Logic -- modern mathematical logic, descending from Frege -- is not psychological and does not pretend to be. It is a branch of mathematics. Aristotle's syllogistic has been wholly absorbed into a part of math logic -- the predicate calculus (not to be confused with differential and integral calculus!). The subject matter of math logic, and within its more limited scope the syllogistic, is which forms of arguments are valid -- that is, given a content-free representation of the premises, which forms of conclusions follow. A simple example:
If p then q p So q (This is a bit of propositional calculus called, traditionally, modus ponens.) If Hegel's Logik -- no relation to either modern math logic or the Aristotlean syllogistic -- is psychological, it is not a matter of individual psychology. Hegel has some interesting things to say about philosophy of mind on an individual basis, but these are mostly incidental. If there is a"psychology" in the Logik, it is the psychology of Geist, Spirit, which is sort of the mind of a supra-human being that is embodied in the form of life of a whole culture. The Logik is really what modern philosophers call metaphysics, about substantive concepts like being and nonbeing, substance and accident, and the like. It only confuses things to think that Hegel was trying to do badly what Kant or Frege was doing well in thinking abour logic -- that is the mathematical theory of formal validity. Hegel was instead doing, possibly well, what Leibniz and Spinoza were doing when they were thinking about the ultimate structure of reality abstractly described. Hegel, btw, doesn't think that whatever is, is rational in the sense that everything is always hunky dory and this is always the best of all possible worlds. He's not Leibniz, and he's intensely aware of the Voltairean criticisms of that sort of Panglossian foolishness. The least charitable reading of the real = rational idea is that after a long period of history in which the real wasn't rational, we have reached the point where it finally is and history can stop now. Marx and the Young (left) Hegelians took Hegel, or the old (right) Hegelians to be saying something like that. A more charitable reading is that the real is _intelligible_, that we with the equipment of the Logik we can make sense out of whatever is real, without necessarily thinking it is perfect. --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Charles B writes: > > An aspect of this issue is the sense in which > dialectics > > is a logic. > > What would we think if all natural and historical > > theories/practices were > > 'logical' ? In the sense of the formal logic of > Aristotle and > > I.M. Copi. > > Would we think that formal logic is so 'elastic' > that it cannot be > > 'falsified' ? No , we would expect a certain > pervasiveness of > > formal logic > > ,and so with dialectics. > > Hegel called dialectics a "logic," while many > Marxists have followed this lead. I wouldn't call > it a logic in the same sense as formal > (Aristotelian, deductive) logic. Alternatively, if > dialectics is (are?) a logic, it's qualitatively > different from formal logic. However, you're right > that just like formal logic, dialectics can't be > falsified. > > For Hegel, the real was rational and vice-versa, so > that there was a correspondence between mental > states (dialectical "logic") and empirical reality > -- or at least there would be if we worked hard > enough at improving our dialectical conceptions. > > On the other hand, as far as I understand Marx, the > real world isn't rational. Not only are there are > contradictions in the world, but our mental states > don't correspond to the heterogeneous and messy > reality. You can't simply go from dialectical > formulas to getting conclusions about the real > world. To the extent that the dialectics describe > the actual laws of motion of the empirical world, > it's a first approximation. The world operates _as > if_ there were a dialectical process going on. In > CAPITAL, for example, Marx tried to describe the > laws of motion of capital, but this never was seen > as describing the actual world of capitalism except > at a high level of abstraction. He assumed, for > example, that the working class was almost > completely passive in its response to the > depredations of capital (cf. Lebowitz's book, BEYOND > CAPITAL). The empirical world doesn't fit this > assumption (unless the working class has been pretty > much atomized, as in the US). > > For Marx, I would guess, the reality would be > rational only when communism was established. But > that's another story. > > JD > __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - Helps protect you from nasty viruses. http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail
