Jim, you can put "orthodox" or "fundamentalist" marxist in quotes if you wish, but the point is that grossmann and mattick did not refer to their theoretical efforts that way. i wish you would forgo using such appellations even in quotes. As I said, there are theoretical and empirical reasons why Marx thought the rate of exploitation would rise in secular terms but not rise 'sufficiently' to compensate for the FROP such that extorted mass of surplus value remained sufficient for continued accumulation. This idea that accumulation founders on a shortage of surplus value is not an article of faith by orthodox believers; there is a theory behind it. It is subject to disconfirmation at both theoretical and empirical levels.
> > No, I didn't say "Marxists": I said <quote> "orthodox" Marxists <unquote>. > Also, note the word "some." I was not lambasting "Marxists" or even all > self-styled "orthodox" ones. Instead, I was suggesting that both the > "orthodoxy" and the "unorthodoxy" present _incomplete theories_. Rakesh, > it's best to read what people say _in context_. I don't think you should refer to a theory in theological terms even in quotes. We don't dismiss objections as heresy, as I have said. > > >Theoretical analysis reveals that accumulation puts upward pressure on the > >OCC; > > This is extremely controversial: that's not the point; all worthwhile theories are extremely controversial. there are theoretical and empirical reasons given for upward pressure on the OCC. it's not held as a matter of faith; belief otherwise is not denounced as heresy. raising the "technical composition of > capital" (roughly the machine/labor ratio) which should raise the OCC > _also_ raises labor productivity, which undermines the rise in the organic > composition by lowering the value of machinery and other means of > production. What that means is that whether or not the OCC rises is > _historically contigent_, not some transhistorical "law" of capitalism. The > data suggest that the OCC rose during some periods -- especially the > "industrial revolution" phase of now-rich countries like the U.S. -- but > then leveled off in the trend. (Of course, one can always re-measure the > OCC to make it rise, but I find that kind of study to be doubtful: the best > studies emphasize the ratio between the value of fixed means of production > and that of net output, because it indicates whether or not any rise in the > OCC is significant.) Again, let's get clear as to what Marx's basic theoretical idea was. One of the best ways to reduce unit values and thereby gain a competitive advantage is to replace via mechanization some quantity of direct labor with a lesser quantity of indirect labor. Unit value and use value thus tends to move in inverse direction. The lesser the unit value, the greater the mass of use values. Marx reasoned that while the replacement of a certain greater mass of direct labor by a lesser sum of indirect labor would provide the individual capitalist with an immediate advantage, it would tend raise the value of capital relative to direct labor employed in the system as a whole and thus reduce the average rate of profit even as the rate of exploitation rose. Now you raise the very reasonable objection that if unit values are so reduced, why won't the inputs of other capitals be cheapened and thereby their profit rates raised. No one denies the force of this objection, and on theoretical grounds it depends on whether tries to ascertain the effects of such a depreciation of unit values by the use of simultaneous or difference equations, by the use of a comparative statics method or a more dynamic one. It's late, i had some wine, so I'll argue for this position later. What I am responding to is the condescending idea that adherence to falling rate/mass of profit theory can be characterized as orthodox or fundamentalist. > Whether or not the reserve army is exhausted is also historically > contingent. During the late 1960s in the US (and maybe Western Europe), it > effectively was. It's possible in the future, but not at this point. (Note > that I didn't mean to refer to "money wages." Instead I should have made it > clear that I meant "real wages." I am sorry that I didn't make this clear.) But this does not respond to my point. there are strong theoretical reasons not to believe that capital will usually will founder on a shortage of labor even with a strong bout of accumulation. > > >Plus, with a continuous depreciation of unit values, even a slow rise in > >the money wage implies a higher rate of > >exploitation (even as the real wage increases)--I am assuming here a > >constant value of money as Marx does in his theory. > > The value of money is irrelevant in this context. I don't think so. Marx assumes it throughout, and it simplies his point. Since I confused the falling/rising rate of exploitation issue, I'll leave out your reply. > One way of summarizing the result is to use Marx's phrase about a > contradiction between the production and realization of surplus-value: > > --- when the production of surplus-value is easy (for the capitalists, > natch), realization problems hover and can pounce (as in the late 1920s & > perhaps the late 1990s); how do you know the system was choking on an excess of surplus value in these periods? I would argue that the way in which general, protracted crises were and are being overcome shows that it was and is a shortage of surplus value that choked the system into a general crisis. > > --- on the other hand, when realization is easy (as in the late 1960s), the > production of surplus-value can be extremely difficult, too. why? why is it ease of realization that makes production difficult? \ > I don't see why "worker resistance" is always secondary to the alleged rise > in the OCC. Class antagonism and conflict is a basic element that defines > capitalism and other exploitative modes of production. One of the key > reasons for capitalists' efforts to raise the technical composition of > capital -- in addition to the aggressive process of competition amongst > capitalists -- is that it's a way to try to deal with (suppress) class > antagonism on the job. Of course, a "technical fix" often fails, so it's > tried again. Workers' struggles in day to day battle are usually defensive, attempts to resist capital's attempts to raise the rate of surplus value or to lower the wage below the value of labor power. Marx's gives theoretical reasons for this conclusion in VPP. THe point of class consciousness is to turn defensive battles into a revolutionary struggle to uproot the mode of production. I will let Fred respond to your characterization of his theory as a variant of the labor squeeze one. I think it's a very bad characterization indeed. > As I said above, I referred specifically to "'orthodox' Marxists" -- and > was NOT criticizing Marxists in general (or even "orthodox" ones in > general). As I said, I think that the idea of a "Marxist orthodoxy" > doesn't make sense: Marxian political economy has always been a _debate_, > not an orthodoxy. Howard & King's two-volume history of Marxian economics > makes this clear (though they consistently take sides in the debates, often > hurting their presentations' completeness and fairness). Whatever Jim, you called FROP/mass of surplus value theorists the orthodox ones. Sure you put it in quotes. But we don't want the label; it adds nothing; it identifies nothing; it just prejudices the debate you say you want. > > "an insufficiency of surplus value in the process of production"? during > the 1920s in the US, when labor productivity in manufacturing soared > relative to real wages? Yes Jim, the rate of exploitation can rise and surplus value can still be short for the continued accumulation of capital. I don't understand what the problem here. > > Erik Olin Wright understood this well. > > where? Capital, Crisis and the State. Forgot the title. the Verso book from the late 70s. > I hope that the insulting reference to the WSJ also helps counteract the > insulting suggestion that I support ObL. You started the insulting references by calling us "orthodox", albeit in quotes. So from now on I will call you a "bourgeois empiricist", OK? Rakesh > > --
