
always been suspect, whatever the modern Nobel prize-winning generation
of market theorists has postulated.

Full article at:
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT34WZHVESC
&live=true&useoverridetemplate=IXL8L4VRRBC&tagid=IXLUCLOJQBC

Michael Keaney
Mercuria Business School
Martinlaaksontie 36
01620 Vantaa
Finland

[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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