Are the material facts of "demand management" cause or effect of mass de-mobilization? By "material facts" I mean, for example, a lower unemployment rate, an ensuing reconfiguration of wealth/political power (as well as other concomitant details covered under the aggregated measures), as induced by fiscal or monetary policy measures.
It seems to me that, in principle, the answer is both, which begs the question of the specific circumstances under which they may reinforce mass activity rather than dim it? Again, in my mind, this goes back to the question of "party building," which -- unfortunately -- pushes all the wrong buttons among a lot of leftists. So, replace if you will the word "party" (or, worse, "vanguard") with the phrase "political formation," "institutional infrastructure of left-wing politics," or you name it. I've repeatedly gone back to the old texts that (I felt) used to shed light on the issue (Marx/Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, Gramsci), and I find them increasingly insufficient. Lars Lih's exercise of situation old discussions in detailed historical context may relativize things a bit too much, but the risk of generalization is certainly high. So I wish I could be comfortable saying that the concrete answers will come from the concrete struggles people will face. I guess, but that underplays the importance of theory, learning from history, etc.
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