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Volume 20 - Issue 13, June 21 - July 04, 2003
WORLD AFFAIRS
A round of uncertainty
WALDEN BELLO

As the next ministerial of the WTO approaches, schisms have begun to
surface between contending parties. The Cancun meet is shaping up to be
another Seattle.

ONLY a little over 12 weeks remain before the tourist haven of Cancun in
Mexico plays host to the Fifth Ministerial of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) in early September. But the negotiations, which have been going on
in Geneva, are practically at a stalemate. A feeling is taking hold that
Cancun will not be another Doha, where cooperation between the United
States and the European Union in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks
helped the acceptance of an agenda for limited trade negotiations.

The current state of affairs is reflected in the polarised situation in
the negotiations on agriculture. The controversial Harbinson Draft for a
new Agreement on Agriculture (prepared by Agricultural Negotiations
Chairman Stuart Harbinson) remains an orphan. The U.S. and the Cairns
Group of developed and developing country agro-exporters consider the
tariff reductions it has proposed too shallow while the E.U. and Japan see
them as too deep. Developing countries are concerned that the draft
requires substantial tariff cuts from them. They are also demanding a
broadening of Harbinson's "strategic products" proposal, which currently
reserves just a few staple foods for shallower tariff cuts.

A negative development is that the E.U. and the U.S., in pushing for
negotiating advantage, have split the ranks of the developing world. The
developing countries in the Cairns Group, such as Brazil, Uruguay and
Thailand, are siding with the U.S. against the E.U. and Japan. The E.U.
has hit back by gaining the support of India and many other developing
countries for a counter-proposal for agricultural liberalisation that
would replicate the allegedly more flexible liberalization formula of the
Uruguay Round.

The long and short of it is that it is very unlikely that there will be an
agreement on the modalities of the agricultural negotiations before
Cancun.

In the controversy over Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) and public health, there has been no give on the part of
the U.S. In defiance of the Doha Declaration, it continues to maintain its
position that only in the case of drugs for three diseases - Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), malaria and tuberculosis - should patent rights be loosened. In
its negotiating discourse, Washington is now talking about loosening
patent rights for "public health crises" instead of "public health
problems". U.S. negotiators have reportedly told their developing country
counterparts that they cannot change their positions, and if the latter
want any movement in the negotiations, they should talk directly to the
pharmaceutical giants! Another disturbing occurrence is that WTO
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi himself is spreading the blame for
the stalemate from the U.S. to Brazil and India, whose manufacturers, he
alleges, will be the ones that will principally benefit from looser patent
rights.

On the controversial "new issues" - investment, competition policy,
government procurement, and trade facilitation - the E.U. is trying to
delink the decision to commence negotiations on these issues from the
moves on the part of the E.U. to liberalise agriculture. The governments
of rich countries have intensified their campaign to convince the
governments of developing countries, which are wary of negotiating these
issues, that liberalisation in these areas is for their own good. To bring
about some movement, the U.S, has reportedly proposed to "unbundle" the
four areas so that negotiations could proceed on them separately. The E.U.
has publicly agreed with the U.S., but its preference is still to take the
four areas together.

The E.U. is also sidestepping developing countries' concerns about
substantive modalities, preferring to narrow down the negotiations on
modalities to be agreed on in Cancun to procedural ones - how many
meetings should be held, and so on. Not surprisingly, this has been
criticised by developing countries as an attempt to elicit from them a
blank cheque to start negotiations without first agreeing on the substance
of these negotiations.

In two key negotiating areas of great interest to developing countries,
there has been absolutely no movement. These are the issues of Special and
Differential Treatment and Implementation. On the latter, interestingly,
at a meeting with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Bangkok a few
weeks ago, Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner of the E.U., placed the blame
squarely on developing countries, whom he accused of not being able to
agree on what the two or three top priorities regarding implementation
were that need to be tackled were.

What does all this add up to? What does the lack of movement mean for the
Cancun Ministerial? The question was posed to Lamy at the Bangkok meeting.
Interestingly, his response was to sidestep the question and simply say
that if one viewed the process from the Doha Ministerial's mandate for the
negotiations to conclude by the end of 2004, then things did not look so
bad, since "in some areas, negotiations are two-thirds of the way through,
in some halfway through, in others a third through, in TRIPS 98 per cent
through."

Now, the role of ministerials is to carry out negotiations in several
areas simultaneously in order to bring about a comprehensive settlement.
Since the modalities of negotiations in critical areas have yet to be
agreed on, the WTO faces a problem that is not insignificant: what its
member-governments will do in Cancun. Perhaps this is the reason why key
WTO officials are now talking about coming up not with a declaration
announcing agreements on issues being negotiated, but a "communiqu�"
serving as a "progress report" on the ongoing negotiations, drawing upon
short reports made by the various negotiating groups on the work they have
undertaken since Doha.

The hopes for a Doha-type outcome in Cancun have been further doused by
the recent worsening of trade ties between the U.S. and the E.U. The E.U.
has threatened to impose sanctions on the U.S. by the end of 2003 for tax
breaks for exporters that a WTO judicial panel has found to be in
violation of WTO rules. In what has been perceived as a retaliatory move,
the U.S. said it would file a case with the WTO against the E.U.'s de
facto moratorium against genetically modified foods. Taken in the context
of already existing trade conflicts as well as the bitter struggle between
the U.S. and Britain on one side and France and Germany on the other over
the U.S. intervention in Iraq, these recent moves do not bode well for the
chances of both parties arriving at consensus positions on negotiating
modalities in agriculture and other trade issues before Cancun. One might
recall that it was not only the revolt of the developing countries at the
Seattle Convention Centre and the mass mobilisation in the streets, but
also unresolved conflicts between the U.S. and the E.U. on agriculture,
the environment, and other issues that brought down the third ministerial
in Seattle in 1999.

Pascal Lamy and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who are
personal friends, are said to be moving to bridge the Washington-Brussels
gap before Cancun, but the contextual conditions are more difficult now
than before the Doha Ministerial in November 2001, when the U.S. and the
E.U. shared a common position on combating terrorism and intervening in
Afghanistan and Washington had not yet imposed a 40 per cent protective
tariff on steel imports and passed its $100-billion subsidies for American
farmers. Nevertheless, it is important not to underestimate the capacity
of Zoellick and Lamy to engineer a U.S.-E.U. concordat as they did in the
lead-up to Doha. Indeed, some observers are putting the odds for a
Doha-type outcome at more than 50 per cent.

As negotiations have ground to a halt in Geneva, civil society
organisations are stepping up their efforts to mount massive mobilisations
and civil disobedience in Cancun and elsewhere in the world during the
week of the ministerial from September 9-14. At a meeting in Mexico City
on May 11-12, delegates to the Hemispheric and Global Assembly against the
Free Trade of the Americas and the WTO declared their "commitment to
derail the Fifth Ministerial of the World Trade Organization," which they
accused of institutionalising a free-trade paradigm that has resulted in
"greater poverty, inequity, gender inequality, and indebtedness throughout
the world" and "accelerated the destruction of the global environment".

The Mexican authorities are preparing for the arrival of thousands of
activists not only from Mexico but from North America and Central America.
In activist circles in Mexico, the big question is whether the Zapatistas
of Chiapas will lend the anti-WTO demonstrations the widespread legitimacy
they carry and the large numbers they can mobilise.

Opposition from civil society has put the WTO on the defensive. In what
many observers have interpreted as an effort to split global civil society
in the lead-up to Cancun, Director-General Supachai has invited several
leading NGOs to form a "WTO NGO Advisory Committee". The invitation has so
far received a cautious response from the target organisations, which will
court the anger of their peers should they decide to break ranks.

With confrontation in the air and the WTO's credibility at its lowest
point in years, Cancun is shaping up not to be another Doha but Seattle
II.

Walden Bello is Executive Director of the Bangkok-based Focus on the
Global South and Professor of Sociology and Public Administration at the
University of the Philippines.

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