latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-kissinger11-2010apr11,0,3413800.story
latimes.com

Kissinger cable heightens suspicions about 1976 Operation Condor killings

A document suggests the secretary of State rejected warning South
American governments against international terrorism. Five days later,
a bombing linked to Chile killed 2 in Washington.

By Andrew Zajac and David S. Cloud

April 11, 2010

Reporting from Washington

A newly declassified document has added to long-standing questions
about whether Henry Kissinger, while secretary of State, halted a U.S.
plan to curb a secret program of international assassinations by South
American dictators.

The document, a set of instructions cabled from Kissinger to his top
Latin American deputy, ended efforts by U.S. diplomats to warn the
governments of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina against involvement in the
covert plan known as Operation Condor, according to Peter Kornbluh, an
analyst with the National Security Archive, a private research
organization that uncovered the document and made it public Saturday.

In the cable, dated Sept. 16, 1976, Kissinger rejected delivering a
proposed warning to the government of Uruguay about Condor operations
and ordered that "no further action be taken on this matter" by the
State Department.

Five days after Kissinger's message, Chilean exile Orlando Letelier
and an American colleague [Ronni Moffitt] were killed in Washington's
Embassy Row in a car bombing later tied to Chilean secret police
working through the Condor network. The killings are considered one of
the most brazen attacks ever carried out in the capital.

"The document confirms that it's Kissinger's complete responsibility
for having rescinded a cease-and-desist order to Condor killers," said
Kornbluh, author of a 2004 book on Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.

In a statement, Kissinger said Kornbluh "distorted" the meaning of the
cable and said it was intended only to disapprove a specific approach
to the Uruguayan government, not to cancel the plan to issue warnings
to other nations in the Condor network.

Former State Department officials who worked under Kissinger during
that period now say that his cable did interrupt the U.S. effort to
rein in Operation Condor, not just with Uruguay but with other
countries in the region.

After being told of the existence of Condor by the CIA in mid-1976,
Kissinger initially ordered U.S. ambassadors in Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay and other countries involved in the network to issue
demarches, or formal diplomatic presentations, warning leaders that
"Condor activities would undermine relations with the United States."

"The instructions were never rescinded," Kissinger said in his statement.

But it has been known for many years that U.S. ambassadors to Chile
and Uruguay balked at delivering the demarches, stalling the effort to
head off Condor. The Uruguayan envoy feared for his own safety,
previously disclosed documents have shown, and U.S. officials were
devising a new way to deliver the U.S. warning to Montevideo.

Kissinger said his cable was intended only to delay the delivery of
the demarche to Uruguay, because of "very special circumstances." He
apparently was referring to the Uruguayan ambassador's fears.

However, shortly after Kissinger's order that "no further action be
taken," his top Latin America deputies moved to cancel U.S. warnings
to other countries as well. On Sept. 20, then-Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Harry Shlaudeman told his deputy,
William Luers, to inform U.S. ambassadors in countries involved in
Condor not to convey Washington's concerns about the operation.

The Letelier bombing occurred the next day.

There is no evidence that Kissinger knew of the Letelier plot or the
specifics of any other assassination plans. But the delays in issuing
the demarches meant Chile apparently received no high-level U.S.
warning about Condor before the bombing.

Shlaudeman said in an interview that he had no memory of the cable
from Kissinger or of his own subsequent message to Luers rescinding
the orders to make demarches about Condor. But he acknowledged that
the timing and the similar wording of the two documents were strong
evidence that he had acted on Kissinger's orders.

"I must have sent it because I got the cable from Henry," he said. "I
was carrying out my instructions."

Luers acknowledged that the demarches "were not carried out in Chile,
Uruguay and Argentina before Orlando Letelier's murder."

Letelier served as Chilean ambassador to the U.S. and foreign minister
in the administration of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected
socialist president who was deposed by Pinochet in a 1973 coup. At the
time of his death, Letelier worked at the Institute for Policy
Studies, a Washington think tank, and was a leading anti-Pinochet
activist in the U.S. An institute colleague, Ronni Moffitt, also died
in the bombing.

Scholars who have studied U.S. policy toward South America during this
period say that Kissinger was reluctant to pressure right-wing
authoritarian governments such as Pinochet's in the region; he saw
them as bulwarks against the leftist and communist movements in Latin
America.

"I think the document reinforces what we already know -- that
Kissinger wanted to downplay Condor," said Jeremi Suri, a history
professor at the University of Wisconsin and author of a 2007 book on
Kissinger. "His primary concern was to maintain good and . . .
productive relationships with Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. Condor was
seen as an irritant."

The hesitant U.S. response to Condor and to other human rights abuses
by these regimes had lasting consequences, Suri argues.

"It inadvertently gave a green light to these dictators, who believed
the U.S. didn't care if they went ahead with their terrorist
operations," he said, and it hurt the reputation of the U.S. with the
people of the region, who saw Washington as complicit in the years of
repression.

Had the demarches been delivered as originally ordered, said J.
Patrice McSherry, a professor of political science at Long Island
University and author of a 2005 book on Operation Condor, the deaths
of Letelier and Moffitt might have been prevented.

"No one can say for sure. But it's quite possible that it would have
been a major deterrent."

[email protected] & [email protected]

Copyright © 2010, The Los Angeles Times


-- 
Jim Devine / Remember it with Flowers: April is KKK Month!
;-)
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