(John Ross was a central leader of the Trotskyist International Marxist Group 
in Britain, later a key economic advisor to London mayor Ken Livingstone, and 
currently teaches at Renmin University in Beijing.)

Why China won't suffer a Western type financial crisis
By John Ross
Key trends in globalization
July 23 2014

Inaccurate articles sometimes appear claiming China faces a "severe debt 
crisis." Factually these are easily refuted. Changyong Rhee, the IMF's Asia and 
Pacific Department director, pointed out that China's national and local 
government debt is only 53% of its GDP, compared to U.S. government debt which 
is roughly as big as GDP, or in Japan where government debt is 240% GDP. 
Foreign debt is 9% of China's GDP – insignificant set against the world's 
largest foreign exchange reserves.
Factually, it is therefore unsurprising that China's predicted "Lehman" or 
"Minsky" moment, a financial collapse, invariably fails to occur. But there is 
another, even more fundamental, reason why China's economy does not suffer 
severe financial crises of the type that struck the Western economies in 2008 
or wracked the Eurozone. As this illustrates a way that China's economic 
structure is superior to the West's, it is worth analyzing.

Starting with fundamentals, the way the argument is constructed that China 
faces a "serious debt crisis" violates the most elementary accounting rule – 
more precisely that of double entry book keeping, which was invented in Italy 
"merely" eight centuries ago! This is that for every debit entry there has to 
be a credit one, and vice versa. Discussion of only of one side of a balance 
sheet without the other is financial nonsense. Claims, such as in the Financial 
Times, that the big story of 2014 is "the black cloud of debt hanging over 
China" are financially meaningless given they do not discuss assets to be set 
against debt.

To illustrate this elementary accounting principle, take a simple example. A 
company borrows $100 million at 5% interest, uses it to build houses, and sells 
them at 15% profit. To declare "there is a crisis – the company has a $100 
million debt" is evidently nonsense. The company has debts of $100 million but 
assets of $115 million. It can repay $105 million and make $10 million profit – 
there is no "debt crisis" whatever. That its assets are greater than its debt 
illustrates why it is financially illiterate to discuss only debt without 
assets. A "balance sheet" is called that because it has two sides, not one.

Apply this to China and the West's financial systems. Evidently no financial 
problem exists in either if a borrower makes a profit on a loan – they repay 
it. A problem only exists if the borrower does not make sufficient money to 
repay the debt.

If the borrower is a small or medium one, again there is no difference between 
Western and Chinese financial systems. In both cases the borrower partially or 
fully defaults and, if necessary, goes bankrupt.

Specific criticisms can be made, which this author would tend to agree with, 
that in the West's system companies are sometimes too easily allowed to use 
bankruptcy to escape debts, and China has propped up some companies that would 
have been better allowed to go bankrupt. But these are detailed points, not 
affecting the essence of the matter. China is also now taking a more robust 
line in forcing into default small and medium borrowers that cannot repay loans 
– recently Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science and Technology defaulted 
without a bail out.

But, by definition, individual bankruptcies by small and medium companies do 
not affect the financial system's viability – they are a normal part of market 
functioning. The key difference between China's and the Western financial 
system comes with debts by large institutions – "system making" ones to use 
technical economic terms. Here Western and China's systems differ – and China's 
is superior.

First take Western government debt. As Western governments ideologically oppose 
state investment, Western state borrowing is overwhelmingly used not to finance 
investment but consumption – via social security payments, unemployment pay 
etc. For example, in the United States at the depth of the post 2008 Great 
Recession, annual government borrowing was 13.6 percent of GDP but state 
investment was only 4.5 percent – borrowing overwhelmingly financed 
consumption. As Western government debt primarily finances consumption it 
therefore creates no lasting asset. That is why in the West it is not wholly 
misleading to look at state borrowing purely from the debt point of view – even 
if it is wrong conceptually.

China is different. The bulk of borrowing, particularly by local government, is 
for investment, primarily in infrastructure. Borrowing therefore creates 
lasting assets – roads, subways, housing etc. Assets in turn create revenue 
streams directly, indirectly, or both. Direct revenues are fares, rents, tolls, 
etc. Indirect revenues are generated as infrastructure investment aids economic 
growth, yielding taxes, and has well-known effects in raising land values – 
land sales being one of Chinese local government's biggest sources of income.

As China's government debt is used for investment, not consumption, analysis 
not financially offsetting debt by assets created by them is not merely wrong 
formally but is therefore a serious factual mistake. Similarly, company 
borrowing is primarily used for investment, i.e. asset creation.

This leads to a final difference between China's and the West's financial 
system. In both Western and China's financial systems, if the value of an asset 
created by borrowing equals at least the value of the debt, there is evidently 
no problem. The difference between the two comes with bad investments – where 
the value of the asset created does not equal the borrowing.

A major financial crisis occurs when there are large scale bad investments by 
"system making" institutions, those that are "too big to fail" – this need not 
be a single bad investment but can be very large numbers of small bad 
investments, as with the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis. In these cases, in 
both the West and China, only the state has the resources to solve the problem. 
But the way the state intervenes is entirely different in China and in the West.

In the West, the financial system is fragmented – individual institutions are 
financially separate. As there is no unified financial system, the necessary 
transfer of resources from the state, to prevent collapse of "system making" 
institutions, is therefore external and chaotic. For example, following 
Lehman's collapse, essentially every private Western bank had to be salvaged by 
government subsidies, direct nationalization etc. The same occurred with GM and 
Chrysler. In Greece, the EU and IMF ordered partial bond defaults, bailout 
packages etc. The transfer of resources from the state, and in some cases 
private bond holders, was via chaotic "crisis" means – the "Lehman moment."

Basic laws of economics cannot be avoided, so if in China a substantial number 
of bad loans occur, as with banks in the 1990s, the state also has to transfer 
resources. But in China the core of the financial system is not fragmented, but 
is a single integrated whole constituting central government, local 
governments, state banks, and large state owned companies. Resources are 
therefore not transferred by chaotic crisis, as in the West, but within this 
integrated financial system. China's financial system could be conceptualized 
by the analogy of a single person transferring money from one bank account to 
another – for example from the central government to bail out local 
governments. Or, if you want to put it more popularly, it is as though money is 
transferred from one pocket to another.

A transfer of resources from the state therefore takes place in China, as in 
the West, but in an orderly and not a chaotic fashion. That is why China never 
has a "Lehman moment" or a "Minsky moment," a large scale financial crisis – 
the superiority of China's financial system to the West precludes it happening.

To avoid misunderstandings, this does not mean that if large scale bad 
investments are made in China this does not create problems. If, for example, a 
bad railway investment is made which fails to generate adequate users, the 
resources transferred within the system to bail it out means these resources 
are not available to build a railway which is required. But the problem 
therefore does appear in the form of systemic financial crisis, which does not 
occur for reasons outlined, but in the form of the economy's overall investment 
efficiency declining as resources are sucked into inefficient ventures at the 
expense of efficient ones.

The data on this latter process is clear. Every major economy suffered a 
decline in investment efficiency as a result of the international financial 
crisis. Taking the five years after the financial crisis began, the percentage 
of GDP that had to be invested in China for its economy to grow by 1% rose from 
3.4% to 4.9% – China's investment efficiency worsened under the impact of the 
global financial crisis. But in the United States the percentage of GDP that 
had to be invested for the economy to grow by 1% rose from 8.1% to 33.1%! In 
other words, China came through the negative consequences of the international 
financial crisis much more successfully than the United States.

Because they ignore elementary accounting rules, those writing that China will 
suffer a severe "debt crisis" are writing financial fairy stories – which is 
why, as with all such tales, they never actually occur.

http://ablog.typepad.com/keytrendsinglobalisation/2014/07/why-china-wont-suffer-a-western-type-financial-crisis.html

(A slightly longer version of this article originally appeared in Chinese at 
Sina Financeand this English version, under a different title, was originally 
published atChina.org.cn .)


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