Eugene Coyle wrote:

> There is nothing in neo-classical micro on production that is anything
> but dishonest and obfuscating. Bright students that want to make
> fortunes take Principle and then quickly switch to Finance rather than
> economics because they see that the economics has nothing to do with
> the world. Those students (and our leaders of industry and commerce)
> don't bother with a mastery of micro. They study Finance but are
> delighted to have economists throw dust in the eyes of the public/voters.

Curiously though, modern finance theory is not the result of some
generalization of the actual practice of finance.  Rather, it may well
be the purest, most genuine product of economic thinking.  For reasons
obvious to economists (i.e. incentives), not even one percent of the
insights of modern finance are owed to professional finance
practitioners.  Most of them, by far, are due to economists.

Fourty years ago, finance was still a compendium of detailed
institutional material, with very little analytical structure to pin
it with.  In and by itself, probability theory and statistics were
insufficient to reshape finance.  The work by the French mathematician
Louis Bachelier in the late 19th century (on the random dynamics of
asset prices) was ignored.  So it took the work of a bunch of
economists to revolutionize finance.

By the mid 20th century,  some economic insights had began to jell as
a prototype analytical framework.  Partly due to Keynes, but also to
conventional economists like Irving Fisher and John Hicks.  Then enter
Paul Samuelson's papers, and most importantly the formal incorporation
of uncertainty into economic models by Von Neumann and Morgestern, the
Arrow-Debreu state preference approach to pricing contingent goods
under general equilibrium (the Arrow-Debreu prices are to modern
finance what the straight line is to classical geometry), and
everything went downhill afterwards.

Let me be more specific: *All* the fundamental building blocks of
modern finance are owed to the economists: (1) efficient market theory
(Cowles, Samuelson, Mandelbrot, Fama), (2) portfolio theory (Harry
Markowitz), (3) capital asset pricing theory (Arrow, Debreu, Treynor,
Sharpe, Lintner, Merton), (4) option pricing theory (Black/Scholes),
(5) the theory of informational imperfections (Stiglitz, Akerlof), (6)
agency theory (Jensen, Fama, Stiglitz, Meckling), (7) behavioral
theory (Kahneman, Tversky, Shiller).

The fist four constitute the framework, the "benchmark."  *All* of
them the result of economists using the most conventional economic
approach.  The last three add layers of concretion to the abstract
benchmark.  Also the product of the economists.  The quick-and-dirty,
practical (or "policy") areas in finance all rely on the benchmark:
(1) valuation (arbitrage pricing, an economic concept); (2) portfolio
choice (mean-variance analysis); (3) capital budgeting (the NPV
criterion, which follows from the former); (4) capital structure
policy (the irrelevance proposition by Modigliani/Miller, an instance
of Coase's theorem: under certain conditions, the assignment of
property rights is irrelevant in resource allocation), (5) optimal
financing policy (due to tax, bankruptcy, agency, and behavioral
implications), and (6) dividend policy (Modigliani/Miller again with
no tax, agency, etc. effects).

So, the idea that behavioral finance (the application of behavioral
economics that has grown most explosively lately for reasons obvious
to economists) refutes traditional asset price theory or traditional
portfolio allocation or traditional anything is as silly as saying
that Marxist relative prices directly tied to labor values are refuted
by production prices.  No such thing.  In the way finance people look
at it, the traditional models of modern finance theory provide naive
benchmarks.  Then more "realism" is added.  So far, the "anomalies" or
gaps between the limit concept and observed reality are better
explained as coming from three sources: agency issues, informational
asymmetries, and the quirks raised by behavioral finance.  But things
won't stop there...

Hegel would not have expected any different.
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