Andy Blunden. June 2009

Reading “Capital”

http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/reading-capital.htm

There are a number of ways in which people have read Capital.

(1a) According to one reading, Marx was (amongst other things) an
economist and Capital is a book about economics. Marx recognised that
the political economists of the period of the rise of capitalism (Adam
Smith, Ricardo) wanted to develop a genuinely scientific theory of the
workings of capitalism while later economists (J S Mill, Malthus) were
merely apologists, whose theories deliberately obscured the truth
about capitalism so as to cover up the fact of exploitation and disarm
the workers. So Marx developed the work of the early political
economists, and produced a sound body of scientific knowledge, in
contrast to modern economic science which is both unscientific and
ideological. The cornerstone of Marx’s theory in this reading is
“Marx’s labour theory of value,” and any attack on the LTV is an
attack on the working class and an attack on Marx. In this reading,
“critique” means exposing the ideological character of all economics
beyond the early period of Smith and Ricardo, and cleansing these
early works of their weaknesses and illusions.

(1b) In a variation on (1a), Marx produced not the only valid theory
of economics, but one among many, and taken together with modern
approaches and mathematical methods, is a valuable component part of
economic science, with its strengths particularly in crisis theory,
long term trends, and in providing a point from which sceptical
criticism can be mounted against monetarism, neo-liberal economics and
so on. Such readings make up the majority reception of Marx. Marx’s
1865 lecture “Value, Price and Profit,” where he discusses the
underlying causes of movements in wages and prices over the preceding
decades is a classic and convincing instance of the effectiveness of
Capital as a work of practical economic theory.

(2) According to Harry Cleaver and others, Capital is not a book about
economics at all – why would Marx want to give advice to the
capitalists? – but rather is about the class struggle. Not just in
1865, but as early as 1847, Marx was giving talks to workers,
debunking the wages fund theory, confirming the legitimacy of the
fight for higher wages. Capital shows, for example, the importance of
fighting for shorter working hours. In this reading, Capital is
actually useless for the capitalists, but is a science of the class
struggle under capitalism. Cleaver claims that despite a century of
efforts, “Marxist economics” has failed to provide a useful theory of
economics, for either business or government.

Marx confirms that the concept of value is similar to the ancient
concept of ‘natural price’, and that other things being equal, prices
should gravitate to their value. But fundamentally, value is not an
approximation to price, but a measure of the distribution of the
social labour, and prices may deviate from the norm for even historic
periods of time. The organic composition of capital, an important
category in Capital, measures the proportion of past, dead labour to
living labour, something irrelevant to business or capitalist
government; the rate of surplus value is a measure of exploitation but
nothing to do with profit or even the distribution of household
incomes. But this does not alter the fact that a theory which aims to
inform the class struggle, needs a practical, realistic theory of
prices, wages, employment and so on, and at the very least must not
deceive in its description of the economy.

(3) According to others, Capital is neither a manual of economics nor
a manual for the class struggle, but rather a critique of political
economy, that is, a critique of the body of ideas which describe the
institutions and behaviours characteristics of bourgeois society.
Political economy is the most refined and precise expression of the
socially valid categories of bourgeois society, and is interesting
only insofar as it is indeed socially valid. Critiquing it means
bringing out the ‘real meaning’ of its categories, getting behind the
appearance to the essence of the matter, by demonstrating that what
appear to be eternal, necessary and rational relations, relations
inscribed in well-established social practices and institutions, are
in fact historically bounded, and actually quite crazy ideas which are
open to change. Further, the critique of these institutions is located
within the struggle to overthrow them. Critique means exploring the
basis of the social validity of these concepts and uncovering the
internal contradictions in them, to search for possible ways out of
them.

The difference between (2) and (3) is that in Harry Cleaver’s reading
there is no need to reconstruct the whole concrete reality of life in
bourgeois society (prices, interest rates and so on) in terms of the
concepts of Capital, since the aim is solely class struggle and not
political economy as such. It is not that Capital inhabits an
alternate universe, but rather that Marx is interested in a different
range of problems than the capitalists.

On the other hand, even though wages, prices and profit are not the
starting point for Marx, the aim is nonetheless to reconstruct these
concepts in terms of value. A critique would not be a critique of
political economy if it went only to life in bourgeois society (the
object of political economy) and not political economy itself, the
subject of bourgeois society and the object of the critique. The
subject and object of political economy are not identical, but they
mutually constitute one another; critique means penetrating a form of
life by examining its intellectual forms.

There is both a (3a) Humanist (e.g. Cyril Smith) or (3b) Structuralist
(e.g. Louis Althusser or Moishe Postone) version of reading Marx’s
Capital as a critique, according to whether writer believes with Marx
that “men make their own history, but ... under circumstances existing
already given and transmitted from the past,” or on the contrary takes
capital as a totalizing identical subject-object absolutely subsuming
the consciousness and activity of everyone in modern society.

(4) For many, whether Capital is a critique of or a contribution to
political economy, or both, it is not the conclusions Marx arrived at
in 1867 which are important – after all, political economy has changed
radically since Capital was written – but rather it is the method of
Marx’s study. Marx’s method now needs to be emulated in today’s new
situation. This reading would include Geoff Pilling and Tony Smith,
but may produce radically different results, according to the degree
to which the writer sees Marx as having produced a more or less
“effective procedure” such what Tony Smith calls the “systematic
progression of socioeconomic categories,” or, as others would say that
Marx’s critique was immanent, growing out of the practical conflicts
within bourgeois society itself: – whereas Hegel’s aim had been to
reconcile these contradictions, Marx’s aim was to sharpen them.

I will argue that although the above readings are by no means “equally
valid,” Marx’s own writing, both in Capital itself and his private
correspondence, lends some credibility to each of these views.

I will propose a reading which demonstrates that a critique of
political economy (in Cyril Smith’s terms) asks the question: what is
it about bourgeois society that gives rise to this kind of thinking
and activity? This entails re-establishing what is socially valid in
bourgeois society and the sources and limits of that validity. How
else can we explain the fact that Marx was incessantly questioning
Engels about how capitalists performed their calculations, what
exactly they meant by this or that term, exactly how did they organise
the various kinds of wage payment, credit and so on? So such a
critique must re-establish socially valid concepts, but on a
foundation which transcends the limits of bourgeois society. It must
also separate genuine science from self-serving “Just-so stories,”
which contribute nothing to understanding the necessary and lawful
character of social relations but serve only to obscure their
exploitative nature or put one or another class in a better light.

But what results from such a critique, rather than being an economic
science, is closer to what Harry Cleaver wants, in that it renders
life in bourgeois society transparent in terms of social practice, and
contributes to working class consciousness by bringing class interests
to light from behind the veil of hourly wages, interest on capital,
and so on. It is also not entirely useless for understanding that
struggle as it unfolds in the form of capitalist crises, and if
correct, such a reading does provide an understanding of Marx’s
“method” – not as some kind of effective procedure, but as an immanent
critique of its object, and therefore a useful guide to continuing his
work today.

Shortly after Marx’s death, Jevon’s theory of marginal utility gained
wide popularity and according to Engels:

“[The poor state of political economy in England] is the fault of
[Marx], to a great extent; he has taught people to see the dangerous
consequences of classical economy; they find that no science at all,
on this field at least, is the safe side of the question. And they
have so well succeeded in blinding the ordinary philistine, that there
are at the present moment four people in London, calling themselves
‘Socialist’ who claim to have refuted our author completely by
opposing to his theory that of - Stanley Jevons!” (Engels to
Danielson, 15 October 1888)

So this brings us to the question of when is a theory just ideology
and apologia, class interests masquerading as science, and how do we
know when there is science beneath the shell of ideology.

The first theory of the origin of surplus value was Merchantilism,
which claimed that profit arose in the sphere of exchange, that is,
merchants created wealth by selling things at more than they paid for
them. Unsurprisingly, the founders of Merchantilism were traders
involved with the East India Company. Next came the Physiocrats who
claimed that the soil was the sole source of value. In eighteenth
century France, this theory made abundant sense, especially for
landowners: the peasants produced more than they needed for their own
subsistence, and the rest of the economy operated by circulating that
surplus. Unsurprisingly again, the founder of Physiocracy, Quesnay,
was himself a landowner. Nowadays, the idea that capital is the source
of value, institutionalised in the going rate of interest on savings,
appears to be an irrefutable fact; no-one who wants to get rich works.
So, we can understand how the idea of “socially necessary labour” as
the substance of value, and surplus value arising from the
exploitation of wage-labour have a clear ideological function in the
formation of the proletariat as a class for itself. Conversely,
attacks on the labour theory of value will be seen as attacks on the
workers movement. In other words, all theories of the measure of value
and source of surplus value have directly reflected a particular class
standpoint.

Marx’s British followers reacted to the Marginalist attacks on Marx
accordingly, and a theory Jevons had about sun spots being the cause
of the business cycle provided a fine opportunity to subject him and
his theories to ridicule. The marginal theory is after all little more
than a development of the supply-and-demand theory which Marx shows to
be relevant only to short-term surface phenomena, and unable to
explain, for example, why a car is worth more than a diamond. But
historians of economic theory talk about the Marginalist Revolution
because in the 1860s Jevons, Manger and Walras introduced quite new
methods which transformed economic theory and we have to ask whether
it is feasible to dismiss the whole of modern economic theory as a
‘variation on supply-and-demand’ even though it has its roots in this
idea. However imperfectly, modern macro-economics deals with economic
wholes. Can we rest on the claim that everything after Ricardo was
ideology? The only writer I know who has taken a genuinely critical
stance towards modern economic theory is Luc Boltanski and his
collaborator Eve Chiapello. These writers have made a deep critique of
the management literature of the 1980s especially, relating it to the
demands of the movements of 1968. Boltanski shows that radical
criticism of capitalism is often reflected in subsequent changes in
the practices of the ruling class, something by no means limited to
the generation of ‘68.

Transparently ‘political’ issues are to be found all through the pages
of Capital which bristles with ethical language. For example, the
concept of necessary and surplus labour, surplus labour being labour
performed over and above what the worker is paid for their sustenance,
and appropriated without payment. For example, the proof, taken over
from Smith, that other things being equal, the labour market will
force wages down to the socially necessary minimum level needed to
keep them alive and raise the next generation of workers, and that
workers can gain wage rises by industrial action, without losing the
value of their pay rise through inflation, but on the contrary
increasing the workers’ share of the total product.

The idea of dividing up capital between constant (goods and services
purchased off other capitalists and consumed in production) and
variable (wages) and surplus value (lumping rent, interest and
corporate largesse in with profits) and then measuring this over the
cycle of turnover of capital rather than per annum, just makes no
sense within the business of profit-making, but makes abundant sense
from the standpoint of the workers.

In other words, I think there is plenty of evidence that Harry
Cleaver’s claim that Capital is about the class struggle is well made.
All the main categories in Capital are about social relations: labour
time, value, exploitation, while categories like price, profit and in
fact anything relevant to the running of an individual firm are
secondary, phenomenal forms of the manifestation of the essential
human relations involved.

This conclusion would settle the matter if bourgeois economics were
purely and simply apologia.. That is, if the claim that capital is the
source of new value, that workers are paid the full value of their
labour in their weekly wage packet, and that employees’ wage levels
determine the selling price of a product, were nothing more nor less
than fairy tales aimed at covering up the reality of economic life.
Some may be, but this is clearly not the case without qualification:
these are ideas used to manage bourgeois society. Political Economy is
how capitalists behave and think, and in general how non-capitalists
think as well. It is the thinking which actually runs the businesses,
the banks and the governments. It is in the minutiae of capitalist
management that the meaning of the categories of political economy are
really revealed. Almost invariably, attempts at fundamental
justifications of economic science are, in my experience, ideology
from beginning to end, and this is reflected in the inability of
economists to do more than predict and control relatively short-term
effects. But this does not alter the fact that the objects and
practices of bourgeois society appear before people as objective
facts.

It is now widely and rightly believed that economists don’t know
what’s going on. Virtually no-one saw the October 2008 Global
Financial Crisis coming even days before it broke out. But on the
other hand, capitalism hasn’t collapsed yet, and compared to the 1958
Great Leap Forward in China, in which millions of people died of
starvation or the miracles of ‘planned economy’ in North Korea, it is
silly to deny the capacity of the bourgeois to manage a world system
of the production and reproduction of material life, something which
they have done with some success, at least since the end of World War
Two, though no-one can claim with any degree of certainty that their
success will last any longer than the close of business tomorrow.

But coping in practice does not at all guarantee being able to capture
that in theory. As the saying goes: “you don’t have to be a horse to
judge a horse.”

The concepts of Political Economy embody the forms of activity which
are socially valid in capitalism, and in that precise sense they are
valid and confront individuals as objective forms of practice, which
you ignore at your own risk. But that does not prove the fact that
‘priests of the bourgeoisie’, these ‘learned scribes’ are able to
systematise the forms of thought and practices of bourgeois society,
or even that these forms lend themselves to the formation of an
internally consistent theory. There is nothing to force us to believe
that the thought forms of bourgeois society are free of internal
contradiction and fallacy. On the contrary. It is the job of critique
to strip of the ideological covering to expose such internal
contradictions, aporia and fallacies, and without dismissing them as
apologia, bring out the social basis for the various theories through
a study of their historical development.

>From Engels’ Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy of 1843 up
till Marx’s 1859 “A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy,” Marx and Engels titled their work critique. And the meaning
of “critique” is made clear in Marx’s 1844 “Introduction to the
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” for which “the criticism of
religion is the prerequisite of all criticism,” most particularly the
views outlined there in terms of a critique of religion are to be
taken as a model for the critique of capitalism.

“The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion,
religion does not make man. ... This state and this society produce
religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because
they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this
world, ... The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the
struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.”

Political economy is the system of thought forms within which people
live by producing and exchanging commodities, and Capital demonstrated
this – the whole universe of sweat-shops, insurance companies,
industrial corporations, multimillionaires, famines and wars flows
from commodity production. Within such a world, in the main, the
concepts of political economy are valid to the extent that they are
connected with practice rather than apologetic “Just So” myths. The
struggle against capitalism is therefore the struggle against that
world of a particular kind of inverted consciousness, one in which
social relations between people take the form of relations between
things.

But in a letter to Kugelmann on 28 December 1862, Marx says of the
soon-to-be-published book: “It is a sequel to Part I, but will appear
on its own under the title, Capital, with A Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy as merely the subtitle.” Marx worked
hard to get the book noticed and criticised by the professional
economists of his day, and clearly wanted to engage them in debate.

In the letter to Kugelmann of 11 July 1868, he says:

“... it shows the depth of degradation reached by these priests of the
bourgeoisie: while workers and even manufacturers and merchants have
understood my book and made sense of it, these ‘learned scribes’ (!)
complain that I make excessive demands on their comprehension.”

And while he was most interested in getting it to workers, criticising
Lassalle for not working harder to encourage workers to read it, he
certainly aimed at taking his fight into the recognised scientific
circles. He believed (and with good reason) that his work engaged in a
meaningful way with mainstream economic theory; it did not live in a
parallel universe. Marx complained that he was being met with a
conspiracy of silence, but history shows that Capital did get the
recognition it deserved, and Capital haunts bourgeois economics to
this day, like the ghost of its dead father.

The point is that prices, profits, rents and so on are, in Marx’s
scheme of things, merely surface appearances, like the froth and
bubbles on the surface of the ocean, the forms of which tell us little
about the main business of tidal shifts and melting ice-packs. Marx
begins with the concept of bourgeois society and moves to more and
more concrete concepts, that is to say, he reconstructs the concrete,
the appearances, in scientific terms. In such an approach the effect
of a drought in Australia on mortgage rates in the US, and so on,
belong somewhere in Volume XX. They are not excluded, but it is the
dynamics of class relations which are fundamental and central.

So in summary, Capital remains an unfinished work and it seems
unlikely that the job of finishing it to the point where it could
provide a superior tool for management of government or corporate
economic affairs will ever be completed, were it to remain the work of
an isolated individual. Basically it is a practical task. With the
partial exception of Boltanski, the theoretical work of critiquing
political economy seems to have died with Marx. So far as I know, none
of the “Marxist Economists” have critiqued the theory of marginal
utility beyond denouncing it as an ideological apology aimed at
discrediting Marx and demobilizing the workers’ movement (all of which
may well be true, by the way). There have been a plethora of new
economic forms of activity since 1883. Marx never knew Taylorism,
which completely transformed work practices, the social division of
labour and the composition of the working class. He never knew
Fordism, which completely transformed the form of exploitation, the
concept of a living wage, and the nature of working-class communities;
he never knew the welfare state with its system of universal
state-provided benefits, or Toyota-ism and its appropriation of worker
cooperation for the benefit of capital, or the practices of
franchising, out-sourcing, the practice of part-time working, and the
export of manufacture to non-union industrial zones in far-off
countries, or the inflow of economic migrants to the former colonial
centres. All these represent transformations in political economy, not
anticipated in Capital.

Just one example: in Marx’s day, workers were basically locked in a
large building to work under their own supervision for as long as the
capitalist could force them to using the weapon of keeping wages at
near-starvation level. This way of thinking is directly reflected in
the categories of Capital because that’s how capital worked. But this
is no longer the case in the countries where capital predominates.

So those who read Capital to learn Marx’s “method” have a point. Even
some very fundamental features of Capital may no longer be relevant.
And what is more, it is fair to suppose that later development in the
activity of capital must, in some sense at least, come closer to the
essence, the truth of bourgeois society. The critic does not create
thought out of thought; theory can only reveal what is already present
in social practice. In the Grundrisse, Marx said:

“... Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the
product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and
unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, ... in the theoretical
method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the
presupposition.”

So the job of Marx’s continuers begins with the latest developments in
bourgeois society most especially insofar as the concrete sheds light
on the categories of current economic theory and vice versa. It seems
likely that such a continuing critique would continue to use the
concept of value at its foundation, if we are to be true to Marx.

In the letter to Kugelmann quoted above, in responding to a bourgeois
critic of Capital, he observes:

“The chatter about the need to prove the concept of value arises only
from complete ignorance both of the subject under discussion and of
the method of science. Every child knows that any nation that stopped
working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a few weeks, would
perish. And every child knows, too, that the amounts of products
corresponding to the differing amounts of needs demand differing and
quantitatively determined amounts of society’s aggregate labour. It is
self-evident that this necessity of the distribution of social labour
in specific proportions is certainly not abolished by the specific
form of social production; it can only change its form of
manifestation. Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing
that can change, under historically differing conditions, is the form
in which those laws assert themselves. And the form in which this
proportional distribution of labour asserts itself in a state of
society in which the interconnection of social labour expresses itself
as the private exchange of the individual products of labour, is
precisely the exchange value of these products. ...

“On the other hand, as you correctly believe, the history of the
theory of course demonstrates that the understanding of the value
relation has always been the same, clearer or less clear, hedged with
illusions or scientifically more precise. Since the reasoning process
itself arises from the existing conditions and is itself a natural
process, really comprehending thinking can always only be the same,
and can vary only gradually, in accordance with the maturity of
development, hence also the maturity of the organ that does the
thinking. Anything else is drivel.”

So what is involved is the transhistorical necessity of every society
making some arrangement or other for the distribution of the social
labour and its products. This is what is contained in the concept of
value. Implicit in the concept of value is the notion of the intrinsic
equality of human beings. In an emphatically world economy in which
capital based, for example, in the US, is manufacturing in India and
drastically underpaying labour, we have an instance of price being
less than value for long periods of time. But once ‘the great mass of
the produce of labour takes the form of commodities [and]
consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of
owners of commodities’, there is a necessary tendency towards the
equalisation of wages, which nonetheless may take centuries of war and
revolution to exert itself.

There are dozens of such problems that arise as a result of changes in
the political economy of modern life, the solution of which are
presupposed in a continuation of Marx’s work.
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