In 2000, economist Steven Levitt and sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh 
published an article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics about the 
internal wage structure of a Chicago drug gang. This piece would later 
serve as a basis for a chapter in Levitt’s (and Dubner’s) best seller 
Freakonomics. [1] The title of the chapter, “Why drug dealers still live 
with their moms”, was based on the finding that the income distribution 
within gangs was extremely skewed in favor  of those at the top, while 
the rank-and-file street sellers earned even less than employees in 
legitimate low-skilled activities, let’s say at McDonald’s. They 
calculated 3.30 dollars as the hourly rate, that is, well below a living 
wage (that’s why they still live with their moms). [2]

If you take into account the risk of being shot by rival gangs, ending 
up in jail or being beaten up by your own hierarchy, you might wonder 
why anybody would work for such a low wage and at such dreadful working 
conditions instead of seeking employment at Mc Donalds. Yet, gangs have 
no real difficulty in recruiting new members. The reason for this is 
that the prospect of future wealth, rather than current income and 
working conditions, is the main driver for people to stay in the 
business: low-level drug sellers forgo current income for (uncertain) 
future wealth. Rank-and file members are ready to face this risk to try 
to make it to the top, where life is good and money is flowing. It is 
very unlikely that they will make it (their mortality rate is insanely 
high, by the way) but they’re ready to “get rich or die trying”.

With a constant supply of new low-level drug sellers entering the market 
and ready to be exploited, drug lords can become increasingly rich 
without needing to distribute their wealth towards the bottom. You have 
an expanding mass of rank-and-file “outsiders” ready to forgo income for 
future wealth, and a small core of “insiders”  securing incomes largely 
at the expense of the mass. We can call it a winner-take-all market.

Academia as a Dual Labour Market

The academic job market is structured in many respects like a drug gang, 
with an expanding mass of outsiders and a shrinking core  of insiders. 
Even if the probability that you might get shot in academia is 
relatively small (unless you mark student papers very harshly), one can 
observe similar dynamics. Academia is only a somewhat extreme example of 
this trend, but it affects labour markets virtually everywhere. One of 
the hot topics in labour market research at the moment is what we call 
“dualisation”[3]. Dualisation is the strengthening of this divide 
between insiders in secure, stable employment and outsiders in 
fixed-term, precarious employment. Academic systems more or less 
everywhere rely at least to some extent on the existence of a supply of 
“outsiders” ready to forgo wages and employment security in exchange for 
the prospect of uncertain security, prestige, freedom and reasonably 
high salaries that tenured positions entail[4].

full: 
http://alexandreafonso.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/how-academia-resembles-a-drug-gang/
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