In the initial few days after Syriza took office, there was a sense that 
this would be a different kind of government since both its words and 
deeds appeared to be a break from the past. Alexis Tsipras announced 
that privatization of the Piraeus port would be halted and that the 
minimum wage would be restored, while Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis 
spoke of challenging austerity up and down the line.

But when Syriza sat down with the EU kapos, reality came as a slap in 
the face as it would appear from its willingness to accede to a 
continuation of business as usual. Was there going to be any difference 
between Syriza and PASOK? Its left critics, from the KKE to Antarsya, 
now seemed vindicated.

Apparently, Yanis Varoufakis has furnished Greece’s overlords with a 
5-page “reform” proposal that includes the minimum wage hike, something 
that will undoubtedly irk the Germans. Varoufakis claims that if the 
proposal is refused, the deal will be “dead and buried”. We will 
obviously find out more later on.

In their readiness to characterize Syriza as PASOK redux, the left seems 
to have suffered a short-term memory loss. When PASOK’s Costas Simitis 
took office in 1996 with about the same percentage of the vote that 
Syriza just received, he moved rapidly to implement a “modernization” 
program that would be crowned by entry into the Eurozone. Marxist 
economist Stavros Mavroudeas outlined PASOK’s program as follows in 
“Greece and the EU: capitalist crisis and imperialist rivalries”:

        The economic policies of the Simitis governments of PASOK hold a 
special place in this canvas of neo-liberal restructuring. With its 
religious adherence to the EMU requirements and rules it expanded and 
deepened furthermore the neoliberal policies. In order to achieve 
entrance to the EMU it instituted austerity at the expense of labour as 
wage costs had lag behind productivity increases. It repeatedly and 
systematically reformed labour law in the direction of deregulation and 
flexibility (introduction of part-time, extended part-time 
‘arrangements’ of working time, private firms hiring and lending 
workers, weakening of collective bargaining etc.). It expanded 
privatisation programmes and also provided even more space within the 
Greek economy to foreign capitals. It reformed the welfare system 
curtailing benefits even though it failed – due to strong strike action 
– to proceed even further. Finally, it facilitated actively two major 
one-off acts of income redistribution from the working and middle 
classes to capital. The first was the so-called ‘stock-exchange theft’ 
in which savings from the popular and middle classes were systematically 
driven by 12 government’s economic policy to a stock market bubble.

In other word, with no pressure at all be applied on PASOK from German 
bankers, it plunged ahead with an economic program that would eventually 
turn into the disaster of the past five years at least. PASOK was 
ideologically disposed to neoliberalism. It, like Tony Blair’s Labour 
Party, believed that Greece could move forward through an application of 
free market economics that had been embraced by liberals and 
conservatives alike. In the mid-90s, both Jeffrey Sachs and Milton 
Friedman preached the benefits of deregulation, privatization, reduction 
in government spending, trade agreements such as the WTO, and all the rest.

full: 
http://louisproyect.org/2015/02/23/sometimes-the-boss-is-much-stronger/
_______________________________________________
pen-l mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l

Reply via email to