No, I have not read it, but the abstract is entertaining nonetheless.
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6994
I. J. ALEXANDER DYCK, University of Toronto - Joseph L. Rotman School of
Management
Email: [email protected]
DAVID A. MOSS, Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the
International Economy Unit
Email: [email protected]
LUIGI ZINGALES, University of Chicago, National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), University
of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship, Graduate School of
Business, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Email: [email protected]
We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of
"rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make
elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general
voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media
are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To
show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we
document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of
U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century.
We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to
general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a
counterbalance to special interests.
--
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA
95929
530 898 5321
fax 530 898 5901
http://michaelperelman.wordpress.com
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