Labor's Role in the Obama Era: A Troublesome and
Unreliable Ally?

Nelson Lichtenstein
Dissent UpFront
DissentMagazine.org - June 7, 2010

http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=360

With a perilous set of midterm elections on the horizon,
it would be understandable if labor and its liberal allies
just closed ranks with President Obama and the Democrats,
downplayed any disappointment they might feel, and muted
their critique of his often lukewarm liberalism. After
all, if the Republicans take one or both houses of Congress,
then the whole Obama presidency will be in danger.

As every good unionist knows, solidarity is a great
thing, but in this case it is the wrong prescription for the
American labor movement. Instead, the unions and other
labor partisans should be difficult and demanding allies of
our president. History shows that such a posture would
generate the greatest political and organizational dividend, for
labor as well as any insurgent group that seeks to
transform American politics and policy. To show what I mean, let's
take a look at two eras of labor and social movement
success-the 1930s and the 1960s-in order to win a few
insights that might be useful for our own times. As Mark
Twain once wrote, "History never repeats itself, but
sometimes it rhymes."

There are three points to be made about such times past.
First, conservative movements and right-wing ideas
actually grow more extreme in eras of liberal and labor reform.
We know that is true today, but it was also true at other
moments of change or potential change in
twentieth-century U.S. history. Second, when a Democratic administration
is in power, the most potent and efficacious strategy for
labor and its leadership is to be-and be seen as-a
troublesome, even unreliable ally. And third, the labor movement
needs to be, and be seen as, a social movement. This does not
come without organizational costs. It is a dangerous
strategy, but such a transformation is essential if anything
resembling an organized labor movement is to survive.

We sometimes look at past moments of victory through
rose-colored glasses, but neither the era of the New
Deal nor that of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and
early 1960s were times of uncontested liberalism. They were
also times of mobilization, a renewal of ideas, and activism
on the Right. The opponents of reform were not always
out-of-touch reactionaries. They were often innovative
and  aggressive men and women who would later achieve power
and position when the political winds tilted in their
direction.

The Right grew in these eras not because of too much
radicalism on the part of labor and civil rights activists,
but because any great reform, no matter how carefully
put forward, polarizes a society. The rise of labor in the
1930s created a kind of civil war even within the working
class.
It was mainly nonviolent, and it would later subside,
but such polarities can be expected whenever many Americans,
even some that one might expect to be allies, see change
as a subversion of their religious or ideological
worldview. In the 1930s that social and ideological civil war divided
not just American parties, but also churches, factories, and
many communities. Anti-labor and anti-FDR rhetoric was
pervasive in the years of the Great Depression, even as
the unions triumphed at Flint and Pittsburgh and in the
mines and mills of countless smaller towns.

One of the great right-wing demagogues of that time was
Father Charles Coughlin, a Catholic priest from Royal
Oak, Michigan who pioneered the use of radio for sermons and
political talk. He was a brilliant speaker whose
audience far exceeded, in comparative terms, the reach of Fox
News and its most flamboyant pundits. Coughlin had been a
supporter of FDR and labor in 1933 and 1934 because he
hated the big banks, the big corporations, and the Depression
itself. "Roosevelt or Ruin" was the slogan he deployed
when FDR ran for president in 1932.

Indeed, Coughlin thought that Wall Street and the
Communists were the twin evils of a secular Satanism subverting the
virtuous citizens of the United States. And as Elizabeth
Warren has reminded us in such compelling fashion,
Americans really do mistrust the bankers and the speculators of
that New York street, today as much as eighty years ago.

Father Coughlin broke with FDR when he realized that the
New Deal would regulate Wall Street, not abolish it; and
because Coughlin and some other conservative Catholics believed
that the new, militant industrial unions, who deployed as
organizers lots of socialists and Communists and other
kinds of secularists, were stealing the loyalty of their own
parishioners right out from under them. Indeed, it was
the success of the UAW-CIO right in Coughlin's own Detroit
that sent him into a frenzy of anti-labor, anti-Semitic, and
anti-FDR invective. To Coughlin, the New Deal was a
Jewish plot and the UAW a red front. Sinclair Lewis was
thinking of people like Father Coughlin, as well as Huey Long, the
roughshod governor of Louisiana, when he published in
1935 It Can't Happen Here, a novel which imagined a fascist
dictatorship come to America.

Father Coughlin was eventually defeated and silenced
when the very highest leaders of the Catholic Church realized
that he was a grave liability. The Church did not want
to force American Catholics, who were probably a majority
of all the workers enrolled in the new unions during the
later years of the Great Depression, to choose between their
Catholic faith and the CIO and its New Deal allies.
Cardinal Francis Spellman, the powerful, conservative New York
bishop, eventually told FDR and other federal officials
that he would stand aside if the federal government cut off
Coughlin's radio license.

The first point to remember from this tale is that
liberal administrations and social movements are bound to face
right-wing demagogues. To defeat that threat, labor and
other progressive groups must go after their base. This
is best done by mobilizing their own constituencies, so as
to create an alternative structure of meaning and motion
around which those on the fence or even deep within the enemy
camp may rally. That is what the CIO did to Coughlin. The
second point is that there was never an era of good feeling in
American politics, nor for that matter an era when labor
and its liberal allies could comfortably command the
allegiance of a majority of the populace. They have always been
under attack.

The next important point to remember is that the labor
movement, as well as the civil rights movement, achieved
their greatest influence when the Democratic
administration in power perceived the leadership of these social
movements as troublesome, unreliable, and unpredictable allies.
Labor leaders like John L. Lewis of the Mineworkers, Philip
Murray of the Steelworkers, and Walter Reuther of the
Autoworkers were frequently seen by the White House as "going off
the reservation," a phrase I first encountered in the
archives at Hyde Park when I poured through the files of FDR's
public policy staff.

In 1936 John L. Lewis took a half million dollars from
the UMW treasury-real money in those days-and parceled it
out to FDR's reelection effort, but on Labor Day 1937 Lewis
denounced the president for trying just a few months
before to remain neutral during the Little Steel strike, an
industrial war that reached its bloody climax when ten
demonstrators were shot to death by police outside of
the Republic Steel Corporation on Chicago's South Side.
Declaimed Lewis in his rich Shakespearian voice:

Labor, like Israel, has many sorrows. Its women weep for
their fallen and they lament for the future of the
children of the race. It ill behooves one who has supped at
labor's table and who has been sheltered in labor's house to
curse with equal fervor and fine impartiality both labor and
its adversaries when they become locked in deadly embrace.

In 1940 John L. Lewis, by then president of the CIO,
rejected FDR's bid for a third term and supported
Republican Wendell Willkie, because he thought U.S. entry into the
Second World War would lead to the same disastrous
results for labor as involvement in the Great War twenty years
before: right-wing reaction, strike-breaking, and the
destruction of industrial unionism.

John L. Lewis was a difficult and sometimes vain
individual. Did he win friends in the White House? Certainly not!
Did he win respect for the labor movement and policies more to
their liking? Yes, if only because FDR and his advisors
were determined, on the eve of the Second World War, to
ensure that labor would be an ally and that the influence of
Lewis, and the politics he represented, would be effectively
marginalized.

The same was true of Martin Luther King Jr. and the
civil rights leadership in the early 1960s. Like the leaders
of labor during the insurgent 1930s and 1940s, civil rights
leaders were unreliable allies, because the movements
they represented were multifaceted and in many respects
uncontrollable. These ministers, students, and local
activists were loyal first and foremost to the movement
over which they tried to preside.

Although King's canonization today often obscures the
real tensions that existed between his movement and the
administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.
Johnson, King, like John L. Lewis, was indeed a troublesome and
unpredictable ally. When, in the late summer of 1964,
LBJ asked King to suspend demonstrations during the fall
campaign, King was inclined to go along, but he soon
rejected the president's request because he simply did
not have the power or even the moral authority to enforce
such a suspension on a social movement then at flood tide. King
thereby cemented his own leadership and pushed the
president to back with unprecedented vigor one of the nation's
most radical pieces of legislation, the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, which finally consigned a reactionary brand of states
rights to the dustbin of American history.

One other example of this sort: just before May 1, 2006,
Congressional allies of the Latino organizations and
unions that were about to stage a massive "Day Without
Immigrants" march advised organizers to hold off-or at least to have
their march on a Saturday, not a workday, when the event
would be less disruptive. But the organizers, a very
loose-knit coalition, went ahead, and with magnificent
results, which transformed a march into a general strike
and helped solidify a Latino-labor alliance that did much to
engender the massive vote for Barack Obama two years
later.

And now to my final point. The labor movement wins when
it is broad and inclusive, but the expansion comes with its
own dangers. Today, given the dire straits in which the
labor movement finds itself, those risks must be courted. We
know about those risks and rewards from the experience of
social movements in the recent past. The feminist movement
provides a fitting parallel. It has transformed America-but who
are the feminists, and how do you organize them? You don't.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s when that movement took
off, people simply announced that they were part of the
women's liberation movement: there was no test, no membership
card, no dues to pay, no line to follow.

The same was true of the labor movement in the first
third of the twentieth century, before the codification of
labor law and the creation of the administrative apparatus
necessary to enforce it. Under those circumstances there
was plenty of room for a labor movement to define itself in
expansive fashion. Was it an immigrant rights
organization which gave voice to Southern and Eastern Europeans
recently stigmatized by the 1924 immigration restriction law; was
it a movement for industrial democracy, even socialism, in
which middle class people could participate, and even
become leaders; or was it a community mobilization in which
women and all sorts of non-workers of that time could play
major roles?

Those questions remain controversial. In the early 1970s
when the feminist movement pushed at labor's door, many
women unionists began to organize a group which
eventually became the Coalition of Labor Union Women. But would
unaffiliated pro-labor feminists be allowed to join?
This would have added invaluable energy to the new
labor-feminist alliance, but it would also have transformed CLUW into
the kind of grouping that the labor leadership of that era
might not entirely understand, much less control. So George
Meany, who actually remembered similar conflicts stretching all
the way back to the Women's Trade Union League in the 1920s,
decreed that only existing union women could become part
of CLUW. That organization was built, but it lost its links
to the feminist Left.

It is therefore not enough for organized labor to
broaden itself by welcoming new forces into its ranks. It must
also adopt as its own the students and activists who are now
on the outside looking in. It is from those unruly
movements and initiatives that a new generation of activists will
arise. In courting such individuals, labor faces the
unpredictable and the untidy, because the AFL-CIO may
well be held responsible for the actions and rhetoric of
people it does not fully understand or control. But that is a
risk that must be taken if we are to become a social movement
once again.

[Nelson Lichtenstein is MacArthur Foundation Professor
of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara,
where he directs the Center for the Study of Work,
Labor and Democracy. His most recent book is The Retail
Revolution: How Wal-Mart Created a Brave New World of
Business. This article is taken from a talk given at the
AFL-CIO Executive Board Meeting on March 1, 2010.]
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