Iran: A land of paradoxes
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Shlomo Avineri February, 08 2002
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(February 8) - In his recent State of the Union speech, US President George
W. Bush identified Iran, together with Iraq and North Korea, as belonging to
the "axis of evil," involved in terrorism and the production of weapons of
mass destruction.
Iran certainly deserves to be classified as aregional and possibly global
destabilizer, and its support for the fundamentalist Islamic terrorism of
Hizbullah in Lebanon is aimed at further undermining
the ever-diminishing chances of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.
But internal developments in Iran are complex, and any demonization of the
Islamic republic as such is simplistic, as is a dichotomous polarity
between "conservatives" and "moderates," the latter led by President
Mohammed Khatami, is not very helpful in what is a multi-faceted context.
In many respects, Iran is perhaps the most interesting country in the
region, with the greatest potential for a
development which may lead, not to a Western-style democracy, but to greater
opening
and liberalization. The paradox is that this potential is embedded in its
ideology as an
Islamic state.
The last few years have shown some remarkable developments. Among them:
Holding of elections: These are limited within an Islamic discourse, and in
order to run in the elections, parties and individuals have to get an
imprimatur from the highest Islamic authority in the land. Hence they are
obviously not free (an anti-Islamic candidate cannot run). But within this
Islamic discourse, there is a fierce contest between various groups and
interpretations.
Women have the vote, and participate actively in political life.
Because elections to the majlis (parliament) and the
presidency are contested, they are meaningful. It is, for example,
clear that Khatami was elected with the support of women and younger
people, and the "establishment" candidate was not elected. There is
nothing like this in any Arab country: In Egypt or Syria (just as in
Belarus) there is virtually only one candidate, and he receives between
97-98%
of the vote.
Debates in parliament are real, with different views expressed (again, in a
limited Islamic context), with real voting taking place (again, not like
the rubber-stamp sham parliaments in country such as Egypt and Syria).
To the Western eye, the extreme image of women in black chadors is the only
picture one has of women in Iran. While this is an obvious mark of the
discrimination of women, the picture is more complex.
For example, in medicine: Because male doctors are not allowed by strict
Islamic law to treat women patients, for years the government has
encouraged crash courses to train women doctors. As a consequence, there
are today many more women doctors in Iran than under the shah, and the
number of women dying in childbirth is among the lowest in the region.
Similarly, the government has instituted a very active birth control
program, and has found a way of legitimizing it within an Islamic context
("we want educated Islamic families, not just large
Islamic families"). Iran has consequently one of the lowest birth rates
in the region.
All this also has consequences for foreign policy.
As an Iranian political scientist recently put it at a seminar in Germany,
younger people in Iran
do feel themselves as Muslims, and Iran will not become a secular society.
But they view their Islam as part of their Iranian identity, whereas the
older clerics viewed their Islam as a universal revolutionary identity.
These younger people, the Iranian scholar claimed, are first of all Iranian
nationalists, and would like to dissociat themselves from Middle Eastern
politics, including the Arab-Israeli conflict.
They will continue, of course, to give verbal support to the Palestinian
cause, but it is not at the top of their agenda.
It is a complex, and perhaps confusing picture. But anyone who knows
European history will perhaps identify a parallel: the Calvinist, Puritan
revolution. The Calvinists in Geneva, or Cromwell's Puritans, were - like
the clerics in Teheran - biblio-centric, with a Hol Book as their model
for an idealized society. Their society was supposed to be puritanical,
frugal, non-permissive, with laws against conspicuous consumption and
luxuries. It was also anti-feminist, anchored in patriarchal family
structures.
But because the Calvinists did not accept a Church hierarchy, they based -
like the Iranian Shi'ites who are not part of the Sunni majoritarian
universalism - their legitimacy on the community of believers and
introduced elections. And once you introduce elections - and different
modes of interpretation of the Holy Book ar possible and legitimate -
there exists a mechanism for participation, control, dissent (limited as it
may be) and the introduction of innovativ strategies which try to
legitimize change within a traditional context.
In Europe, after all, Calvin's Geneva - an autocratic theocracy, more
similar to the Ayatollah Khomeini's Teheran than to any other regime -
eventually developed, through English Puritanism, towards modern
parliamentarianism.
Will Shi'ite Iran follow a road similar to that on the European Calvinists?
Nothing is predetermined, but the parallel is striking, and for all the
present involvement of some Iranian authorities in terrorism, the picture
is more complex, more interesting - and perhaps more
promising.
(The writer, professor of political science at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, is a former director-general of the
Foreign Ministry.)
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