David is correct.  I would bring up this example:

 Estes, Ralph W. 1995. Tyranny of the Bottom Line: Why Corporations Make 
Good People Do Bad Things (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler). 
  166: From 1971 to 1976, the fuel tank in the Ford Pinto was located only 
six inches from the rear bumper, was liable to be punctured in even a minor 
rear collision by bolts protruding from the differential housing.  And then 
any spark from a cigarette, ignition, or scraping metal, and both cars 
would be engulfed in flames." Dowie, Mark. 1977. "How Ford Put Two Million 
Firetraps on Wheels." Business and Society Review (Fall): pp. 46-55. 
  166: "Ford management chose the bottom line over customers' lives." 
Strobel, Lee Patrick. 1980. Reckless Homicide: Ford's Pinto Trial (South 
Bend: And Books): p. 117. 
  166-7: Ford designed the Pinto to be light and cheap.  Ford president Lee 
Iacocca decreed "the limits of 2,000": under 2,000 pounds and under $2,000. 
  167: A rubber bladder inside the gas tank could have kept fuel from 
spilling when the tank was ruptured.  Crash tests showed the bladder worked 
well.  But its cost would have been $5.08, and it was rejected.  Another 
change would have prevented gas tanks from breaking up so easily in 
rear-end collisions and in rollover accidents that would have cost $11.  It 
was rejected.  Ford produced a cost-benefit analysis showing that the 
deaths and injuries avoided would not justify a cost of $11 per car. 



On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 05:09:20PM -0800, David B. Shemano wrote:
> Michael Perelman writes:
> 
> >> Sadly, the author was correct -- at least in so far
> >> as the current courts are concerned. In the eyes of some judges, the law
> >> goes even further than ruling that corporation that violate the law lack
> >> a guilty mind.  They insist that corporate managers, who should possess
> >> a mens rea, have an ethical responsibility to violate the law when doing
> >> so will prove profitable for stockholders.  For example, Frank H.
> >> Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, the former a federal judge as well as
> >> a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago School of Law, wrote:
> >> 
> >> It is not true, however, that there is a legal duty to enforce every
> >> legal right ....  Managers do not have an ethical duty to obey
> >> regulatory laws just because those laws exist.  They must determine the
> >> importance of these laws.  The penalties Congress names for disobedience
> >> are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere
> >> to the rules:  the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition
> >> that managers not only may, but also should violate the rules when it is
> >> profitable to do so. [Easterbrook and Fischel 1982, pp. 1171 and 1177 n]"
> 
> You are being very misleading.  The quote is not about criminal laws, but 
> non-criminal regulatory rules.  The point is that if the penalty for 
> violating a rule is X, but the economic benefit of violating the rule is 2X, 
> it is economically efficient to violate the rule.  This is a derivation of 
> the law and economics argument that if A contracts to sell B a widget for a 
> $1, and C then offers A $3, it is economically efficient for A to breach the 
> contract with B, force B to mitigate his damage by going to the market and 
> buying the widget from D for $2, and then have A pay B damages of $1, which 
> is why the common law favors as a remedy consequential damages instead of 
> punitive damages or injunctions.   If you want to argue that there is an 
> overriding moral obligation to obey rules and agreements no matter what the 
> economic cost and no matter what the rule or agreement (in which case you 
> should be opposed to all monetary fines and insist upon imprisonment for all 
> violations, even for going 75 in a 65 zone), so be
>  it, but make that clear.
> 
> David Shemano
> 
> 
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-- 
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929

Tel. 530-898-5321
E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu
michaelperelman.wordpress.com
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