In view of the recent discussion that brought up
alleged ties between the ISI and Chechen militants, I
thought this might be of interest. This is from a
Chechnya-themed news server I subscribe to. CD
Author Calls for Serious Steps To Improve
Pakistan-Russia Relations
Islamabad NDC Journal in English 28 Jun 04
[Group Captain Abrar Ghalib, SI (M): "Pak-Russia
Relations in Post Afghanistan War: Geopolitical
Scenario"]
Introduction
After 1971, Pakistan's relations with the Soviet
Union remained strained, and after the Soviet armed
forces were sent into Afghanistan in December 1979,
Pakistan's stand against the Soviet intervention
resulted in further worsening of relations. Indeed,
Pakistan's support to the Afghan struggle against the
Soviet occupation alienated the Soviet leadership, and
resultantly Pakistan was in a virtual state of war
with Moscow. Though the Soviet occupation ended in
1989, a considerable degree of resentment persisted in
the political and military circles. Ironically
relations between Islamabad and Moscow came under
severe strain once again, as the Taliban and religious
parties in Pakistan began sympathizing with the
Chechen freedom fighters.
The overall situation has undergone a significant
change since September 2001. The differences over
Afghanistan have disappeared and some moves have been
made to improve bilateral relations between Moscow and
Islamabad. Most importantly in the changed post Cold
War environment, Russia is looking for as many
partners as possible to counter the uni-polarity
affected by U.S. hegemony.
Pakistan-USSR Relations in the Wake of Military
Intervention in Afghanistan
Strains reappeared in Pakistan-USSR relations
following the Soviet-backed communist takeover in
Kabul in April 1978. As a consequence of this
development, Pakistan felt exposed from the North and
began supporting the insurgents fighting against the
communist regime of Taraki in Kabul. On 19 March
1979 Pravda accused Pakistan along with China and
others for their "Reactionary machinations against the
democratic Afghanistan". A high-level delegation led
by Mahmood Haroon Minister of Interior visited Moscow
to allay Moscow's apprehension regarding Islamabad's
alleged complicity in the counter-revolutionary
activities against Soviet-backed communist regime in
Kabul. But Moscow remained unconvinced (footnote 1).
Pakistan's Security Concerns
The Soviet military action in Afghanistan
involving some 100,000 Soviet troops marked the
beginning of a "Cold War" between Islamabad and
Moscow. In the soviet move into Afghanistan,
Islamabad saw the elimination of a valuable strategic
buffer and the possible Soviet military drift towards
its own borders. From Pakistan's security viewpoint
it was a nightmarish situation, as the Red Army stood
perilously close to the Khyber Pass, a traditional
gateway of the invaders of the subcontinent. In
order to mitigate Islamabad's threat perception
resulting from its move into Afghanistan, Moscow
offered to guarantee the inviolability of the Durand
Line. This offer was made through India in March
1980, presumably during Sawaran Singh's trip to
Islamabad as a special envoy. The Soviet proposition
was rejected by Islamabad as it involved India and
Iran as co-guarantors of the inviolability of the
Durand Line.
Pakistan's security compulsions forced it to
embrace Washington once again. Moscow grew hostile
towards this "second honeymoon" between Washington and
Islamabad. On the eve of president Zia's visit to
Washington in December 1982 Izvestia, in a long
article accused Pakistan of conducting "An undeclared
war against the democratic republic of Afghanistan",
and noted that its "Arms build-up exceeds its defence
needs", and that its "efforts to create a nuclear
weapon cannot fail to alarm its neighbours".
Izvestia warned Pakistan that its use "as a blind tool
of American imperialist policy in the region is not
only fraught with serious consequences for peace in
the South and South West Asia, but also harbours a
threat to the security of the people of Pakistan
themselves". Moscow has also accused Pakistan for
its lack of sincerity in seeking a negotiated
settlement of the Afghan issue through Geneva parleys.
Besides pursuing a strategy of verbal threats
Moscow had also put indirect military pressure on
Pakistan to change its pro-Washington tilt as
evidenced by the frequency and intensity of the cross
border raids, air violations and artillery barrages.
Over the Mattni incident in April 1985, in which
several Soviet soldiers got killed, Moscow reacted
angrily and described the incident as "an act of war
against the USSR" Gorbachev himself warned President
Zia of the dire consequences if Islamabad its Afghan
policy (footnote 2).
The range of issues on which Pak-USSR perceptions
diverge and conflict is indeed very long. Most of
Moscow's grievances against Islamabad were based on
her negative perception of Islamabad's policy of
strategic alignment with Washington. Resultantly
throughout the period of Afghan conflict, Pak-USSR
relations remained frigid. However USSR did make a
last desperate attempt to seek Pakistan's help to
salvage the collapse of Soviet backed communist regime
in Afghanistan. Soviets wanted Najib to stay in
power, but Pakistan's perception was that he would be
equally collaborative with India and USSR. This
eventually would become a security nightmare for
Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan had a strong vested
interest in the success of Mujahideen. Pakistan
eventually managed to frustrate Soviet design in
Afghanistan.
PAKISTAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE 1990
The Chechen Problem
Relations between Islamabad and Moscow came under
severe strain once again, notably as the Taliban and
religious parties in Pakistan began sympathizing with
the Chechen movement for autonomy. Russia responded
by launching a campaign against Islamic fundamentalism
since it faced unrest among Muslim minorities in many
of its autonomous republics and regions. Also
Pakistan was severely criticized for her alleged
support to Chechen freedom fighters.
The Kargil Crisis
Facing a Kargil like situation in its own
province, of Dagestan, Russia perceived Kargil crisis
as an issue that had implications for geo-politics in
South Asia and its own interests. So it expressed
serious concern over the heightened tension in the
region and urged India and Pakistan to exercise
restraint and settle the matter through dialogue.
Russia is sensitive to the Kashmir dispute in general,
and Kargil in particular because any tension between
India and Pakistan could spill over into the CIS
region, which has a geographical proximity to the
South Asian region. The Afghan crisis is already
causing tension in the neighbouring states of
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Facing a Kargil like
situation at Chechnya and Dagestan, Russia expected
such issues to be sorted out between India and
Pakistan without outside intervention.
Russia did not want the U.S. or China to influence
the region directly through the Kashmir dispute, which
may tilt the balance of power against it.
Russia's stand on Kargil crisis was based on its
global and regional interests. In the changed post
Cold War environment, Russia is looking for as many
partners as possible to counter the uni-polarity
affected by U.S. hegemony. The proposal "for a
strategic triangle" involving Russia, India and China,
the revival of a "Strategic partnership" with India,
and Russia's interests in improving its relations with
Pakistan were the product of this thinking (footnote
3).
Internal Situation in Afghanistan
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in
l989, Afghanistan continues to remain mired in a civil
war and its spillover effects have led to grave
repercussions in the Central Asian region, South Asia,
and the Middle East. The Afghanistan imbroglio
continued to cast a heavy shadow over the relations
between Russia and Pakistan. In the Afghan conflict,
Russia and Pakistan's interests were at
cross-purposes. Much of this is based on fears,
suspicions and concerns about security interests in
the region. Pakistan would not like to have a
hostile government on its western periphery as well,
since it is already insecure as regards the hostile
India on its eastern border.
Russia was fearful of destabilization in Central
Asia, leading to its consequences being felt on Russia
itself with the emergence of Islamic renaissance in
Central Asia. Once more both Pakistan and Russia
found themselves on the two different sides of the
fence. Both have a stake in the outcome of the
Afghan conflict. Moscow was concerned that should
the Taliban consolidate their power by defeating the
Northern Alliance under Ahmad Shah Masood, they will
support Islamic uprisings in Central Asia, thereby
destabilizing the entire region.
Russia blamed the Taliban to be allegedly behind
the uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan. To contain
the spillover effect from further spreading throughout
Russia and Central Asia, the Russians had been
extending material and political support to the
anti-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan.
Russian Military Sales to India
Another irritant, which is bedeviling the
Pak-Russian bilateral relations, is the Russian arms
sale to India. Pakistan has strong reservations
about the Russo-Indian military relationship.
Pakistan feels that the continued sale of military
hardware to India by Russia will further deteriorate
the military imbalance, which is already highly tilted
in favour of a hegemonic India. Mr. Prikhodko, an
aide to President Putin's comments are worth observing
when he said that 'long-range national and
geo-political interests of Russia and India largely
coincide. Our cooperation helps stabilize situation
not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also promotes
a healthier climate through out the world (footnote
4).
During President Putin's visit to India, the two
sides signed a strategic partnership document. The
most significant part of the visit was perhaps the
signing of several multimillion dollar arms contracts,
under which India would buy 140 Sukhoi, Su-30 MKI jet
fighters and T-90 tanks. It would also get a Russian
aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorchkov, for free, but
will have to pay $ 750 million for its refitting in
Russia and another $1.2 billion for Mig 29-K jets to
add to its offensive capability (footnote 5). The
provision of this weaponry will be detrimental to
Pakistan's security and will disturb the already
heavily tilted balance of power in the South Asian
region.
Relations Since 9/11
The overall situation has undergone a significant
change since September 2001, when Pakistan joined the
US-led coalition against terrorism, and played a
leading role in the operations against the Taliban and
Al Qaeda. The differences over Afghanistan have
disappeared and some moves made to improve bilateral
relations between Moscow and Islamabad.
The Period of Rapprochement
The demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991
witnessed a tectonic shift in world affairs. From a
bipolar world to uni-polar one, the emergence of the
United States as the triumphant and sole super power
out of fifty years of cold war has necessitated a
shift in priorities and goals of the nation states.
Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, was caught
between a nostalgic past and an uncertain future.
'Russia's international status has significantly
degraded, with one of the world's two super powers'
now being viewed by many as a little more than a Third
World regional power, though still possessing a
significant but increasingly antiquated nuclear
arsenal'. The break up of the Soviet Union saw the
Russian borders roll back to from where they had been
in the Caucasus in the early 1800s, in Central Asia in
the mid-1800, and in the West in approximately 1600.
This has generated enormous soul searching in Russia
about its current identity and where it stands today
in the global scenario (footnote 6).
Shifts in Russian Foreign Policy
It is believed that in the initial period, two
approaches existed in Russia regarding the policy to
be followed towards the two major states of South
Asia-India and Pakistan. One opinion favoured that
the traditional 'special' relationship with India
should be retained and India should be given priority
in the country's policy towards South Asia, while, at
the same time, developing good relations with other
regional countries, including Pakistan. According to
the other school, the epoch of 'special' relationship
with India should be ended, as it was adversely
affecting the country's relations with Pakistan. The
second view at this time was regarded to be dominant
in the country's Foreign Ministry; the first view was
believed to be prevalent among the academic community
and the Parliamentary circle (footnote 7).
Pakistan's relations with the Russian Federation,
which emerged as the largest successor to the USSR and
proclaimed itself the successor of the Soviet Union,
are quiet inseparable from the legacy of more than
four decades of Pak-Soviet relations. But the
situation warranted an opportunity for a new beginning
in Islamabad-Moscow relations, which was taken up by
both sides. High-level bilateral contacts took place
between Pakistan and the Russian Federation
immediately thereafter. It seemed for some in the
changed geo-political scenario after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, that Moscow tended to accord greater
attention to Pakistan and other Muslim countries on
its southern periphery (footnote 8).
However, despite interests evinced on both sides
to establish a constructive and positive relationship,
certain irritants continued to exert their negative
influence against the establishment of cordial
relations. Such as: the situation in Afghanistan,
international terrorism, threat of destabilization in
Central Asia, transnational network of drug
trafficking, Russian supply of arms to India and so
forth.
Conclusion
One of the most serious lapses of Pakistan's
foreign policy has been its failure to pay due
attention to improving relations with Moscow, even
after the end of cold war. The history of relations
between Pakistan and USSR / Russia has been a history
of missed opportunities which cost us dearly in the
past, including the loss of half of the country in an
unceremonious manner. Pakistan's short as well as
long-term interests demand that we pay sufficient
attention to our relations with Russia, which is
likely to regain her lost status after it has sorted
out its economic and managerial problems.
Diplomacy is not a zero sum game, and good
relations with one country do not preclude good
relations with another. Close ties between Moscow
and Delhi do not rule out for Pakistan possibility of
developing friendly relations with Russia. If Delhi
can improve relations with Beijing, despite China's
tilt towards Pakistan than why Pakistan can not
improve its relations with Russia?
There was an expectation that with the end of the
cold war, Russia and Pakistan would offload the
baggage of conflict in Afghanistan from their backs,
and steer a new course towards cooperative relations.
The assumption was that both of them would free
themselves from the stranglehold of prejudices and
misperceptions, and see each other as potential
partners in promoting stability and security in
Afghanistan and Central Asia. This has not happened.
It is more distressing to note that no serious
effort has been made by either side to stir the
stagnant waters of latent hostility.
This is not to suggest, however, that a
breakthrough in bilateral relations with Russia can
not be achieved. For this to happen, modification is
required in Pakistan's military-strategic planning and
to understand that a constructive engagement has to be
vigorously pursued.
It is also important that Russia, Pakistan and
Central Asian states evolve a regional framework to
resolve outstanding issues. This would require more
than visits of special envoys. Official spheres may
remove the mental roadblocks that have characterised
relations between Russia and Pakistan. Between them
lies a vast region where fundamental questions
revolving around ideological foundations,
institutional capacity building, national development,
economic and political transformations will require
greater empathy and deeper cooperation among
neighbours. It is high time to shift policies from
cold war paradigm of a zero sum game to cooperative
regional security. This will demand change in the
policy of thinking both in Islamabad and Moscow.
Pakistan must pursue an earnest and serious
dialogue with Russia to improve bilateral relations,
and at the same time Beijing should be involved to use
her influence with Moscow to facilitate rapprochement.
End Notes [Footnotes]
1. Pravda, 1 June 1979.
2. S. M Burke, "Excerpts from Pakistan's Foreign
Policy a Historical Perspective", Oxford University
Press 1975.
3. "Russian Interests in South Asia and the Kargil
Crisis", KM Pari Velan, research Scholar, CRCA & EES,
SIS JNU, New Delhi.
4. Umashankar Phadnis, "India watching
Pakistan-Russia contacts", www.indiatoday.com
5. Politics: "Putin seals Russia-India ties",
www.russiajournal.com
6. Zbigniew, Brzezinski, "The Grand Chessboard",
Harper Collins Publisher Inc, 1997,p 89.
7. Jyotsna Bakshi, "Russian Policy towards South
Asia", Website-asiamedia.com.
8. Ibid.
Author
Group Captain Abrar Ghalib, SI (M)
[Sitara-i-Imtiaz--Military--name of a medal] was
commissioned in June 1982 in GD (P) [General
Duty--Pilot] Branch of Pakistan Air Force. As a
pilot he has the honour of flying various types of
fighter aircraft on the inventory of PAF. He has
served on various Command, Staff and Instructional
appointments. The officer is a graduate of National
Defence College Islamabad and holds master's degree in
War Studies. [preceding paragraph published in
italics].
__________________________________
Do you Yahoo!?
New and Improved Yahoo! Mail - 100MB free storage!
http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail
