Julio Huato wrote:
> Jim wrote that GDP is "a measure of exchange value," while "Strictly
> speaking, it's impossible to measure use value".
>
> *This* treats use value and exchange value as two disjoint categories,
> *because* -- I insist -- value is the *social* form of that *material*
> entity we call (noun) use value or useful object. As a result, there
> is absolutely *no* way to measure value except by measuring use value.
> And there is absolutely *no* way to measure use value except by
> measuring value (or its correlate under social conditions other than
> commodity production). ...
That _totally_ agrees with what I said: that is, there is absolutely
no way to measure use-values (and add them up) except to measure their
values. However, what you get is a sum of values and _not_ a sum of
use-values. It's a sum of money, not a sum of "utility."
That is, I agreed that we can add up values or exchange values. But
how do you measure use-values so that they can be added up, as
use-values but not values? My elementary school teacher said: five
pounds of apples plus ten five of oranges equals what? my sassy
response was of course "15 pounds of fruit." But what if your economy
also produces 50 pounds of uranium and 20 hours of hair-cuts? how are
those added in? Even if we throw out the service sector (which we
shouldn't do), 15 pounds of fruit plus 50 pounds of uranium is 65
pounds of what? stuff? That is what I meant by saying that use-values
can't be measured and then added up. There is no such thing as
"stuff" than means anything. We can't say that 50 pounds of uranium
has more use-value than 15 pounds of fruit.
Later, I learned the economists' trick of adding apples, oranges, etc.
by attaching prices to them before aggregating (and then correcting
for inflation). It's only neoclassical economists who see the
aggregate as a measure of utility or use-value.
A historical reference: as Robinson and the Cantabrigians pointed out
years ago (until it was promptly forgotten), you can't add up
different distinct concrete kinds of capital goods to measure an
aggregate "stock of capital," which is then treated as if it were a
collection of a homogeneous kind of use-value. Instead, you can only
add up the prices of the capital goods (price*quantity). There is no
common unit ("leets") that is used to measure all of the concrete
means of production that can be added up. The only common unit is the
currency unit used in pricing, which depends on how society values the
different types of means of production.
> To connect with your way of putting things, say value is the SNLT
> required to reproduce a commodity (e.g. a basket of apples). How do
> you measure SNLT if not by measuring concrete, specific applications
> of the productive force of labor (labor power, yes Sir)? What is a
> concrete labor process if not the "use value" of the "labor power" of
> particular individual workers?
Value or SNALT represents the shared characteristic of goods and
services (use-values) that are produced for sale (i.e., are
commodities). As I noted, you can add up values even though we can't
add pounds of fruit to hours of hair-cuts, since value can always be
measured in the same unit. Adding up values does NOT produce a measure
of use-value but rather the amount of what Nathan Tankus calls
"financial flows" to buy the use-values. As mentioned, there are a lot
of non-market benefits of commodities that do not have values attached
to them. So a lot of the multidimensional _quality_ that characterizes
a use-value is missed if we calculate a unidimensional aggregate of
financial flows.
Again, "labor power" (workers' ability to do work, their personal
capacities) is _not_ the same as the "productive power of labor"
(which as far as I can tell can only mean labor-power's productivity).
The first is a measure of how much time is dedicated to work (under
the capitalist's thumb) while the latter is the amount of output this
is produced by a given amount of labor-power.[*] For a specific type
of concrete labor-power that's producing one single kind of use-value,
one can calculate labor productivity as the number of the specific
type of use-value that's produced per hour of labor-power hired (e.g.,
apples per hour). This is concrete or use-value productivity. But if
we have a variety of different use-values being produced, we can only
add up (the per-unit value of item A)*(the number of A produced) +
(the per-unit value of item B)*(the number of B produced) + etc. That
aggregate of value is not an aggregate of use-value. It's an aggregate
of value. The "labor-power productivity" is _value_ productivity.
Years ago, Fogel and Engerman (two wacky economic historians)
purported to measure productivity in order to claim that slave labor
was more effective than free labor in the antebellum US economy. Maybe
they were right, since the slaves clearly worked harder. But their
calculation was bogus because it addressed a completely different
question. The slave's productivity was measured basically as cotton
(and other slave-produced crops) produced per worker, while the free
workers' productivity was measured as corn (and other freely-produced
crops) produced per worker. As is blatantly obvious if we leave out
other crops besides cotton and corn, these two numbers cannot be
compared, since they are in different units.
So F&E followed the usual economist's trick, to add up use-values
using prices and to then correct for the effects for inflation. This
meant that the productivities of the two sets of producers could be
compared, because they were both in (inflation-corrected) dollars per
worker. The problem with F&E's conclusion about the greater
productivity of the slaves was that it reflected the temporarily high
relative price of cotton at the time. Following F&E's style of
calculation, when the relative price of cotton fell, the slaves would
suddenly become "less productive."
Less productive of _value_, yes, but that's not the same as less
productive of use-value. It's productivity of use-value (the
effectiveness of labor) that was what F&E were trying to describe.
> And how do you measure the concrete labor of Peter, one individual
> worker picking apples from a tree today, so the measure is made
> comparable with the concrete labor of the same Peter doing the same or
> other task yesterday, or of Sam, another individual worker doing the
> same task or some other, similarly necessary to produce the said
> basket of apples? Where do you get your weights from, the weights
> with which your form your "expectation" or "index" or "average" or
> whatever you wish to call it? I'll tell you where from: you introduce
> value weights or something akin to value weights. And so you should.
Of course, I wasn't saying anything different. However, in practice
(in measuring "labor productivity") each hour of production
labor-power is treated as equal to every other hour of production
labor-power in order to calculate output/hour. Strictly speaking, we
shouldn't do that, but we don't have much choice.
Part of the problem is that the individual productivities of different
workers are interdependent because they work together. Thus, we can
only measure the average productivity of a specific workplace. Even
then we can't really measure their "productivity" unless they produce
commodities, so their products are valued by society. (In theory, we
could get a good approximation of value productivity of
non-commodities if there are similar products on the market, however.)
> Yes, value is the social form that useful objects (use values, the
> noun) take under specific social conditions. Or if you do not wish to
> call it value, call it whatever you wish to call it; it will
> correspond to the common notion of value. The portions of Capital you
> quote make precisely the point that the reason why value exists, a
> social form attached to use values (the noun), is not some physical
> property of these things, but specific social conditions (private
> ownership, etc.).
I don't see why this is relevant.
> You don't see Marx saying that use values can be aggregated into a
> single number,
and I agree with him on that.
> but Marx does this aggregation himself in his various
> examples (as he did throughout his life), as you or I or everybody
> else does and must do. A basket of apples is an aggregation.
gosh, I hadn't thought of that!
> Producing one single apple, or just the act of picking it from a tree
> and placing it in the basket, is *qualitatively* different from
> picking another apple from the same or another tree and placing it in
> the same or in a different basket. Is it legit to speak of a
> "concrete" labor productive of apples or you can only accept a vector
> of size n to refer to the n different qualitative tasks that must be
> performed to produce the apples? Can you see that the labor that
> produces a single apple is in fact the aggregation of a very complex
> series of concrete qualitatively different tasks?
of course. So much is obvious.
> E.g., (1) get a
> ladder, (2) lean the ladder on the tree, (3) climb the ladder, (4)
> stretch the arm making sure you don't fall, (5) pick the apple, (6)
> place it in basket, (7) climb down the ladder or grab another apple,
> etc. How do you do aggregate these very different steps without
> weighting them? Can you see that these different tasks can, in turn,
> be decomposed into simpler and more elementary actions on the basis of
> their distinctive qualities? How do you determine your weights? So,
> how can you say that Marx never tried to "add" or average use values?
I'd say that he didn't add different types of labor (picking apples,
climbing down the ladder, etc.) as much as he used _capitalism's own
standards_, i.e., values to "weight" and add up the different concrete
labors. (That's why "skilled" labor can be reduced to "unskilled"
labor.)
However, as far as I can tell, he only added up different concrete
labors that produced commodities. It's only the (non-quantitative)
aggregate of labor in the apple orchard that counts (assuming that the
apples are sold), since the individual types of that Julio lists are
not "directly social" and valued by society. They only become "social"
and have values attached to them when the apples are sold.
> What was his department 1 and department 2 in volume 2 of Capital if
> not a reference to aggregate use values that, in closer scrutiny, are
> incredibly heterogeneous?
When Marx talks about these "departments" he is talking about the
_value_ of output of two sectors that produce two distinct types of
use-values. He never sees the quantity of output produced by the two
departments as being measured in the same units. Rather, it's
price*quantity of the two departments that's measured in the same
units. When Marx sets V1 + S1 equal to C2 (for simple reproduction) he
is not equating the use-value of goods associated with variable
capital in sector 1 plus the surplus-value of goods associated with
surplus-value in that sector equal to the use-value of constant
capital in sector 2. Rather, it's "financial flows": the value of
"value added" in sector 1 = the value of constant capital used in
sector 2.
Yes, if we apply any thought at all, it's obvious that those two
"departments" involve incredible heterogeneity. But that means that
we're talking about the sum of price*quantity for many types of
capital good (produced in department 1) and the sum of price*quantity
for many types of means of subsistence (produced in department 2). The
only way that these aggregates can be compared is as sums of value (or
of price). They can't be compared as "tons" of means of production and
"tons" of means of subsistence.
> All that said, let me note that measuring use value (adjective, i.e.
> the usefulness of particular objects) is not the same as measuring use
> values (noun). It is an observable fact that no society can reproduce
> itself without *measuring* use value (adjective), which can be done
> (very roughly) by measuring use values and then taking actions on the
> basis of how one feels about these quantities of use values (noun).
> There are, of course, more refined ways of doing this. In any case,
> we do it. We all do it. We must do it. Otherwise how would we lead
> our lives, make our choices, take our actions, which insofar as we act
> humanly are purposive?
In other words, we measure the utility of goods and service the way
that neoclassical economics describes? even if we do (and the
description seems tautological), that doesn't mean we can _add_ up
what item X is worth to me and what item Y is worth to you.
> Of course, each individual decides (by action or omission) on how
> important things are to and for her. These individual actions are
> validated socially. How? Why? Because each individual takes these
> actions in a social context, in interaction with other individuals.
> This validation is precisely the process of social formation, of
> formation of social structures -- e.g. of value as a socially
> objective structure (or relation of production). The social valuation
> of commodities is only one elementary and abstract part of a more
> complex and concrete process of social formation. The formation of
> political power or, disaggregated a little, of government "policies"
> (which are truly not that different from other legal contracts, such
> as financial securities) is another such process, which interacts with
> the process of social valuation.
Ignoring the political valuation bit, are you saying that markets
attach prices to different commodities that reflects the utility
(subjective value) they provide to their buyers? so what else is new?
Marx knew that all commodities had to be use-values (or have
use-value) since otherwise people wouldn't buy them. However, goods
and services have external costs and benefits, which means that there
are use-values which do not have prices attached (except as
theoretical estimates). Also, I attach a different subjective value
to any commodity than someone else does.
> The productive force of labor is a "stock" in that it is something
> defined to exist at a point in time.
if so, then I haven't the slightest idea of what you mean by the
"productive force of labor." You're using the language differently
from what I've seen in the past.
> Labor, as an activity defined as
> taking place over a period of time, is a "flow."
right.
> You say, but labor
> productivity (the power to produce of a particular kind of productive
> wealth, such as "labor power") is measured as the ratio of a flow to
> another flow (or to some stock). Indeed, how else do we measure
> stocks, but by their ability to to emit flows? How do we measure a
> power or force but by what it can generate or produce over time?
This is confusing. I guess there's a language problem here. In Marx,
"labor power" refers to a human capacity, the ability to work (which
is leased out to the boss for a limited time period). The "power of
labor" is something quite different, something like "labor
productivity." Labor power is not the same as the power of labor.
> I'm being a bit of a Hegelian, as Marx was, in my use of the terms
> "productive forces" (or powers), "productive force (or power) of
> labor," and "labor power" (in the narrower sense).
See above. I thought Marx used Hegel in an effort to clarify his
thinking. The Hegelianism above seems to muddy matters instead.
> Because: What are
> the forces of production if not the forces of *labor*, whether
> "objectified" or "living" labor powers?
That sounds reasonable, though I would define "forces of production"
in terms of the natural/technological relationship between people and
physical inputs and outputs, as opposed to the "relations of
production" which is defined by institutional relationships among and
between people. I don't see the relevance of "forces of production"
here, however. How does this help us add up use-values without getting
an aggregate of value instead?
> I am sure that Marx used
> these (and other) closely related terms with full consciousness of
> these implications. But that's neither here not there. We need to
> think about terms, etc. in ways that make sense to us. Think of your
> power to undertake a given particular action, e.g. your power to walk
> or talk? Is it a flow or a stock? Think of your actual action or
> sequence of actions (the activity of walking or talking). Is it a
> flow or a stock? How do you measure your power to walk or talk if not
> by measuring your walking or talking activity and comparing it to
> something else (the length walked in a day, the number of people
> persuaded by your talk, etc.)?
An activity is a flow while a capability is a stock. For example, my
walking is a flow (a process happening over time) while my ability to
walk can be seen as a stock magnitude (or a collection of stocks).
However I cannot _add_ my walking to your walking or my breathing to
get some single number (a flow magnitude) unless by some miracle each
of these two activities has a price or value. Similarly, I cannot add
my ability to walk to my ability to throw a ball to get a single
number (a stock magnitude) unless somehow these capacities have prices
or values attached to them.
> Value is a measure of labor productivity. ...
Value isn't a measure of concrete labor productivity, e.g., apples
picked per hour, since value depends on the process of society's
valuation of apples. Value is instead one aspect of the value
productivity of labor (i.e., (value per apple)*(apples per hour)).
--
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your
own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
[*] The productivity of labor-power is what's usually called the
"productivity of labor," confusing people (including me). For a
specific type of concreted labor-power, the "productivity of
labor(power)" equals (use-values produced per ounce of labor
done)*(the number of ounces of labor done per hour of labor-power
hired) which equals (the effectiveness of labor)*(the intensity of
labor). The "effectiveness of labor" is what people usually think
we're referring to when we refer to the "productivity of
labor(power)."
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