NY Times June 8, 2012
Lobby E-Mails Show Depth of Obama Ties to Drug Industry
By PETER BAKER

WASHINGTON — After weeks of quiet talks, drug industry lobbyists 
were growing nervous. If they were to cut a deal with the White 
House on overhauling health care, they needed to be sure President 
Obama would stop a proposal by his liberal allies intended to 
bring down medicine prices.

On June 3, 2009, one of the lobbyists e-mailed Nancy-Ann DeParle, 
the president’s top health care adviser. Ms. DeParle sent a 
message back reassuring the lobbyist. Although Mr. Obama was 
overseas, she wrote, she and other top officials had “made 
decision, based on how constructive you guys have been, to oppose 
importation on the bill.”

Just like that, Mr. Obama’s staff abandoned his support for the 
reimportation of prescription medicines at lower prices and with 
it solidified a growing compact with an industry he had vilified 
on the campaign trail the year before. Central to Mr. Obama’s 
drive to overhaul the nation’s health care system was an unlikely 
collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry that forced 
unappealing trade-offs.

The e-mail exchange that day three years ago was among a cache of 
messages obtained from the industry and released in recent weeks 
by House Republicans — including a new batch put out on Friday 
morning detailing the industry’s advertising campaign in favor of 
Mr. Obama’s proposal. The broad contours of the president’s 
dealings with the drug industry were known in 2009 but the newly 
public e-mails open a window into the compromises underlying a 
health care overhaul now awaiting the judgment of the Supreme Court.

Mr. Obama’s deal-making in 2009 represented a pivotal moment in 
his young presidency, a juncture where the heady idealism of the 
campaign trail collided with the messy reality of Washington 
policymaking. A president who had promised to air negotiations on 
C-Span cut a closed-door deal with the powerful pharmaceutical 
lobby, signifying to some disillusioned liberal supporters a loss 
of innocence, or perhaps even the triumph of cynicism.

But if it was a Faustian bargain for the president, it was one he 
deemed necessary to forestall industry opposition that had 
thwarted efforts to cover the uninsured for generations. Without 
the deal, in which the industry agreed to provide $80 billion for 
health reform in exchange for protection from policies that would 
cost more, Mr. Obama and Democratic allies calculated he might get 
nowhere.

“There was no way we had the votes in either the House or the 
Senate if PhRMA was opposed — period,” said a senior Democratic 
official involved in the talks, referring to the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America, the drug industry trade group.

  Republicans see the deal as hypocritical. “He said it was going 
to be the most open and honest and transparent administration ever 
and lobbyists won’t be drafting the bills,” said Representative 
Michael C. Burgess of Texas, one of the Republicans on the House 
Energy and Commerce subcommittee that is examining the deal. “Then 
when it came time, the door closed, the lobbyists came in and the 
bills were written.”

Some of the liberals bothered by the deal-making in 2009 now find 
the Republican criticism hard to take given the party’s 
long-standing ties to the pharmaceutical industry.

“Republicans trumpeting these e-mails is like a fox complaining 
someone else raided the chicken coop,” said Robert Reich, the 
former labor secretary under President Bill Clinton. “Sad to say, 
it’s called politics in an era when big corporations have an 
effective veto over major legislation affecting them and when the 
G.O.P. is usually the beneficiary. In this instance, the G.O.P. 
was outfoxed. Who are they to complain?”

Dan Pfeiffer, the White House communications director, said the 
collaboration with industry was in keeping with the president’s 
promise to build consensus.

“Throughout his campaign, President Obama was clear that he would 
bring every stakeholder to the table in order to pass health 
reform, even longtime opponents like the pharmaceutical industry," 
Mr. Pfeiffer said. "He understood correctly that the unwillingness 
to work with people on both sides of the issue was one of the 
reasons why it took a century to pass health reform.”

  In a statement, PhRMA said that its interactions with Mr. 
Obama’s White House were part of its mission to “ensure patient 
access” to quality medicine and to advance medical progress.

“Before, during and since the health care debate, PhRMA engaged 
with Congress and the administration to advance these priorities,” 
said Matthew Bennett, the group’s senior vice president.

Representative Henry Waxman of California, the top Democrat on the 
House committee and one of those who balked at Mr. Obama’s deal in 
2009, now defends it as traditional Washington lawmaking.

“Presidents have routinely sought the support and lobbying clout 
of private industry in passing major legislation,” Mr. Waxman’s 
committee staff said in a memo released in response to the 
e-mails. “President Obama’s actions, for example, are no different 
than those of President Lyndon B. Johnson in enacting Medicare in 
1965 or President George W. Bush in expanding Medicare to add a 
prescription drug benefit in 2003.”

Still, what distinguishes the Obama-industry deal is that he had 
so strongly rejected that very sort of business as usual. During 
his campaign for president, he specifically singled out the power 
of the pharmaceutical industry and its chief lobbyist, former 
Representative Billy Tauzin, a Democrat-turned-Republican from 
Louisiana, as examples of what he wanted to change.

“The pharmaceutical industry wrote into the prescription drug plan 
that Medicare could not negotiate with drug companies,” Mr. Obama 
said in a campaign advertisement, referring to Mr. Bush’s 2003 
legislation. “And you know what? The chairman of the committee who 
pushed the law through went to work for the pharmaceutical 
industry making $2 million a year.

“Imagine that,” Mr. Obama continued. “That’s an example of the 
same old game playing in Washington. You know, I don’t want to 
learn how to play the game better. I want to put an end to the 
game playing.”

After arriving at the White House, though, he and his advisers 
soon determined that one reason Mr. Clinton had failed to pass 
health care reform was the resilient opposition of industry. Led 
by Rahm Emanuel, his chief of staff and a former House leader, and 
Jim Messina, his deputy, White House officials set out to change 
that dynamic.

The e-mails, which the House committee obtained from PhRMA and 
other groups after the White House declined to provide 
correspondence, document a tumultuous negotiation, at times 
transactional, at others prickly. Each side suspected the other of 
betraying trust and operating in bad faith.

The White House depicted in the message traffic comes across as 
deeply involved in the give-and-take, and not averse to pressure 
tactics, including having Mr. Obama publicly assail the industry 
unless it gave in on key points. In the end, the White House got 
the support it needed to pass its broader priority, but industry 
emerged satisfied as well. “We got a good deal,” wrote Bryant 
Hall, then senior vice president of the pharmaceutical group.

Mr. Bryant, now head of his own firm, declined to comment. So did 
Mr. Emanuel, now mayor of Chicago; Mr. Messina, now the 
president’s campaign manager; and Ms. DeParle, now a White House 
deputy chief of staff. Mr. Tauzin, who has left his post as the 
industry’s lobbyist, did not respond to messages.

The latest e-mails released on Friday underscore the detailed 
discussions the two sides had about an advertising campaign 
supporting Mr. Obama’s health overhaul.“They plan to hit up the 
‘bad guys’ for most of the $,” a union official wrote after an 
April meeting with Mr. Messina and Senate Democratic aides. “They 
want us to just put in enough to be able to put our names in it — 
he is thinking @100K.”

In July, the White House made clear that it wanted supportive ads 
using the same characters the industry used to defeat Mr. 
Clinton’s proposal 15 years earlier. “Rahm asked for Harry and 
Louise ads thru third party,” Mr. Hall wrote.

Industry and Democratic officials said privately that the 
advertising campaign was an outgrowth of the fundamental deal, not 
the goal of it. The industry traditionally advertises in favor of 
legislation it supports.

Either way, talks came close to breaking down several times. In 
May, the White House was upset that the industry had not signed 
onto a joint statement. One industry official wrote that they 
should sign: “Rahm is already furious. The ire will be turned on us.”

By June, it came to a head again. “Barack Obama is going to 
announce in his Saturday radio address support for rebating all of 
D unless we come to a deal,” Mr. Hall wrote, referring to a change 
in Medicare Part D that would cost the industry.

In the end, the two sides averted the public confrontation and 
negotiated down to $80 billion from $100 billion.   But the 
industry believed the White House was rushing an announcement to 
deflect political criticism.

“It’s pretty clear that the administration has had a horrible week 
on health care reform, and we are now getting jammed to make this 
announcement so the story takes a positive turn before the Sunday 
talk shows beat up on Congress and the White House,” wrote Ken 
Johnson, a senior vice president of the pharmaceutical organization.

In the end, House Democrats imposed some additional costs on the 
industry that by one estimate pushed the cost above $100 billion, 
but the more sweeping policies the firms wanted to avoid remained 
out of the legislation. Mr. Obama signed the bill in March. He had 
the victory he wanted.
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